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T
his study analyzes in detail for the first time the
mutual influence between Mexico and Mexican
communities in the United States. It surveys and
incorporates what work has been done in this area,
but relies most heavily on field research, including
dozens of interviews with leaders, officials, and other individu-
als on both sides of the border. It concludes that there have
been substantial efforts by the Mexican government in recent
years to influence the opinion and activities of Mexican-origin
communities in the United States, but they have been of limit-
ed scope and success. Conversely, voluntary associations and
private activities by Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans—
that is, Americans of Mexican ethnicity born in the U.S. and in
M e x i c o, re s p e c t i ve ly — a re having substantial influence on
domestic activities in Mexico.
The mutual influence discussed in this study takes place
against a background of change, as Chapter 1 explains. The
Mexican government’s policy of acercamiento(getting closer or
rapprochement) with what it calls “Mexican communities
abroad” represents a sharp shift from earlier, decidedly nonin-
terventionist principles. There have been not only political
changes—on both sides of the border—but important techno-
logical ones as well.
In February 1990, the Mexican government launched its
“Program for Mexican Communities Abroad” (the PCME).As
discussed in Chapter 2,it had four objectives: (1) to respond to
complaints of Mexican-American and Mexican organizations
in the U.S. that Mexico was neglecting its U.S. compatriots; (2)
to create a political lobby; (3) to assist Mexican immigrants
subject to abuse and exploitation in the U.S.;and (4) to improve
the image of Mexican immigrants in Mexico and to remove the
abuses they suffered there. Mexico has also expanded and
upgraded its consulates in the United States and opened more
than two dozen cultural institutes.Mexico ’s new activism in the
U.S. included lobbying for NAFTA, taking a public stand
against Californ i a’s Pro p o s i t i on 187, and amending the
Mexican constitution to permit Mexican immigrants to retain
their nationality after becoming U.S. citizens. In the past
decade, Mexico has courted the major Mexican-American and
Latino organizations while Mexican presidents and state gov-
ernors have pushed U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans to
the top of their agendas. Mexican-born immigrants—and,
s p e c i f i ca lly, their hom e t own associations (HTA s ) — w o u l d
absorb much of the attention of the PCME’s programs.
Chapter 3 discusses these hometown associations; it is the
heart of the book and, therefore, will make up the bulk of this
executive summary. Mexicans, like other immigrants, tend to
locate where relatives, friends, and neighbors reside.There is a
marked hometown character to immigration, because emi-
grants from one community will settle in a single particular
location in the U.S. Migrants enable their friends and relatives
to follow them by furnishing information, job tips, and hous-
ing, making migration “a network-driven process.”Hundreds if
not thousands of Mexican hometown associations have sprung
from such networks. HTAs are most common in the older,
more settled immigrant colonies of Los Angeles, Chicago, and
Texas but are also found in areas of more recent settlement,
such as New York and Atlanta.
HTAs provide a concrete link to the communities of origin
and a way of maintaining ties with their culture, customs, lan-
guage, and traditions.They usually focus on helping the home-
town by providing reconstruction or development aid, but they
also provide opportunities to socialize and exchange informa-
tion. Many HTAs help members pay for funeral expenses or
transfer remains back to Mexico. They sometimes afford legal
assistance, often through the Mexican consulate. They furnish
clients and helpful contacts to their business members. HTAs
encourage family unity and discourage offspring from drugs
and gangs.
By 1998,some 500 Mexican hometown associations  in the
United States had registered with Mexican consulates. Since
most clubs do not register with the consulate, however, they
may number as high as 2000. During the 1990s, the HTAs
have multiplied.
Those drawn to activities of the HTAs vastly outnumber
club members. The HTAs raise money through raffles, beauty
contests, radio advertisements, and door-to-door collections.
Along with a visit home to the village festival, the beauty pag-
eant or the HTA’s celebration of a local national or religious
holiday is the immigrant ’s crowning annual social event.
Most hometown associations appear to develop sponta-
neously, often unbeknownst to the Mexican consulate. But the
consulates may bring potential members of a hometown organ-
ization together for the first time and provide them with a
locale for their initial meetings. The Mexican government
cooperates with HTAs by putting them in contact with new
members, other HTAs, and authorities at home.Though some
HTAs are suspicious of Mexican authorities, often the con-
sulates provide them a forum through which club officials keep
in touch with one another, meet with the press,and get to know
Mexican-American leaders.
Though the Mexican HTAs are the most active and
numerous, and receive the most support from their govern-
ment, those of many other national origins have them, too.
Hometown associations are thus a pervasive but largely invisi-
ble feature of the American landscape. HTAs abounded during
the first great wave of immigration in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Italian,Jewish, Mexican,Chinese, and Japanese
HTAs specialized in mutual aid,insurance, and health services.
Latino HTAs are less involved in mutual aid and other direct
services for members partly due to the rise of private insurance
and the welfare state. The hometown orientation of today’s
Latino HTAs points to a salient feature of Latino immigrants,
especially Mexicans—their “transnational” or transitional char-
acter as “perpetual in-betweens.”Their hometown focus can be
attributed to the proximity of home and the availability of air
travel, access to phone, fax, e-mail, and video cassettes, on the
one hand, and the the paucity of English courses, the lack of
citizenship programs,and the backlogs at the INS on the other.
HTAs are genera lly apolitica l , n on s e c t a rian voluntary
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organizations, but many have begun to speak out on political
issues on both sides of the border. Last fall,lobbying in the U.S.
by HTAs forced the Mexican government to rescind a key
funding measure that would have penalized motorists to
Mexico. Most recently, both major opposition presidential can-
didates campaigned in U.S. immigrant communities,seeking to
get them to lobby relatives and friends. As the main benefac-
tors of their families and communities, the immigrants’ recom-
mendation carries weight. In a unprecedented step, this year
several Mexican hometown federations in Los Angeles joined
organized labor in calling publicly for amnesty for illegal immi-
grants.
HTAs are most likely to be found among settlers from rural
areas who face drastic adjustments of lifestyles and customs and
steep learning curve s . B a ck hom e, once-poor immigra n t s
become respected leaders because of their investments and
charity. HTAs collect money for the village’s religious festival,
to renovate the church, or for a variety of infrastructure proj-
ects, including schools, roads, and wells. Recently, some HTAs
have begun to focus on job-creation and have started small fac-
tories. They are thus a mechanism for the transfer of remit-
tances. From the Mexican government’s perspective, they have
the advantage of often focusing on productive or social invest-
ment.
Remittances have a significant multiplier effect in sender
communities, comparing favorably to many aid programs that
are vulnerable to money being siphoned off by local officials.
HTAs tend to be scrupulous in the collection, transfer, and
investment of funds in Mexico, which suffers from endemic
corruption, clientelism, and informality. HTAs often form par-
allel committees in the home community to monitor projects.
The hometown movement is an inconspicuous and uncelebrat-
ed channel of American influence in Mexico: generally foster-
ing transparency, accountability, voluntary organization, and
political competition in a country attempting to achieve a tran-
sition to a market economy and democracy. Such a transition,
it might be added, is the best hope for reducing immigration
flows into the United States.
Local HTAs often seek broader affiliations with other local
clubs in state federations and with other city federations or
with associations from their hometown located in other parts of
the U.S. The visit of a Mexican state governor sometimes has
sparked the confederation of individual social clubs into a
statewide federation, a process encouraged by the PCME.
While obviously reinforcing ties to Mexico, these contacts may
also constitute part of the process of integration into American
society. Organizing HTAs brings many immigrants into con-
tact with the larger society. Association leaders learn how to
conduct meetings, form nonprofit organizations,create statutes
and bylaws, and become acquainted with the legal process. For
many members, the hometown association is a springboard to
community involvement in the host country. While tied to
Mexico in numerous ways, the HTAs are also quintessential
American voluntary associations, of the sort that Alexis de
Tocqueville singled out as building blocks of American democ-
racy.
The influence of the PCME and other Mexican organiza-
tions is important with respect to educational, cultural, busi-
ness, health, and other activities, but so is the independent role
played by U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans and by pri-
vate and voluntary organizations (including, but not limited to,
HTAs). Bilingual education is perhaps the most controversial
of these issues,but they also include sports,civic awards—even
beauty pageants. All are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
The Mexican government has cooperated with U.S. school
districts in immigrant education for more than two decades.
Mexico has placed particular emphasis on bilingual education.
Mexico sees Spanish language training as the “main instru-
ment” for teaching Mexican immigrant children English. To
support bilingual education, Mexico has developed teacher
e xchange pro g ra m s , i m m e r s i on courses for U. S. b i l i n g u a l
teachers, and distance learning. It has also distributed Spanish-
language textbooks and promoted adult education in Spanish.
To reach Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans, Mexico
also has developed an array of cultural, recreational,health, and
business programs. Each year Mexico nominates outstanding
Mexican Americans for awards. The latter is part of Mexico’s
courting of Mexican-American and Latino organizations. By
law, the U.S.-born children of U.S. Mexicans are American cit-
izens, and Mexican Americans enjoy population growth rates
well above the national average.Mexico is aware of the increas-
ing political importance of Mexican Americans, and accord-
ingly their capacity to befriend Mexico or at least ward off crit-
icisms of Mexico. But the interests of Latino organizations do
not always coincide with those of Mexico, and they are just as
liable to mount criticisms against Mexican government prac-
tices or support democratic reforms.
Chapter 6 is devoted to “political interpenetration”—that
is, the mutual political influence of Mexico, including especial-
ly Mexican gove rnment agencies, on the one hand, a n d
Mexican Americans, U.S. Mexicans, and their voluntary asso-
ciations, on the other. The former have made outreach efforts
towards leaders and organizations of the latter; they have also
encouraged Spanish-language media in the U.S. One impor-
tant innovation in the U.S. midwest is “networks of protection”
(redes de proteccion), developed by the Mexican consulate in
Chicago to provide information about immigrants’ rights and
obligations on migratory, labor, penal, and other subjects. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the very controversial
subjects of dual nationality and absentee voting rights.
Chapter 7’s conclusions and policy recommendations begin
by pointing out that, without a doubt, Mexican immigrants in
the U.S. are a primary target of Mexican federal and state poli-
cies, programs, and activities. Community organizing efforts
are directed at the HTAs; teacher exchanges, bilingual pro-
grams, and textbook donations concentrate on schools with
important contingents of immigrant children, and so do health
programs and even the bulk of sports activities. Mexican
Americans, on the other hand, are reached mainly by cultural
and business programs and the granting of awards. But Mexico
is neither so strong nor so foolish as to attempt aggressive polit-
ical activism in the United States.This is not to say that there
will not from time to time be efforts that cross the line nor,
obviously, that the U.S. shouldn’t be alert to such transgressions
and object when they occur.The study concludes by suggesting
that citizenship promotion could be an important binational
initiative. Both Mexico and the U.S. have an interest in U.S.
Mexicans becoming U.S. citizens. For the U.S., this would fur-
ther immigrants’ social and political integration into U.S. soci-
ety. For Mexico, it increases the ranks of Americans unlikely to
be hostile to Mexico.
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T
his study describes, among other things, the recent
shift in Mexican government (federal and state)
policies and activities towards Mexican popula-
tions in the United States. Broadly speaking, two
groups compose the Mexican populations in the
United States: those of Mexican origin and the Mexican-born.
The form e r, U. S. - b o rn Mexica n - o rigin citize n s , w i ll be
referred to as “Mexican Americans” in this study. The latter
consists of Mexican immigrants—illegal aliens (or undocu-
mented workers), legal residents, and Mexican-born U.S. citi-
zens—and will be referred to as “U.S. Mexicans.”
Acercamiento: Getting Closer
The Mexican government’s policy of acercamiento (getting
closer or rapprochement) with what it calls “Mexican commu-
nities abroad”—U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans—rep-
resents a sharp shift. After a long period of neglect, Mexico
established a national agency in 1990 to develop programs and
coordinate relations with its diaspora.In the same year, Mexico
expanded and upgraded its consulates in the United States and
opened some two dozen cultural institutes and centers to work
with Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans. Prior to that,
Mexico had begun to move away from its strict policy of non-
intervention—which had been spurred by nationalism and
fears of U.S. interference—to a recognition of interdependence
with the United States.
The new orientation cleared the way for Mexican activism
in the United States. Mexico mounted an extensive lobbying
effort from 1991 to 1993 on behalf of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Next, in 1994, Mexico took
a public role in the fight against California’s Proposition 187.
In 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce declared that “the
Mexican nation transcends the national boundaries.”The next
year, partly in an effort to encourage U.S. Mexicans to vote in
U.S. elections (and thus to ward off future initiatives like
Proposition 187), Mexico amended its constitution to permit
Mexican immigrants to retain their nationality after becoming
U.S. citizens.In the past decade, Mexico has courted the major
Mexican-American and Latino organizations while Mexican
presidents have pushed U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans
to the top of their policy agenda.
So has Mexico become a major influence in U.S. political
life? Has it fostered an ethnic interest group that lobbies for
Mexican interests?
The answer is no, not yet, and probably not in the foresee-
able future. That has not happened, despite all of the above
events, for reasons that shed light on developments, some of
them richly ironic, on both sides of the border.
When the 1990s began, one Mexican goal seems to have
been building a Mexican version of the Israeli or Cuban-
Am e ri can lobby. Though the Pro g ram for Mexica n
Communities Abroad, or PMCE, succeeded in improving
relations with the major Mexican-American and Latino organ-
izations,Mexican diplomats came to realize that the agendas of
Mexican-American elected officials and organizations were
often at sharp variance with Mexico’s. After arguably redun-
dant lobbying for the passage of NAFTA, after the peso crisis,
and after a backlash for its exertions against California’s
Proposition 187, it became clear that Mexico needed to fine-
tune its appro a ch to Am e ri can politics and Mexica n
Americans.
Mexico’s efforts to assist Mexican immigrants without
political activism had proved more successful and rewarding.
Operating through the invigorated Mexican consulates, the
government systematically wooed Mexicans north of the bor-
der with services ranging from literacy classes and social secu-
rity for migrant workers to investment advice for entrepre-
neurs, soccer leagues for youths, and AIDS counseling for
teenagers—to go along with the traditional policy of providing
extensive legal assistance for Mexican-born prisoners on death
row.
But what came to absorb the most attention from Mexican
consulates were immigrant hometown associations (HTAs).
Though hometown associations have sprouted wherever there
are major concentrations of Mexican immigrants—with or
without the assistance of the Mexican government—Mexico’s
consulates have boosted these organizations and have made a
special effort to promote their federating in statewide group-
ings. The number of HTAs, if we include the smaller and less
formal associations not linked to the consulates, could conceiv-
ably run as high as 2000. With their growth in numbers has
come considerable influence back home.
Parallel to the surge in immigrants, financial remittances
have increased steadily over the past two decades. In the
process, Mexican immigrants have become politically and eco-
nomically influential in their home communities. Accordingly,
there has been a reversal in the Mexican image of their
migrants—from baseborn renegades to hometown heroes.
Hometown associations are usually established to lend
assistance to the rural community of origin. Wary of the cor-
rupt practices of Mexican local, state, and federal government
THE MELTING BORDER
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officials, HTAs set up local committees to monitor how the
money is being spent and how a project is advancing. In this
way, they are spreading the practices and the values of trans-
parency and self-government into rural Mexico. At the same
time, they have become an important vehicle of adaptation to
American life for the immigrants.
Moreover, HTAs have become active politically both in
Mexico and in the United States. In the U.S.,HTAs are a wild
card in the Latino electorate—to date they have not been dis-
covered by the national political parties, though local politi-
cians in Texas and California seek their support and some
groups have made their appearance on Capitol Hill.In Mexico,
they have become a prominent political factor in many “sender”
communities and states. In 1998, the governor of Zacatecas,
the leading sender state, was elected with important,if not cr u-
cial, support of the powerful Zacatecas community in Los
Angeles. This spring, Mexico’s presidential candidates made
unprecedented efforts to woo U.S. Mexicans in the hopes that
they would use their influence with voters back home.
If the decade began with hopes for building a pro-Mexican
lobby, it ended with the Mexican government bested by immi-
grant groups it had promoted. In December 1999, HTAs
joined with opposition activists to force President Zedillo to
retract a conspicuous government initiative. “For t’is the sport
to have the enginer/ Hoist with his own petar.”1 Yet as much as
anything, the incident reflected the extent to which Mexican
politics have evolved in a democratic direction over the past
decade, an evolution welcomed by many in the ruling party.
The Mexican government promptly set about mending
relations with its immigrant community even as it maintained
the exc e llent ones it had developed with seve ral major
Mexican-American and Latino groups. Though the PCME
expends most of its energy on U.S. Mexicans, the latter groups
may prove to be more politically potent because of their
prospects for lasting growth and influence. But their conver-
sion, along with immigrant groups, into a potent Mexican
lobby seems a remote prospect and not one the Mexican gov-
ernment is counting on for the present.
None of this should be taken to mean that the significant
efforts of the talented Mexican officials involved in the acer-
camientohave been in vain.The following study will document
just how far Mexico has come in its pursuit of U.S. Mexicans
and Mexican Americans. Yet Mexico remains the suitor; its
objects of desire remain elusive when not refractory.
The Mexican Populations 
in the United States
The Mexican diaspora in the United States makes up nearly
two-thirds of its burgeoning “Hispanic” population of more
than 31 million, which has doubled in the past two decades
(see Tables 1-5, Figure 1). Of the more than 20 million Mexi-
cans and Mexican Americans in the United States, the U.S.
Mexican population is approximately 7.3 million, of which
legal residents make up about 4.8 million and illegal aliens (or
“undocumented workers”) approximately 2.5 million (though
that estimate may well be low) (see Tables 4-5). Mexicans are
settling in the United States at the rate of more than 300,000
a year.2 In 1998, there were 131,575 Mexicans legally admitted
to the United States, which was 19.9 percent of total immi-
grants admitted3 (see Table 6). In addition,more than 170,000
Mexicans were estimated to have entered illegally. Mexico is
the leading country of origin of illegal aliens, with 2.7 million,
or 54 percent, of that population in 19964 (see Table 7).
In the 1990 Census, Mexican populations were heavily
concentrated in California, with more than 45 percent of the
total Mexican population, followed by Texas with 29 percent,
and Illinois, Arizona,and Colorado. Taken together, these five
states were the place of residence for 11.2 million of the 13.3
million Mexican-born and Mexican Americans living in the
U.S. at the time (about 85 percent). Mexican groups were also
concentrated in a few urban areas within these states, such as
the Los Angeles and Chicago metropolitan areas.
In the last thirty years,more than 10 million Mexicans have
settled in the United States (about the same number have
returned to Mexico after ten or more years in the U.S).5
Though Mexicans remain centered in a few states and metro-
politan areas,concentrations of Mexicans have spread to many
areas of the country in the past decade. During the 1990s,
nearly 75 percent of Mexican immigrants continued to settle in
thirty-three counties in California, Texas, Illinois, Arizona,
Colorado, Georgia, and New York.6 These included cities such
as San Antonio, Houston,Dallas-Fort Worth, El Paso, Fresno,
Phoenix, Chicago, and New York, as well as the Texas Rio
Grande Valley. California remained the most common destina-
tion, normally accounting for almost half of the total influx of
Mexican immigrants,but California’s overall share of the coun-
try’s Mexican-born population declined from 58 percent in
1990 to 47.6 percent in 1997.7 In the last several years, Mexi-
can immigrants have fanned out to Oklahoma and Nevada and
spread to the midwest (Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, and
Iowa),to a band stretching down from Michigan through Indi-
ana and Kentucky, to the northeast (Maine and Rhode Island),
the south (Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina), and the
east (New York, New Jersey, and Maryland) (see Table 8).8
At the same time, Mexico and the United States have
heightened their engagement and broadened their contacts,
which now include not only a free-trade area (per NAFTA),
but a plethora of contacts between states, counties, municipal-
ities, and nongovernmental organizations. The thickening of
the U. S. - M e x i can re l a t i onship and the increased flux of
Mexican migration form an essential part of the background to
the changes that have occurred in Mexican policy towards
Mexicans in the United States.
The revolution in technology has certainly played a major
role in these changes, too. Air travel between the two countries
has become less expensive and more frequent. Direct flights
between mid-level Mexican cities such as Guanajuato, San
Luis Potosi, Morelia, and Zacatecas, and U.S. cities such as
Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Los Angeles are a post-
NAFTA phenomenon, and one often spurred by Mexican
immigration. Telephone calls have become cheaper, fax and e-
mail have opened new, inexpensive modes of communication,
electronic money transfers have made rapid remittances a real-
ity, and the video cassette lends immediacy to far-flung com-
munities.
But Mexico’s ac erca m i e n t o with U. S. M e x i cans and
Mexican Americans reflects many other developments on both
sides of the border.
Developments on the U.S. Side
The Immigration Act of 1965 instituted the policy of family
reunification, and the 1986 Simpson-Rodino Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) granted legal-resident status
to large numbers of illegal immigrants. IRCA dispelled the
“illusion of impermanence” for these “Rodinos,” enabling them
to discard the habits of clandestinity and to travel back and
forth across the border without detention or deportation.9
IRCA also allowed long-term immigrants and special agricul-
tural workers legal permanent residence.
Other important developments north of the border have
included:
n The 1975 and 1982 expansion of the Voting Rights Act,
affording Mexicans and other Hispanics the same extraordi-
nary protections and benefits provided black Americans.10
n The Chicano movement and other political activity among
Mexican Americans and the rise of Mexican-American and
Hispanic organizations and Mexican immigrant social clubs
or hom e t own associations (HTA s ) . M e x i ca n - Am e ri ca n
organizations began demanding that the Mexican govern-
ment develop an institutional response to Mexicans in the
U.S.11
n The flowering of nongovernment organizations and the
involvement of local community organizations in Hispanic
and Mexico-related questions.
n The advent and growth of bilingual education programs and
an accom p a nying bilingual educa t i on bure a u c ra cy and
lobby—and the rise of opposition to them.
n The rise of identity politics and multiculturalism.
n The tendency of prominent U.S. foundations and U.S. gov-
e rnment agencies to re g a rd Mexicans and Mexica n -
Americans as part of a disadvantaged national minority.
n The development of a well-funded pro-immigration lobby
that includes such organizations as the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the
National Council of La Raza (NCLR)—and the resurgence
of restrictionist organizations on the other side of the immi-
gration debate.
n The controversy around California’s Proposition 187.
It is important to note that these changes in U.S. politics
and culture have been crucial to the mainly subsequent shifts in
Mexican policy.
Developments on the Mexican Side
The developments south of the border prompted by events in
the U.S. include:
n The shift from “s o j o u rn e r” to “s e t t l e r” i m m i g ra t i on .
Immigrants now tend more often to migrate with their
spouses and children, head for urban rather than rural areas,
and pursue year-round rather than seasonal work.This shift
was deepened by IRCA. Before IRCA, 60 percent of immi-
grants were illegal settlers; after IRCA, more than three-
quarters were legal residents.12
n Remittances from Mexican immigrants. Remittances are
currently estimated at between $6 and $8 billion annually,
registering an eightfold increase between 1980 and 1998.
Remittances now constitute Mexico’s third largest source of
f o reign exch a n g e, a fter oil earnings and manufacture d
exports.13
n The democratization of Mexican politics,which has featured
the emergence of opposition political parties and their
“export”14 to the United States.The competition for support
from U.S. Mexican communities led the ruling Party of the
Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) to attempt to improve
relations with them. Soon the Mexican federal government
implemented a coordinated and generally nonpartisan pro-
gram.15
n Attitudinal changes. Because of the numbers of Mexican
immigrants, their remittances to Mexico, and their increas-
ing influence in Mexican communities, attitudes among
m a ny Mexicans tow a rds immigrants and Mexica n
Americans have changed over the past two or three decades.
Formerly, most urban Mexicans and Mexican officials saw
the Mexican-born and Mexican-descended in the U.S. as
poor and powerless.They were often disdained as renegades
who had abandoned their country and culture. They were
“pochos” (bland or rotten ripe) who spoke well neither
Spanish nor English and were spurned by Americans. Over
the past decade or two, immigrants have become valued for
their economic contributions to their families and commu-
nities and are often considered heroes for braving the dan-
gers of the border and the hazards of immigrant life. In
many Mexican villages, immigrants have become political
p l ayers as well as econ omic benefactors. M e a nw h i l e,
Mexican officials perceived that Mexican Americans had
gained influence in U.S. society, culture, and politics. Rather
than traitors, the Mexican diaspora is seen by Mexican offi-
cials, one of them writes, as a “precious resource from which
to draw support, both in the domestic and international
arena ....”16 The Mexican government now perceives a self-
interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming proficient and remuner-
a t i ve and in Mexican Am e ri cans becoming influential.
Moreover, it is enjoying the domestic economic and political
impact of this ascendance.
n The emergence of human rights as an issue. Partly as a result
of the increasing numbers of immigrants and the promi-
nence of opposition parties, the “human rights” of Mexican
immigrants have become an issue in Mexican public opin-
ion. Though Mexico recognizes that “any state enjoys the
sovereign prerogative of controlling its borders,” it also con-
siders the defense of immigrant rights a legitimate concern
of their homeland under international law.17
n Economic liberalization.The opening of the Mexican econ-
omy, which culminated in NAFTA, led the Mexican gov-
ernment to “take advantage of the opportunities offered by
the American political process”18 and to seek support among
U. S. o p i n i on leaders, p o l i t i c i a n s , m e d i a , and Mexica n
Americans.
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1990: The Initiative
of the Mexican Government
T
hough previous administrations made overtures to
Mexican-American leaders, and individual states
such as Zacatecas developed relations with their
migrant communities in the U.S., the administra-
tion of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) was
the first to mount a coordinated federal outreach effort.
By 1990, the Mexican presence in the United States had
become massive and permanent. Mexican immigration had
doubled in the 1970s and again in the 1980s and was on a
course to double again in the 1990s.The amnesty provisions of
the 1986 IRCA legislation were in the process of providing
legal resident status to some 2.3 million formerly illegal and
transient Mexican aliens.19
Meanwhile, the Mexican economy was becoming an export
economy oriented to the United States for both capital and
markets. The Salinas administration was launching a major
effort to arrive at a free-trade agreement with the United
States.That administration viewed the increasingly influential
and prosperous Mexican-American community as a market,an
investment source, and potentially a player in U.S. decisions
that were sure increasingly to affect Mexico.20
In previous presidential campaigns, the PRI candidate rou-
tinely held meetings at the border with Mexican-American
leaders. But as in much else, the 1988 campaign broke the
m o l d . An opposition presidential ca n d i d a t e, C u a u h t e m o c
Cardenas, who together with Munoz Ledo had left the PRI to
form an opposition alliance, vigorously and personally courted
Mexico’s California communities. Cardenas,a former governor
of the state of Michoacan, was the son of a legendary populist
Mexican president. Michoacan had been a major source of
Mexican immigrants to California since the 1920s.21 Cardenas
himself visited California before, during, and following the
PRI’s first truly contested election in sixty years. In the cam-
paign,he sought funds and votes in the United States and came
out in support of the right of immigrants to cast absentee bal-
lots in Mexican elections. Cardenas criticized the PRI for
neglecting U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans and pro-
posed that the Mexican government develop programs to sup-
port that population.22
Later in the campaign, the Mexican government was
acutely embarrassed by a proposed amendment to the Cali-
fornia Democratic Party platform from a Mexican-American
caucus, citing human rights violations and demanding that
U.S. Mexicans be given the vote.23 In another stinging embar-
rassment,after the elections Cardenas’s claim that he was a vic-
tim of electoral fraud was supported by energetic and frequent
opposition-led demonstrations in front of the Mexican con-
sulate in Los Angeles.24 Both mortifying incidents attracted
widespread media attention in Mexico itself. Thus, domestic
politics as well as immigration demographics,the new orienta-
tion of the Mexican economy, the growing size, affluence, and
influence of Mexican com munities in the U. S. , and the
prospect of a free-trade agreement all persuaded the Salinas
administration to launch an unprecedented federal program for
Mexican communities abroad.
A project was centered in the Mexican Secretariat of
External Relations (SRE) and nursed by foreign minister
Fernando Solana, a senior official named Roger Dias de
Cossio, and Javier Barros and Andres Rozental, undersecre-
taries for North America. Theirs was “a great project of acer-
camiento” whose aim was to forge “a non-partisan instrument of
Mexican foreign policy.”25
The effort got a strong boost after President Salinas met on
October 2, 1989, in Washington, D.C., with leaders of such
Mexican-American organizations as NCLR and MALDEF.26
Salinas unveiled a plan to create a federal office devoted to rela-
tions with Mexicans in the United States.27
The Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME)
was founded in February 1990 as an adjunct to the SRE and
put under the leadership of Diaz de Cossio. Four objectives
were advanced for the PCME. First, it was to respond to the
complaints of Mexican-American and Mexican organizations
in the U.S. that Mexico neglected its compatriots in the U.S.28
Thus, it was to develop friendly and cooperative relations with
Mexican-American organizations that had become influential
in the U.S.—or at least to defuse antagonism towards Mexico.29
Or, to put it another way, the PCME would improve Mexico’s
image—remove “stigmas” and “stereotypes”—in the United
States thanks to relations with the increasingly powerful
Hispanic organiza t i ons and the exposure of Mexica n
Americans to Mexico.30 Second, the first Director General of
the PCME recounted that there was “a great deal of discussion
about creating the Mexican equivalent of the Israeli lobby.” But
he was careful to add that fostering a Mexican lobby was “not
a state policy” and was not part of the “Plan de Gobierno.”
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CHAPTER TWO
The Pro g ram for Mexica n
C om munities Abroad (PCME)
Rather, such a lobby was expected to “evolve over the years as a
result of the relationships formed.”31 As Jose Luis Bernal, the
Mexican consul in Los Angeles, enunciated it to me, a lobby
was merely the “implicit” purpose of the program. Until the
formation of the PCME,another Mexican official pointed out,
his government “had no strategy regarding its diaspora, unlike
countries such as Portugal, Greece, the Philippines, not to
mention Israel; and this despite a huge diaspora.”32 Third, the
PCME would assist Mexican immigrants subject to abuse and
exploitation in the United States, as reportedly strongly urged
by MALDEF in the Salinas meeting.33 Fourth, the PCME
would aim to improve the image of Mexican migrants in
Mexico and to remove the abuses they suffered there.34
To achieve these objectives, Mexico sought to build an
institutional bridge between the Mexican government, on the
one hand, and U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans—the
two target groups of the PCME’s programs and activities.This
would come to mean promoting and facilitating joint projects
and serving as a link between the Mexican diaspora and public
and private Mexican institutions.35
With Los Angeles serving as a pilot city, the PCME rap-
idly established cultural, sports, educational, health,communi-
ty, and business programs to promote these goals (PCME’s
activities are described in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5). It
began reaching out to Mexican-American groups in a system-
atic fashion and establishing relations with the immigrant
hometown associations. Soon it began encouraging their feder-
ation, like the Zacatecas clubs in Los Angeles, which preceded
these efforts (see below, pp. 17-18).
The main instruments in the PCME’s efforts were
Mexico’s consulates in the United States and specially created
“cultural institutes” and “cultural centers.”The consulates were
s t rengthened institution a lly. The tra d i t i onal distinction
between diplomatic and consular branches was eliminated—in
Los Angeles, the consuls was given ambassadorial rank—in
order to attract superior personnel and upgrade assignments.
New staff was added, “including people with extensive records
in public service such as career diplomats, as well as former
governors and secretaries and undersecretaries of state.”36
For the new cultural institutes and centers,boards of direc-
tors made up of prominent local Mexican-American and
Mexican-born citizens were formed. The consuls assumed the
overall leadership of these organizations, which sometimes led
to conflict with local Mexican-American leaders in which
sometimes the latter prevailed.37
In the past, aside from the normal administrative services,
the consulates had very little contact with Mexican immigrant
workers. Community relations usually focused on cultivating
relations “with the Mexican-American elite of professionals
and businessmen in the U.S., but without any clear plan.”38
The Salinas administration placed considerable emphasis
on the new initiative.The administration mobilized other gov-
ernment agencies to assist in the effort.39 Press offices were
appended to important consulates, as were representatives of
the At t o rn ey Genera l’s office and the Social Se c u ri ty
Institute.40
The new consuls were encouraged to transcend Mexico’s
traditional and somewhat dogmatic accentuation of the princi-
ple of nonintervention.41 This was part of a broader rethinking
of international relations as Mexico opened its economy and
moved toward NAFTA. In general, the economic opening led
Mexican officials to see the outside world not as something to
defend against but as a lever of development.
Mexico’s traditional noninterventionism, known as the
Estrada Doctrine, was a function both of Mexico’s old-style
revolutionary nationalism and of its internally oriented eco-
nomic policies. The latter involved, for example, strict protec-
tionism, the building up of local industry, and the nationaliza-
tion of oil reserves and production. Beginning in the 1980s,
Mexico adopted policies of economic liberalization, including
an export-oriented posture, liberalization of foreign investment
guidelines, and privatization of many government companies.
For some Mexicans,the entry into NAFTA meant that Mexico
should amend its view on nonintervention.
Under the new orientation,the Mexican government began
organizing efforts in the U.S. to influence the U.S. decision-
making process. Mexican consulates started granting inter-
views with the U.S. media.The consuls abandoned a noninter-
ventionism that had “failed to take advantages of the opportu-
nities offered by American political process.”42
Current Structure and 
Activities of the PCME
The “Plan of Government” of Mexico’s incoming President
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon declared that one of his admin-
istration’s sovereign objectives was “to guarantee a close con-
n e c t i on with Mexican and Mexica n - o rigin com mu n i t i e s
abroad.” He promised to “grant priority” to an initiative that
would bring together a group of programs designed to “rein-
force cultural ties” with those communities “on the basis of the
recognition that the Mexican nation transcends the national
boundaries.”43 A former director of the PCME adds that “the
Mexican state defines its nation as a cultural entity not limited
by its geographic borders.”44
Current Mexican government authorities consider it their
responsibility to “attend to the educational,cultural, recreation-
al and health needs of Mexicans abroad to support them in
their personal development and their adaptation to their new
circumstances.”45 It is important to note that the Mexican gov-
ernment tends to regard its assistance to Mexican immigrants
as a means of adaptation and integration into American socie-
ty: by improving their education (thus making them more fit
for employment and civic life), their health, and their “self-
esteem,” and by helping to keep them from the influence of
street gangs and drugs.46
In Mexico, the Ministry of Foreign Relations coordinates
the PCME’s activity with nine federal departments, twenty-
three state governments,hundreds of municipalities,and sever-
al public and private organizations.47 Since 99 percent of
Mexico’s external population resides in the U.S., the PCME
concentrates its activities in that country. In the U.S., the
PCME functions through Mexico’s forty-two consulates and
twenty-four cultural centers or institutes. The cultural centers
and institutes are tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations with
b o a rds of directors drawn pri m a ri ly from the Mexica n -
American community. These organizations are self-financing,
raising revenues from Mexican and U.S. companies and foun-
dations, so as to avoid criticism in Mexico that scarce budget-
ary resources are being spent outside of the country and also to
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encourage the host community to regard the projects as their
own.48
When the PCME was conceived by the Salinas adminis-
tration, it was assumed that its efforts would be primarily
directed towards the Mexican-American community.49 But it
soon developed that the Mexican-born immigrants,and specif-
ically their hometown associations (HTAs), would absorb
much of the attention of the PCME’s programs.50 “Although
Mexican Americans may benefit from these programs,” writes
Rodulfo O. De la Garza,“there is no doubt that immigrants are
the primary target” of PCME’s efforts.51 From the next chap-
ter’s discussion of the programs and activities of the HTAs, it
will become apparent why this is so.
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CHAPTER THREE
H om e t own Associations (HTA s )
T
he main activities of the PCME involve commu-
n i ty organiza t i on , e d u ca t i on , c u l t u re, s p o rt s ,
health, business, awards, outreach to Mexican-
American leaders and organizations, and dissemi-
nating information. Hometown associations or
social clubs (clubes de oriundos) absorb the bulk of the attention
of the PCME as well as of individual state programs directed
toward Mexican communities in the United States.
Origins 
As far back as the nineteenth century, Mexican communities in
the United States formed “welfare organizations designed to
provide their members with sickness and death benefits at a
time when state-supplied social security was unavailable.”52
They also formed societies, such as La Sociedad Cervantes and
La Sociedad Mutualista Mexicana,specifically dedicated to pre-
serving Mexican national traditions.53 These societies were
often highly structured and ritualistic and sought to preserve
“old country social propriety” and “to remain Mexican in lan-
guage, customs and social goals.”54
Regional social clubs for purposes of mutual aid or recre-
ation date from the 1920s.55 The contemporary hometown
association dates from the 1950s.56 At least one club has been
in continuous operation since the 1950s: The Club Avala in
Los Angeles, composed of natives of Chihuahua, was founded
in 1958.57
There is a marked hometown character to Mexican immi-
gration to the United States. Mexicans, like other immigrants,
tend to locate with family, friends, and neighbors. 58 Thus, for
example, in the last decade New York City has received as
many as 700,000 Mexican immigrants, over 50 percent of
whom hail from the state of Puebla.59 It stands to reason that,
as the Consul for Community Relations told me, “no Mexican
is going to New York in the dead of the winter without a place
to stay and a job.”60 Generally, most emigrants from one com-
munity will settle in a single very particular location in the U.S.
Immigrants from Cueramaro, Gunajuato, live in Hawaiian
Gardens in Los Angeles while those from Leon, Guanajuato,
live in Compton, another Los Angeles suburb. These migrato-
ry patterns tend to perpetuate themselves in what have been
called “migration chains.”61
In this respect, Mexicans resemble immigrants the world
over for whom “particular destination points have tended to be
linked to particular points of origin.”62 Migrants from different
parts of China have settled in different places in Thailand,
Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the United States.63 Two towns four miles apart in north-
ern Italy sent the bulk of their respective emigrants to opposite
sides of the Au s t ralian con t i n e n t . In Buffalo, C h i ca go,
Cleveland, Kansas City, Rochester, and San Francisco (as well
as Buenos Aires and Toronto),Italians from specific towns and
villages “concentrated in particular neighborhoods or even
streets.”64 Polish Jews settled on different lower east side New
York streets from Russian, Hungarian, and Romanian Jews;
German Jews occupied very different parts of that city from the
Eastern Europeans on the lower east side. Lebanese immi-
grants to West Africa settled in different locales according to
the part of their home country from which they hailed, and the
same was true of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines,
Swedes in North Dakota, and Chinese in Indonesia. German
immigrants from the Westphalian county of Tecklenburg set-
tled in two adjoining counties of Missouri ; Fra n k f o rt ,
Kentucky, was founded by Germans from Frankfurt; and
Lorima, Wisconsin,was settled almost exclusively by Prussians
from Brandenberg even as the nearby towns of Hermann and
Theresa were settled by Pomeranians.65
As far back as the 1920s, it was likewise evident that
Mexicans from specific villages were migrating to particular
zones in U.S. towns.66 American researchers were already not-
ing “a tendency for migrants from particular sending areas to be
channeled to specific districts in American cities.”67
Migration is “a network-driven process,” as Portes and
Rumbaut stress, “and the operation of kin and friendship ties is
nowhere more effective than in guiding new arrivals toward
pre-established ethnic communities.”68 “If there is a single ‘law’
in migration,” Myron Weiner writes, “it is that a migration
flow, once begun, induces its own flow. Migrants enable their
friends and relatives back home to migrate by providing them
with information about how to migrate, resources to facilitate
movement, and assistance in finding jobs and housing.”69
The importance of migration networks in Mexican immi-
gration to the United States has been demonstrated in several
investigations.70 Because the decision to migrate is usually a
product of spontaneous family decisions based on the presence
of relatives and friends in specific places who can provide help
and shelter, “[t]he influence of preexisting networks on loca-
tional patterns tends to be decisive among contemporary man-
ual labor migrants.”71 Once having arrived, the immigrants
often rely on neighbors or family members who have estab-
lished themselves in the U.S. to help them find jobs and hous-
ing and lend money; these are also the people with whom they
exchange useful information and pool resources, and make
friends and contacts. Here again the Mexican experience is
standard. As Portes and Rumbaut point out, “ethnic networks
provide sources of information about outside employment,
sources of jobs inside the community, and sources of credit and
support for entrepreneurial ventures.” As a result, “the process
of socioeconomic attainment in this context is entirely network
driven.”72 Beyond the economic sphere, villagers run into each
other in the host country at baptisms, quinceañeras (“Sweet 16”
parties), and posadas (Christmas parties). They help out one
another in emergencies. They may eventually form hometown
soccer or basketball teams and congregate to celebrate the vil-
lage’s patron saint ’s day with a fiesta.
It stands to reason that such networks would form the soil
out of which voluntary organizations have sprung. At the out-
set, these groups may be little more than extensions of the
immigrant networks we have described.73 But kinship and
friendship alone are not usually enough to launch a successful
hometown association. Typically the hometown association
relies on a broader sense of derivation (oriundo) from a com-
mon community of origin. Mexicans refer to their associations
or clubs as clubes de oriundos,a term best translated as home-
town association but literally “a club of the commonly derived.”
Of course, origin from the same hometown “is not a meaning-
ful basis of social organization for people while they are at
home.” Derivation is just a “latent dimension of association in
the hometown community,” but it becomes crucial when
strangers from the same hometown find themselves living
together in a foreign, often hostile, environment.Then deriva-
tion can become an important social relation. A relationship
established abroad can then produce “new forms of association
that not only promote the cohesion of migrants in the United
States but also facilitate their reintegration into the communi-
ty.”74
Whether an informal group becomes an association may
depend on the presence of leaders—which in many cases may
be supplied or fostered by the consulate. What the consulates
call “natural leaders” are usually individuals who have achieved
some success in their occupation. In New York, where restau-
rants are plentiful, the leader of the club is likely to be a chef.75
In Los Angeles, many are independent businessmen or profes-
sionals.76 In Chicago, skilled workers and businessmen lead
several clubs.77 In all cases, they are gente respetada, people who
are looked up to in the community.
At a certain point, informal groups will declare themselves
an association or club, choose a president,and perhaps draw up
rules and maybe eventually seek nonprofit status under U.S.
law.78 A hometown association may get under way in a variety
of ways: forming a soccer team, supporting hometown activi-
ties such as religious festivals, or paving a stretch of road. As
with several Oaxaca clubs in Los Angeles, associations may be
formed at the solicitation of village authorities interested in
attracting remittances to the village and in keeping up migrant
participation.79
Number, Size, and Composition
By 1998, some 500 Mexican hometown associations in the
United States had registered with Mexican consulates.80 But
many, probably most, clubs do not register. Michoacan is the
second biggest sender state of Mexican immigrants in Los
Angeles, but it has few clubs registered with the Los Angeles
consulate. That may be due to the “often conflictive relations
that the Consulate has had with immigrants from this state,
which has been a bastion for the leftist opposition party, the
PRD.”81 There are certainly “many more” than 500 HTAs
throughout the country “working in quiet, unnoticed ways on
small projects.”82 One team of researchers asserts that there “are
literally thousands of associations” that are “known only to
their members and have no formal contact with larger federa-
tions or outside groups either in Mexico or in the United
States.”83 But no one really knows their number. Here we shall
discuss only those hometown associations that are publicly
known,either to the consulate or because they belong to a larg-
er federation.
HTAs have grown rapid ly in recent years. Sustained high
levels of Mexican immigration starting around 1970 are partly
responsible.But the growth also reflects the ending of “the illu-
sion of impermanence” for many formerly illegal immigrants
who became legal residents under the provisions of IRCA in
the late ‘80s and early ‘90s.84 (In 1986,IRCA legalized some 2.3
million Mexican “Rodinos.”)85
Further legislation in 1990 augmented the number of
Mexican legal residents both by increasing the number of legal
immigrants and by stressing the criterion of family reunifica-
tion in granting residencies. Many formerly illegal and vulner-
able Mexicans now felt free to join organizations and otherwise
comport themselves as legal and permanent residents.
During the 1990s, HTAs have continued to multiply. In
1995,109 clubs were registered with the Los Angeles Mexican
consulate.86 By 1998, the number had grown to 170.87 In
December 1999, the consulate official in charge of community
relations told me that there were nearly 230 clubs. La Federa-
cion de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de Calfiornia(Federation of
Zacetecas Clubs of Southern California), which was formed in
1972, began 1999 with forty-seven clubs and ended it with
fifty-four.88 Some of this increase may reflect more comprehen-
sive consular work. But that does not appear a likely explana-
tion for most of the growth, since the consulate’s outreach to
immigrant organizations began in 1990.
No official estimates on the numbers of immigrants in
HTAs are available. In 1995, Carlos González Gutiérrez sur-
veyed the 109 clubs in Los Angeles and found their member-
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ship ranged from 4 to 846 members, averaging about 30.89 At
the same time, he cites the National Immigrant Survey con-
ducted by the NA LEO (Na t i onal Association of La t i n o
Elected Officials) Educational Fund,which found that approx-
imately 10 percent of first-generation Latin immigrants were
active members of social clubs. Assuming only 500 clubs,these
two approximations yield estimates of total membership rang-
ing between 15,000 and 700,000 Mexicans. The estimates of
González Gutiérrez in 1995, however, come in considerably
below the numbers reported by the leaders of the Los Angeles
federations of hometown associations in 1999.The president of
the southern California Fe d eracion de Clubes Jaliscienses
(Federation of Jalisco Clubs) reported that the fifty-two clubs
belonging to his grouping had a total of between 10,000 and
15,000 members. In 1995, González, who was working for the
Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, reported twenty-two Jalisco
clubs with some 270 members. The Zacatecas Federation had
f o rty clubs in 1995 with some 700 members. Now the
Federation claims fifty-four clubs with 35,000 members for an
average of 700 members per club. Aside from promotional
hyperbole, the discrepancy may be due in large part to how
“membership” is calculated. This varies widely because the
clubs are organized and function differently.
For example, the Zacatecas clubs in Los Angeles average
700 members and the Jalisco clubs about 250 members.On the
other hand, the clubs belonging to the California federation of
clubs for the state of Sinoloa (La Fraternidad Sinoloense de
California) average only “10-15 members per club,” according
to the president of the federation.90 Tomas Ramirez, the head
of the Chicago federation of clubs for the state of Guanajuato
(Casa Guanajuato), says that his federation encompasses twen-
ty-eight clubs with some 9000 members.A single club has over
3000 members and $500,000 in capital. In contrast, the state
federation represented by Salvador Cervantes (the organiza-
tional secretary of the Chicago federation of clubs from
Guerrero) claims twenty-one active clubs but each with only
six or seven or so “members” (really, activist organizers). Yet the
events sponsored by Guerrero clubs often attract as many as
300 participants.Clubs generally draw many times the number
of dues-paying members to celebra t i ons of religious and
national holidays and other large public events, such as soccer
games, dances, raffles, picnics, charreadas (rodeos), and beauty
pageants.
Thus, those who are counted as members may come only
occasionally to meetings; in other cases, “members” may be
limited to activist organizers. Some clubs charge dues; others
do not, but pass the plate at meetings.91 What appears clear is
that in many cases the number of those drawn to activities of
the club’s organizers is often many times the number of the
organizers. Under these circumstances, an estimate of the
number of members belonging to Mexican hometown associa-
tions would be hazardous.
On the basis of interviews with HTA leaders in Chicago,
Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Washington, I would estimate
that 40-50 percent of dues-paying members are legal residents,
30-40 percent have become citizens, and 10-20 percent are
undocumented or illegal aliens.The percentages vary from club
to club and federation to federation. The author of a study of
Los Angeles hometown associations judged, for example, that
the Zacatecas and Jalisco federations had a high number of cit-
izens and few illegals, but the Oaxaca federations had high
numbers of illegals or undocumented immigrants.92 In general,
members range from recent immigrants with low-paying jobs
to prosperous business people. Leaders of the associations
include businessmen, workers from the service and manufac-
turing sectors, and community leaders. Generally leaders own
businesses or possess very stable jobs.93
The HTAs vary in character as well as size. Some clubs
concentrate on specific projects for their hometown,while oth-
ers organize large meetings to collect funds. The large
Zacatecan clubs, with 700 members, have systematic and
diverse programs of activities. Small, informal groups do not
bother to register with the consulate and may undertake only a
single project or activity.
In between are organizations such as the Los Angeles Club
Ixtlan del Rio de Nayarit,which is composed of some “45 cou-
ples.” They meet once a month in a different member’s home
and pay no dues. Along with nineteen other HTAs, the club
belongs to a citywide federation (Asociacion de Nayaritas). It
takes no part in politics but cooperates with the state and fed-
eral governments in hometown projects such as building a
nursing home and a university campus.The members all try to
return to Ixtlan for the September 16 Independence Day fes-
tivities. When they do they are greeted by a band, television
cameras, all the local politicians, and some 5000 celebrants. In
Los Angeles, the club attracts as many as 600 people to its
dances, bazaars, raffles, and Christmas parties. The children
help out and many are expected to join the club when they are
older. The club also functions as a mutual aid society and “feels
more like a family than a club.”94
The associations often tend to form in older, more settled
immigrant colonies, especially those whose sender communi-
ties have high per capita indices of emigration with firmly
established networks.95 Los Angeles, where continuous, con-
centrated Mexican immigrant communities date back to the
1920s and 1930s and where hometown associations go back to
the 1950s, had more than 230 HTAs registered with the con-
sulate in 1999.96 New York City, where the bulk of Mexican
immigration is a phenomenon of this decade, has only twelve
HTAs registered with the consulate.
The Role of the Mexican Consulates 
in the Formation of HTAs 
Most hometown associations appear to develop spontaneously,
often unbeknownst to the consulate. The Club Solidaridad de
Chinantla was founded in New York City around 1970,but did
not register with the New York consulate until 1992.97 But
occasionally the consulates bring potential members of a
hometown organization together for the first time and provide
them with a locale for their initial meetings.98 Frequently the
consulate or cultural institute will collaborate with individuals
interested in forming a club by offering support and putting
them in contact with other individuals from the same commu-
nity or state.Subsequently, the cultural institute is likely to sup-
ply general information about associations and, if there is a
state federation, may put them in contact with it.99
In Los Angeles, where there is the largest and most active
Mexican consulate in the U.S., the consulate staff has devised
“an extremely efficient way of promoting clubs.”
The Mexican government finances visits from municipal
presidents [mayors] from high migration regions in Mexico to
Los Angeles. Consular staff set up meetings in the Consulate
for the presidents to talk with migrants from the municipio. The
Consulate has a database of Mexicans living in the United
States who have applied for identity cards called matrículas con-
s u l a re s , w h i ch ca p t u res inform a t i on on birthplace within
Mexico as well as address and phone number within the United
States.This database is used to inform compatriots of the visit
of their municipal authorities to the Consulate. These initial
meetings usually draw from 20 to 50 compatriots, some of
whom haven’t been in contact with each other previously. The
Consulate staff and the visiting public municipal officials use
these meetings to encourage the formation of a club, by articu-
lating the importance of retaining their national and hometown
identity and traditions,helping one another, and building unity
among Mexican immigrants in the United States. Municipal
presidents often stress the role that immigrants can take in pro-
moting progress in their home towns. They also invite their
“absent children” (hijos ausentes) to visit, retain ties,and invest in
their home communities.100
Many of the clubs belonging to the Federation of Jalisco
Clubs in Los Angeles have been formed recently and are typi-
cal examples of consulate-initiated associations. The president
of the Jalisco federation told me that frequently the founding
of a club involves the consulate supplying a list of immigrants
from a given village to the Federation.101 One of the authors of
a study of Los Angeles hometown associations described the
Jalisco Federation clubs as closely tied to the consulate.102
Both the federal PCME and state offices cooperate with
the hometown associations to consolidate organizing efforts
and to put them in contact with other clubs and with authori-
ties at home.103 San Antonio’s Casa Nuevo Leonbegan at the
initiative of the consul in 1995 with “four or five families.” Now
more than sixty families belong to the club.104 In New York
City, the Mexican Cultural Institute Consul for Community
Relations played a more active organizational role in the past.
Now the HTAs are “completely independent,”according to the
consul general.105
The consuls are apt to see the associations as vehicles for
providing services and protection to Mexican citizens in the
U.S., for identifying “natural leaders” in the Mexican commu-
nity, and for developing awareness of Mexico’s position on
issues.106 The president of the Jalisco Federation in Los Angeles
told me that the consulate sometimes asks for letters to U.S.
Senators or Representatives backing Mexican positions. “We
tell them, ‘if we agree with the position,we’ll write the letter. If
not, no.’ We are autonomous.” When the consulate asked for
letters supporting amnesty for illegal aliens, the Federation
agreed to write them.107 A ranking Mexican official in one
major city told me his consulate’s relationship with hometown
associations served to identify community leaders. Another
stated “off the record” that the consulate had solicited letters
f rom com mu n i ty leaders supporting the “c e rt i f i ca t i on” o f
Mexico as a cooperative U.S. ally in the drug war.
Most hometown associations appear to be quite independ-
ent of the consulates. Indeed, many are suspicious of Mexican
governmental authorities, with whom they may have had
unpleasant experiences at home. While some appreciate the
support of the consulates,others prefer to remain entirely inde-
pendent of a government they have learned to distrust. Others
welcome consulate involvement because of direct contact with
engaged officials from the consulate or the cultural institute but
prefer to have nothing to do with the PCME or state pro-
grams.
Hometown clubs maintain contact with the consulate and
attend meetings to stay informed on matters concerning the
Mexican community in the area. In San Antonio, the presi-
dents of the clubs meet monthly in the consulate.108 In general,
the consulates provide a forum through which club officials
keep in touch with one another, meet with the press,and get to
know Mexican-American leaders.
Rural Derivation 
HTAs are found genera lly among settlers from ru ra l
areas.109 Though Mexican cities provide a larger share of immi-
grants than in the past, still about 60 percent of the Mexican-
born in the U.S. come from rural areas.110 They face the more
drastic adjustments of lifestyles and customs and the sharpest
learning curves.111 The human need to seek out friendly faces in
a gigantic,anonymous urban environment is probably felt more
intensely by those used to the communal life of a village.
Saskia Sassen-Koob explained the proliferation of social
clubs among Dominicans in New York as rooted in the rural
origin of the immigrants. The clubs served to reproduce the
kinship and compadrazcosystems of the sending communi-
ties.112 Such systems are familiar in Mexican villages.Moreover,
Sassen-Koob notes that Latin American scholars have found
similar social clubs among communities that have emigrated
from rural areas to Latin American cities: “a significant dispar-
ity between place of origin and receiving society is an impor-
tant variable in the formation of these clubs.”113 The Mexican
and Dominican associations endeavor to mediate the transition
not only between developing and developed countries but also
between town and country.
Mexicans and Dominicans are not the only nationalities
forming hometown organizations and social clubs.Salvadorans
in Washington, D.C., Virginia, Maryland, and California have
founded numerous hometown associations.114 Peruvians, espe-
cially from rural areas, belong to similar HTAs. Indians have
p ow e rful and pro s p e rous organiza t i on s . Ni g e rian and
Ethiopian immigrants in Washington, D.C., belong to associ-
ations organized by tribe and region. Chinese immigrants also
form regional associations; indeed almost all overseas Chinese
belong to such an organization.115 Like the Chinese, Japanese
and Korean immigrants bring with them a thick web of com-
munity organizations based on kinship and village.
Hometown associations are thus a pervasive but largely
invisible feature of the American landscape—or cityscape, to
be more precise. They are rarely if ever mentioned in the
English-language news media and then only as an after-
thought. Take, for example, this passage buried at the end of a
feature article on how residents from Chirilagua, El Salvador,
have migrated to a single Virginia town: “Chirilaguans have
opened new restaurants and other businesses, and a local com-
mittee raises money to build soccer fields, parks, and play-
grounds back in their native village.”116
Historical Precedents
Italian immigrants in the U.S. set up mutual aid societies based
on their particular local community in Italy.117 There were 2000
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of these in New York City in 1910.118 Chinese and Japanese
immigrants in the early twentieth century also formed associa-
tions based on their region of origin.119
In late nineteenth and early twentieth century America,
immigrant Jews established an extensive network of hometown
associations called landsmanshaftn. At their height, there were
several thousand in New York City, 600 in Chicago, and sever-
al hundred in other U.S. cities, representing nearly 1000 Euro-
pean cities and towns and embracing nearly every Jewish fam-
ily in urban America.120
Serving as a “sanctuary from the excessive strains of accul-
turation” and a place to continue old traditions, the landsman-
shaft at the same time “resembled an American fraternal order
with its rites and constitutions, its camaraderie, and its oppor-
tunity for ‘doing a little business.’”121 Involved in mutual aid,
insurance, health services, credit, recreation, and philanthropy,
the landsmanshaft was a vehicle for “reconciling American
Jewish and East European identity.”122
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean kinship and hometown
associations offered welfare services and often spawned rotat-
ing credit associations that played a major role in supplying
credit for business activities. Many evolved into quasi–credit
unions that lent money and paid interest on deposits.123 U.S.
Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and mutualistas (mutual aid
societies) provided assistance to families in need and mediated
disputes in the earlier part of the century, but, unlike the Asian
associations, did not furnish start-up capital.124
On the whole, Mexican hometown associations are less
involved in mutual aid and other direct services for members
than the immigrant organizations of yesteryear. That reflects
the increased participation of private companies and the wel-
fare state in social insurance. Today Mexican HTAs are far
more oriented towards the hometown.That points to a salient
feature of Mexican and indeed Latino immigrants in general:
what some have called their “transnational” character, though
they were better described by Roberto Suro as “perpetual in-
betweens.”125 The prolonged transitional character of Latino
immigration can be attributed to the proximity of home and
the availability of air travel and access to phone, fax,e-mail,and
video cassettes on the one hand, and the fact that, in Suro’s
words,the nation that hosts them seems “happy to let things go
that way”—which I take to mean the paucity of English cours-
es, the lack of citizenship programs, the backlogs at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and so forth.126
Contemporary Mexican hometown associations are also
distinct for their presence in so many parts of the United States
as well as for their efforts to associate regionally and national-
ly. Though it must be acknowledged that the Jewish landsman-
shaftnof the early twentieth century also formed federations or
farbandn based on national origin, these were confined mainl y
to New York City.127 Also distinctive is the role of the Mexican
government and the complex relationships (antagonistic or
agnostic though they may be in some cases) the hometown
associations enjoy with Mexican authorities.
Today hometown associations, sports clubs, and consulates
only begin to supply the services once offered by the “settle-
ment houses” that became common at the turn of the century.
The most famous settlement house was Hull House, estab-
lished by Jane Addams in the Halstead section of westside
C h i ca go, w h e re immigrants from Eastern and So u t h e rn
Europe lived. The area was “a slum complete with overcrowd-
ed tenements, crime, disease, inadequate schools, inferior hos-
pitals,and insufficient sanitation.”The activities of Hull House
included citizenship and literacy classes,adult education,sports
and hobby clubs,theater and dance programs,cooking, sewing,
and homemaking classes, public baths, day nurseries, health
clinics and visiting nurses, immunization programs, art appre-
ciation, lending libraries, political discussion groups, lectures
on educational and workplace reforms, loaned meeting spaces
for labor meetings, mutual aid societies, social clubs—and
hometown associations.128
Purposes and Activities 
Hometown associations have a variety of functions. They are
“social clubs”: opportunities and places to gather and socialize,
exchange information about relatives, the hometown, jobs,
housing, moving, and documentation.They offer company for
the sick and provide other forms of mutual aid.129 They afford
legal assistance, sometimes through the good offices of the
consulate—that is, clubs will lend members to the consulate to
provide assistance if Mexicans run into trouble with the law.130
Many hometown associations help members raise money for
funeral expenses or to transfer remains back to Mexico. The
clubs furnish clients and helpful contacts to their business
members. They provide a concrete link to the communities of
origin and a way of maintaining ties with their culture, cus-
toms, language, and traditions.
Some hometown associations will not undertake commu-
nity activities in the host country.131 Others do get involved in
their new homes. Most often the original engagement is ani-
mated by concern for the children.The Organizxacian Regional
de Oaxaca is active in the formation of basketball teams (bas-
ketball, not soccer, is the typical sport of Oaxaca) with the aim
of discouraging gangs and drug and alcohol use.132 Some mem-
bers of other HTAs told me that their associations also help to
discourage children from drugs and gangs and promote family
unity.133 Club members from Jalisco form informal subcommit-
tees to visit neighborhood schools and support their children.134
If they find problems of general concern, they will bring them
to meetings of the federation of clubs.135 If the child of a club
member has gotten mixed up with a gang or is reputed to be
taking drugs, the club will designate a member to speak with
him.
Over the past several years,a number of studies have point-
ed to the “second generation decline” as a singular feature of
the most recent wave of immigration, especially Latino immi-
gration.136 These studies have found a lower level of drug and
alcohol use among less “acculturated” immigrants and Mexican
Americans.
Portes and Rumbaut argue that “[l]ess acculturated immi-
grants are not only less exposed to these practices,but are under
the influence of the stronger family ties, social controls, and
traditional values associated with their cultural heritage.”137
Rumbaut adds that his research has shown that the most disci-
plined, hardest working, and respectful students “tend to be the
most recently arrived.” They are the ones “who have not been
here long enough to be Americanized into bad habits, into a
Beavis and Butthead perspective of the world.”“An attachment
to one’s home countr y, culture and language can be very posi-
t i ve” for immigrant ch i l d ren in U. S. s ch o o l s , c on t e n d s
University of Nebraska sociologist Lourdes Gouveia. These
attachments “help maintain a sense of identity and self-respect
when the family drops in status,” as often happens when for-
eigners immigrate. As a result, the Venezuelan-born Gouveia
said, citing studies by Rumbaut and others, students who are
the least “assimilated” often do better in school than other
immigrants and sometimes top even the native-born. As one
Mexican government official charged with Hispanic affairs
observes, “Mexicans do not have any grievances against the
U.S. government”138 and tend to regard the U.S. mainly as a
land of opportunit y. So their activities are not generally fueled
by protest against the U.S. government (a situation that stands
in contrast to the recurrent media image in Mexico of govern-
ment mistreatment of Mexican immigrants).
Members of hometown associations usually meet in the
members’ houses or garages, in churches, or in restaurants
belonging to members (the clubs rarely have an office, though
federations often do).San Antonio is opening a clubhouse with
a library and a large meeting hall for the use of the hometown
associations.139 A cherished aspiration of the California Sinoloa
federation is to found such a center, a Casa Sinoloense, which
would house meetings and receive newcomers from Sinoloa.140
A project of the Chicago federation of Michoacan associations
is to create a Casa Michoacan as a center of operations.141 The
newly elected (with the help of the HTAs) governor of
Zacatecas has pledged a matching grant of $125,000 for the
twenty-seven HTAs of the Chicago Zacatecas federation to
build a Zacatecan cultural center this year.142 The construction
of a center seems to be a general symbol of maturity for a fed-
eration.
The hometown associations are generally apolitical, non-
sectarian, voluntary organizations, though at least one club in
Chicago is devoted to promoting transparency and good gov-
ernment in San Luis Potosi. All of them depend entirely on the
voluntary work and donations of members and collaborators.
Many clubs have formed around local soccer games and
leagues.143 Sports serve to break up the routine of repetitive
manual labor typical in the lives of many immigrants,and are a
way of keeping contact with relatives, friends, and acquain-
tances from the hometown. Sports also tend to keep young
people away from gangs and drugs. Cities with large public
parks (such as Prospect Park in Brooklyn or Van Cortlandt
Park in the Bronx) are more hospitable to soccer leagues than
locations without them.144 Soccer leagues can be “a way of
claiming a space in the city and beginning to construct a pub-
lic sense of community.”145 But a competitive team needs funds
to buy uniforms and equipment, pay league dues, reserve play-
ing fields, and rent training space in the winter. Often these
tasks fall to the relatives of the players.146 Team organizers often
throw dances or other events to raise funds.147 But these events
in turn require more sophisticated organizing as well as cash
advances to buy food and drink, rent a hall,and hire musicians
or entertainers. Around these tasks leadership groups may
form, becoming the pivot of a hometown association. At this
point the consulate may play a role by spreading the word and
encouraging emulation. “We used to say,” the Consul for
Community Relations in New York told me, “look at what
Chinantla [an HTA] is doing.”148
Eventually the group may decide to collect money to help
its home community. (In many cases, groups disappear due to
exhaustion,internal conflicts,and the failure of the next gener-
ation to take up the tasks, but the associations usually survive
and develop a broader social purpose.)149 They begin to collect
funds for disaster relief or to send to home communities for
reconstruction or development. Many have formed partner-
ships or other organizations to collect money to spruce up the
village’s traditional religious festival or to repair or renovate the
local church.They also may be dedicated to infrastructure proj-
ects such as construction and repair of roads,bridges,water sys-
tems,drainage and sewer works,schools, churches,orphanages,
and recreational facilities (such as basketball courts, parks, and
rodeos),as well as electrification,water purification, and pollu-
tion control. Funds are donated for educational and medical
supplies and for vehicles for public use.150 Some associations
have started small factories (maquiladoras) in light industries,
such as the textile factory in Montelongo, Guanajuato.151
In short, HTAs are a mechanism, albeit today a minor one,
for sending remittances to the old hometown. From the gov-
ernment standpoint, their contributions have the advantage of
focusing on productive investment rather than exclusively on
immediate consumption, as is the case with individual remit-
tances.152 The collective investments by the HTAs are relative-
ly small but they feed into a much larger stream.
I m m i g rant inve s t o r s , g e n e ra lly individuals, and other
e n t re p reneurs have taken advantage of the prov i s i ons of
NAFTA that allow them to import some U.S. machinery and
equipment duty-free. As a result, many Mexican rural towns
are becoming garment-assembling centers with low unemploy-
ment. Combined with falling birth rates and a more stable
e c on om y, M e x i c o’s increased job cre a t i on has led som e
Mexican economists to foresee job growth matching labor
force growth sometime in the present decade.153 That would
tend to drive Mexican immigration rates down. HTA leaders
often stress that the ultimate aim of their investments is to
eliminate the conditions that led them to emigrate.154
Typically, individual Mexican immigrants will begin by
sending money home for family consumption—for food and
clothing, housing, and educational and medical needs—but
also for pro d u c t i ve purposes such as farm equipm e n t .
Remittances are concentrated in the nine western and northern
“sender” states—seven states (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan,
San Luis Potosi, Guererro, Chihuahua, and Zacetecas) receive
about 60 percent of them—and the bulk goes to some 109
sender municipalities.155 In the case of Michoacan, remittances
reach an estimated $1.2 billion each year, “a sum larger than the
budget of the state government.”156 In Zacatecas, migrant
remittances have outstripped federal revenues.157 According to
the director of the Zacatecas Office for Zacatecan Com-
munities Abroad, Zacatecan emigrants send as much as $1.2
million a day back to their home state.158 Remittances also have
a significant multiplier effect in sender states and communities,
comparing favorably to many aid programs that are liable to be
siphoned off by local officials.
After they have begun to meet immediate family necessi-
ties, immigrant workers often broaden their attention to wider
social needs. Sometimes this is a direct consequence of their
improved standard of living in the U.S. An HTA member who
can now afford a car and drives back to Mexico to live or to
visit during holidays may wish to see that his village has a
paved road. Similarly, he may become concerned that the vil-
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lage has potable water, or a recreational park,or that the school
his siblings attend is in good repair.
Fundraising is commonly carried out in the first instance by
going door-to-door.159 An activist with the Heartland Alliance,
a nonprofit agency that works with HTAs in Chicago, consid-
ers this the hallmark of the HTAs: “a sort of vanguard, grass-
roots ph i l a n t h ro p y ” ca r ried out by organiza t i ons without
offices or paid staff. The money is moved entirely by volunteer
work “because they [HTAs] are so dedicated to the principle
that every cent should end up in the home community.”160
Many clubs have been able to procure, gratis, second-hand
fire engines and rescue vehicles and send them on to commu-
nities in Mexico.161 One example involves Santa Monica,
California, and Mazatlan, which are sister cities. The former,
via the Sinoloa Brotherhood of clubs,donates used ambulances
and fire engines that are repaired and put to use in Mazatlan.162
Each year, HTAs are beneficiaries of a raffle for the servic-
es of Chicago hospitals. When the San Luis Potosi HTA won
the lottery in 1998, club members went back home to assess
resources, patients, and local medical facilities and to choose
the appropriate site. Seventeen doctors and nurses traveled to
Matehuala, San Luis Potosi, and provided medical assistance.
In one instance, the sight of a blind man was restored by means
of a medical procedure unavailable in the region.163
A joint project of the Monte Escobedo, Zacatecas, clubs of
Chicago and Los Angeles saved a small Roman Catholic
school on the brink of extinction.164 The Comite San Miguel
Epejan, a Chicago Michoacan hometown association, con-
tributed $125,000 towards the state’s project of building a road
connecting the village to the county seat and the regional mar-
ket, thus contributing to the economic development of the
region.165 In order to raise money, HTAs hold soccer matches
and tournaments, and organize dances, raffles, barbecues,
C h ristmas and birt h d ay part i e s , c o n v iv i o s ( g e t - t o g e t h e r s ) ,
races, artistic recitals, and seminars, and they participate in
their federation’s annual beauty pageant (concurso de belleza or
certamen), celebrations of national and local holidays, and reli-
gious festivals.166
The home village’s annual fiesta of the patron saint is
always a signal event. Over the past thirty years, these yearly
festivals have become an major vehicle of return migration and
“a symbolic demonstration of the community’s cohesion in the
face of diaspora.”167 The fiestas now make an honored place for
“los ausentes”(the absent ones),who quite often finance the cel-
ebration with their fundraising activities in the United States.
Those who can afford it will choose this time of year to return
home, usually bearing hi-tech gifts. It is a time to start build-
ing or repairing a home with money earned and saved over the
past years. The fiestas are also local mating rites, when an
unmarried woman and a visiting bachelor may find romance,
courtship, and marriage.168
Back in the United States, the beauty pageant is often the
crowning annual social event for the HTA and will involve
many months of preparation. It is one of the main ways the
HTAs seek to involve the younger generation. Winners are
chosen not only for their comeliness but also for their under-
standing of the home community’s history and culture and for
their success in raising funds by selling raffle and dance tickets
or refreshments at association social and sports events.169
In Los Angeles each federation of clubs from Jalisco,
Michoacan, Sinaloa, and Sonora chooses its own queen. “No
mere beauty pageant,” a recent Los Angeles Times front page
feature called the Zacatecas contest, it is also “a cultural rite of
passage for members of a bridge generation, caught somewhere
between Mexico and the United States.”170 The highest scores
in the contests are racked up by cultural knowledge rather than
looks. Part of the former is gained in a two-week bus tour of
the state, with stops at each community represented in the con-
test. Besides banquets and parties “and midday dances with
boys not yet old enough to travel north,”the trip calls for “sober
examinations of the reasons why people left, and the projects
funded by U.S. clubs.”171 The finals take place in a Los Angeles
ballroom to the accompaniment of a band belting out typical
Zacatecan music, with contestants in “folkloric dresses, feath-
ered indigenous headpieces, skirts of bamboo”—all character-
istic of Zacatecas culture.172 Last year’s award ceremony was
held a month later at the Montebello Country Club and
attended by the new governor, Ricardo Monreal, and a dozen
Zacatecas mayors. “With an eye toward future voters,” several
U.S. politicians, including a Congressman and a city council-
man, were also in attendance.173
During the first week of August, the largest and oldest
HTA in the Los Angeles Oaxacan federation—Organizxacion
Regional de Oaxaca (ORO)—hosts the Guelaguetza, a festival of
regional dance, music, and costume that attracts some 6000
people annually.174 HTAs everywhere advertise their events on
local Spanish-language radio and television.175 The consulate
often helps spread the word about events, may defray the costs
of renting a hall, and promotes seminars and special events.
Consulates also furnish legal assistance and help with paper-
work.176
Mexican Independence Day, September 16, brings the
clubs together. In Los Angeles, over 200 clubs march in a
parade in regional costumes, underneath city or state banners,
with floats featuring their beauty pageant winners. 177 The asso-
ciations also often celebrate the Fifth of May (Cinco de Mayo),
another Mexican and Latino holiday.
Local, State, and National Ties:
The Federation of HTAs
The visit of a state governor sometimes has sparked the indi-
vidual social clubs to create a statewide federation.178 Individual
state governments, such as Guanajuato and Zacatecas, also
have also encouraged the formation of state federations of
hometown associations.179 The governors encourage federation
as the most convenient form for dealing with many hometown
associations; in turn, the HTAs find that federation helps win
state funds and attracts the governor to visit their area in the
U.S. Leaders who had encountered difficulty in gaining the
attention of town officials in Michoacan say that, since putting
together a federation, they found they had “much bigger keys
to open much bigger doors.” 180 Association members acknowl-
edge that they are often doing the work of the government, but
they are convinced that if everything were left to the govern-
ment, little would get done.Besides, the HTAs’ work catalyzes
additional government help now because of their remittances
and their public investments.
Despite such incentives, it is not always easy to federate.
This is especially true since the states themselves are not very
united. In Los Angeles, Oaxaca has three federations, reflect-
ing the indigenous character, tribal heterogeneity, and localism
of that mountainous,underdeveloped,and poor southern state,
as well as the relatively recent character of Oaxacan immigra-
tion.181 The three Oaxacan federations are divided along geo-
graphic and tribal political lines, with one (the ORO) sympa-
thetic to the government and two hostile to it.182 In Chicago,
where multiple Michoacan hometown associations existed for
some time, it took several years and the intervention of the
consulate, the PCME, the Zacatecas Federation of Southern
California,and finally the governor of Michoacan before a fed-
eration was formed.183 In Los Angeles, political differences
have impeded the formation of a Michoacan federation.184
The PCME plays a prominent role in the federating
process.It first began to encourage the federation of hometown
organizations in Los Angeles between 1991 and 1994. Partly as
a result of PCME-coordinated visits of state governors, state
federations of hometown clubs for the states of Aguascalientes,
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Sinaloa,and Tlascala were formed
in greater Los Angeles.185 The PCME, through the consulates,
has continued to help coordinate visits to U.S. clubs and feder-
ations by state governors and of mayors (“municipal presi-
dents”). Prominent individuals from other walks of life also pay
visit. This spring, the San Luis Potosi federation hosted the
Archbishop of San Luis Potosi along with the governor at its
annual festival.186 In Chicago, the PCME has been instrumen-
tal in instigating the formation of nine federations,each repre-
senting the hometown associations of an individual Mexican
state in the greater Chicago area. They are now planning to
federate these federations into a single Chicago-wide confed-
eration.187 According to the Mexican Foreign Office, by 1998
there were more than a dozen such regional federations.188 A
Mexican official claims that such “super federations” have not
prospered, however, and that they are not usually promoted by
the PCME or the consulates.189
The Statutes of the Federation of Zacatecas Clubs of
Southern California lists its objectives in the following order:
a) To unite and organize all Zacactecanos located in Southern
California through activities which lead to the social and
economic welfare of our communities here and in Zacatecas.
b) To encourage interest in preserving our customs and tradi-
tions by orientating and supporting our children and youth
and encouraging respect of the family unit.
c) To unite all members to assist in satisfying our legal and con-
sumer necessities by establishing relations with agencies that
provide social services such as hospitals, schools, insurance
companies, government agencies and similar associations
that can assist us.
d) To create a friendly and engaged relationship with the gov-
ernments of Mexico, Zacatecas, and municipalities of origin
so that together social and econ omic projects can be
achieved in our communities.190
Some of these regional federations are reaching out to one
another. Moreover, existing federations have contributed to the
formation of new federations. Leaders of the Los Angeles fed-
erations were invited by the PCME to Chicago. As a result,
“some of the [Chicago] federations … emerged very quickly
due to the enormous impact that the example of the federation
in Los Angeles had on them.”191
The formation of federations has linked otherwise dis-
persed hometown associations and their members.At the same
time, it paves the way for other linkages that transcend the
boundaries of the hometowns and states and brings together
Mexicans from various regions.The gala dinner celebrating the
formation of the Michoacan federation not only welcomed the
governor as honored guest but “became the first activity organ-
ized cooperatively by all of the clubs of Chicago.”192 The lead-
ers of the Jalisco and Zacatecas federations came to know
Jaliscensesand Zacatecanosin cities like Chicago, Denver, and
Spokane by assisting clubs there to form federations.193
In San Antonio, in addition to the association of local clubs
in state federations,the consulate has fostered the formation of
a citywide federation of federations.194 At least one national
federation of federations, the Casa Guanajuato,is contemplat-
ing opening an office in Washington, D.C., to lobby for the
interests of their members and region.195
It is interesting to note that Mexican immigrants prefer not
the supranational “Hispanic” or “Latino” organizations that
seek to organize in their communities, nor even “Mexican-
American” associations,but rather subnational,local groupings.
The latter legitimate and authenticate “one of the most ele-
mentary forms of immigrant identity, their roots in their place
of origin.”196 As one of the contributors to the Binational Study
on migration between Mexico and the United States states,
“immigrants are not the primary constituents of … U.S. based
Hispanic organizations.”197 Once organized in local clubs,how-
ever, they begin to seek, as we have seen, broader affiliations
with other local clubs in state federations and with other city
federations or with associations from their hometown located
in other parts of the U.S.
While obviously reinforcing ties to Mexico, these contacts
can also constitute part of the process of assimilation to the
United States. Historically, as Thomas Sowell points out,
immigrants have “tended to assimilate first with compatriots
from different parts of their country or origin, and later with
members of the larger society around them in the country
where they settled.”198
Comparatively few first-generation Mexicans have reached
even the first stage of this process—their lives rarely afford
them the leisure—but the very effort to organize clubs and fed-
erations brings many immigrants into contact with the larger
American society. Association leaders learn how to form non-
profit organizations, create charters and bylaws, and reach out
to lawyers and become acquainted with the legal process.199
Some come to master customs, regulations, and arrangements
for transferring and monitoring substantial remittances to
Mexico.200 Members meet donors who offer medical, account-
ing, and legal services.201 In the process, they are absorbing
American values and practices and discarding Mexican ones.
For many members,the hometown association is a springboard
to community involvement in the host country.202
The Impact of HTAs on Governance 
and Politics in Mexico 
One of the most impressive features of the associations is their
handling of the collection, transfer, and investment of funds in
Mexico, a country that, especially in rural areas, is marked by
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endemic corruption, clientelism, and informality. The HTAs’
scrupulous procedures have encouraged more regular proce-
dures in Mexico.
Victor M. Espinosa’s study of the federation of Michoacan
hometown associations in Illinois notes their “scrupulously
updated membership lists” and well-documented collection
procedures—replete with receipts, public reports by treasurers
and secretaries, close tracking of expenditures, cosigning of
checks,and other procedures and controls learned in the U.S.203
Chicago-area club leaders have formed parallel committees in
Michoacan villages to consult with the community about pri-
orities, develop proposals, and “monitor implementation and
follow-up of projects undertaken.”204 Some of these parallel
committees are elected in open,public meetings in which trust-
worthy and independent individuals are sought.The donations
of the Oaxaca ORO are monitored by an elected committee for
each project. Receipts, bills, videos, and photographs are
employed in the monitoring process.205
The Zacatecas federations likewise have an extensive mon-
itoring system. Projects are first approved by the federation. If
they are to qualify for state or federal matching funds (see pp.
35-36 below, “State Programs”), proposals must carry the sig-
nature of the federation officers. That requires a feasibility
study and a technical business plan. Each community that
receives funds has a committee that represents the donating
club in the United States.This committee is elected by the res-
idents. For each project a subcommittee is also formed. This
subcommittee buys the materials,contracts laborers,and estab-
lishes competitive bidding for contractors. In the case of a
matching funds “three-for-one program” (see pp. 35-36 below,
“State Programs”), supervisors from the state, federal govern-
ment, muncipality, and the federation monitor the project.
Receipts and bills must be presented to the supervisors. “You
can bribe one supervisor, but it’s pretty hard to bribe four,”
commented one federation office.206
Federation leaders add that these open, competitive, and
transparent procedures enhance the credibility of the local and
state government. Thus, the hometown associations promote
“open and honest governance” and stimulate “unprecedented
voluntary participation in their communities of origin.”207
In some regions, where there is a history of corruption
among local authorities, committees have excluded traditional
officials with bad records. In others, returning migrants who
have retired from their jobs have themselves become elected
officials. “Thus the hometown associations and their parallel
committees in Michoacan have become alternative structures
for decision-making at the local level in the communities of
origin.”208 Officers of the Zacatecas Federation of Southern
California speak of a “parallel government.”209 This competition
can sometimes lead to conflict: Some local officials complain
that, when they do not follow the agendas of their wealthy
Am e ri can cousins, the latter become “s e l f - ri g h t e o u s ” a n d
accuse them of “corruption” without offering any evidence.
The hometown movement is an inconspicuous and uncel-
ebrated channel of American influence in Mexico: generally
fostering transparency, accountability, voluntary organization,
and political competition in a country attempting to achieve
the transition to a market economy and democracy. Such a
transition, it might be added, is the best hope for reducing
immigration flows into the United States.
The hometown associations have adopted American tech-
nology as well as American practices of organization, account-
ability, and self-government. Club leaders in San Antonio and
Chicago use videotape to document key meetings and send
them to their counterparts at home.210
The clubs also organize hometown visits. The importance
of the immigrants and the social clubs in Mexico is illustrated
by the fact that they are often formally greeted on visits home
for the holidays by the municipal president.211 Conversely, the
associations frequently invite hometown officials—secular and
religious—to appear at events in the United States. Governors
and other local officials then will often spice their speeches
with descriptions of the needs of their state or municipality and
will appeal for the investment of remittances.212
In many rural villages of the sender states, the hometown
associations have become political actors.This is most conspic-
uously the case with the Zacatecas associations, but it is also
t rue elsew h e re in states such as Gu a n a j u a t o, J a l i s c o,
Michoacan, and Puebla. Like many of the Zacatecas associa-
tions, the Puebla Club Solidaridad Chinantla de Nueva York
became a factor in local Mexican politics as early as the late
1980s. In 1989, the Club actually ran a candidate for mayor.
The candidacy led to a formal agreement between the club and
the PRI-led municipal government. Following the par ty’s tra-
d i t i onal pra c t i c e, the PRI was seeking to co-opt an
autonomous rival by effectively agreeing to negotiate with him
in making future local decisions.213
There are 1.5 million registered Mexican voters living in
the United States, according to the Mexican Federal Election
Institute. Every electoral district along the border is installing
several special polling places for them. Over the past two years,
it had become almost commonplace for Mexican state gover-
nors in Mexico to campaign among Mexican communities in
the United States at election time.
But the 2000 Mexican presidential campaign posted a
landmark in émigré involvement in Mexican political cam-
paigns as all three major political parties actively courted
Mexican communities in the United States. The presidential
candidates of the two opposition parties came to the United
States to campaign in immigrant communities. Both barn-
stormed through California, and Vicente Fox also traveled to
Chicago. The PRI’s Francisco Labastida Ochoa had made a
campaign pledge not to leave Mexico until after the election,
but he sent his wife and daughter to the U.S. in his stead.214
O p p o s i t i on campaigns con c e n t rated their efforts in
California, Texas, Illinois,Michigan, Oregon, and Washington
state, all of which have large Mexican communities. Campaign
officials for Cuauhtemoc Cardenas said they hoped to mobilize
100,000 registered Mexican residing in California to vote in
Mexico for their candidate. The leader of Mexican Migrants
for Change, who invited Fox to California, told The San Diego
Union-Tribune that her organization would “send teams into
Mexico during the final days of the campaign ‘to convince peo-
ple of the importance of change….We are beginning to realize
that we have influence.’”215
But most U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans would
exercise their political influence from a distance—by lobbying
relatives, friends, and neighbors with phone calls, postcards,
and messages tucked into money transfers.The Fox campaign,
which was running a close second to Labastida at the time, was
anxious to offset the PRI advantage in rural districts by gain-
ing the support of the influential émigré communities. That
campaign devoted part of the funds raised on U.S. soil—they
cannot be used in Mexico—to purchasing postcards to be sent
home before the elections.Fox told The Washington Posthat he
hoped as many as two million cards would be sent:“‘These are
people who are sustaining the economy [in their hometowns],
and they have moral authority in their families to influence
votes,” Fox said.216
The candidates were also capitalizing on the publicity they
would garner in the Mexican media from events staged in the
United States. Fox used his departure for Chicago to inform
the Mexico City daily La Reformathat he was going to “visit
Mexicans expelled by Labastida’s PRI, that had to leave
because the regime is murdering them in their own land with
starvation.”217
Another novelty in this year’s campaign was the presence of
U.S. Mexicans as candidates. A Chicago activist who works
with some of the HTAs, Raul Ross, became the first Mexican
living in the U.S. to be nominated for federal deputy candidate
in the Mexican Congress.The native of Veracruz had lived in
Chicago for almost fifteen years and was running for election
under the Alliance for Mexico, a coalition of five political par-
ties led by the PRD. Ross, who is also director of Mexican
affairs for the Am e ri can Friends Se rvice Committee in
Chicago, told the Chicago Tribunethat he intended to represent
the interests of U.S. Mexicans: “They should have a voice and
a vote in congressional matters.”218
The Automobile Deposit Affair
One demonstration of the growing influence of Mexican com-
munities in the United States on Mexican politics—and an
illustration of the distance and even rancor that separates some
U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans from the Mexican gov-
ernment—was a dispute over automobile deposits in the fall of
1999. The hometown clubs were instrumental in forcing the
Mexican government to cancel a highly visible public policy.
HTAs and the Mexican government began to lock horns in
October 1999 when the government raised the deposit for
incoming foreign vehicles from $11 to between $400 and $800.
Mexico was trying to stem the tide of illegal used cars and
trucks brought in by migrants as well as contraband gangs. In
recent years, the number of illegally circulating vehicles had
soared to some 1.5 million—one out of every ten vehicles in
M e x i c o — evading duties and damaging local pro d u c e r s ,
according to government officials. The vehicles are especially
popular in sender states such as Chihuahua, Durango, Guana-
juato, Michoacan,and Zacatecas, where emigrants have helped
to improve roads and the vehicles often replace donkey-drawn
carts. Vehicles often cost twice as much in Mexico, where the
country’s banking crisis also has made automobile loans pro-
h i b i t i ve . Lo cal automobile producers such as Daimler-
Chrysler, Ford,General Motors, Nissan,and Volkswagen enjoy
protective tariffs negotiated under NAFTA and are responsible
for 18 percent of Mexico’s manufacturing jobs. The Mexican
dispute over the “chocolates,” as the illegal vehicles are called,
dates from the 1970s.
The 1999 climax of the controversy pitted peasants against
industrialists and state governors against central authorities.
For years, Mexican authorities had tolerated the “chocolates.”
The vehicles used to be “amnestied” around election time, and
if authorities did try to seize the vehicles, protesting peasant
groups blocked thoroughfares. The new PRI governor of
Chihuahua, which borders Texas and New Mexico, discovered
upon taking office in October 1998 that half the vehicles in the
state were illegal.The governor claimed that some of the ille-
gal vehicles were being used in holdups and robberies and con-
tributing to the rising crime wave.He then challenged the fed-
eral government, which has authority over imports, by having
the state register and tax the illegal vehicles.That drew the fire
of Mexico’s Treasury Minister, who hauled the governor into
the Mexican Supreme Court. Fellow state governors made
common cause with their Chihuahuan colleague in what they
saw as the latest and most critical round of a rising conflict
between local and federal authorities.
With pressures building from various sides,the federal gov-
ernment resolved to levy the fee.219 The measure would have
forced many Mexicans to cancel planned visits.As many as two
million were expected to come home for the holidays, many
driving automobiles.220
Hometown associations in Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los
Angeles, San Antonio, and San Diego immediately began
organizing weekly demonstrations outside Mexican consulates.
These were sometimes led by activists from the left-leaning
opposition party, the PRD. The associations declared a boycott
against Mexican products. Projected automobile caravans to
Mexico were cancelled.221 Several West Coast associations
protested at their consulates and in Tijuana.222 They told offi-
cials that the deposits “instead of being spent in Mexico would
stay on the border.”223 PRD activists and some HTA members
formed a group called the International Coalition of Mexicans
Abroad (CIME), one of whose activist leaders told The Dallas
Morning News: “If the United States government required us to
pay a deposit, we would kick and scream, but we’d comply
because we know we’ll get our money back. With the Mexican
government, there is absolutely no trust.”224 The leaders of the
Zacatecas Federation of Southern California, among others,
made it clear that they did not believe in street protests but
would write letters to the authorities.225 (The Sinoloa federa-
tion did not join the protests because its rules prohibit partici-
pation in political events.)226
Responding to the protests,several U.S. lawmakers,includ-
ing Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas), wrote Mexico’s
ambassador to the United States, requesting that the govern-
ment rescind the plan. Hutchison threatened to hold Senate
hearings on the car deposit policy.227 U.S.-based consular offi-
cials, claiming they were never consulted by Mexican treasury
department officials, sent strong protests to Mexico City,
reflecting the sentiments of the hometown associations and
others in the Mexican diaspora.228 The proposed policy itself,
drawn up by Mexican treasury officials, also unleashed a
slugfest within the government.229
On December 3, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, in an
awkward about-face, announced the cancellation of the policy
two days after it had been implemented. Zedillo’s shift came
two hours after the Mexican Senate, with support from both
the opposition and leaders of his own party, had passed a reso-
lution calling on him to scrap the plan. The lower legislative
house was set to pass a similar resolution.230
The decision was greeted jubilantly by Mexican hometown
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associations. “I applaud the decision, because so many of our
Mexican brothers travel with just enough for expenses and
couldn’t afford the deposit,”Gerardo Escamilla,the head of the
San Antonio Casa Nuevo Leon, told Reuters.231 “We are cele-
brating,”exulted Luis Eduardo Pelayo Gomez to TheNew York
Times. Pelayo Gomez, an opposition activist involved with
hometown associations in Chicago, told the Times:“This is the
first time the Mexican community here managed to bring this
kind of pressure on Mexico. It shows that we can use our power
and make changes.”232 The chief of staff for a Texas legislator
who played a key role in lobbying for the immigrants told the
Dallas Morning News that the immigrants’ political clout “will
have future ramifications for years to come.”233 The role of the
more politically oriented of the associations was so decisive
that one Mexican consular official said it could mark a new
stage in which the associations start to engage the federal gov-
ernment as interlocutors.
Activists from the left-leaning PRD also saw the event as a
w a t e r s h e d . CIME held its first conve n t i on in Dallas in
February 2000.234 By April, the group was lobbying the U.S.
Congress and meeting with prominent members such as
Representative Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), the chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over immi-
gration laws,and Lamar Smith (R-Texas), who chairs its immi-
gration subcommittee.235 The lobbying effort was part of a
binational agenda on behalf of U.S. Mexicans in the United
States and Mexico. Coalition members told the Dallas Morning
News that the mainstream Latino organizations such as NCLR
and LULAC “do not represent their interests in this country.”
Pointing to countries such as Colombia, France, and Ireland,
the coalition planned to push for immigrant representatives
with full voting rights in the two Mexican legislative cham-
bers.236 The group announced its intention to register as a polit-
ical-action committee. Along with demands on the Mexican
government, the ten pages of coalition resolutions sought
action by the U.S. government on a new amnesty for illegal
aliens,protection of the civil rights of immigrants, and the pro-
motion of safer working conditions and better wages for immi-
grant workers.237
Future Prospects 
Mexican officials worry that the hometown associations may
have reached their apogee since such a high proportion of
members are first-genera t i on immigra n t s , b e n e f i c i a ries of
IRCA’s 1986 amnesty. It is true that children participate in the
activities of the club via sports leagues, beauty pageants, and
organized visits to the hometown,238 and the cult of the Virgin
of Guadalupe has awakened interest among youth in Mexico
and thus led to involvement in hometown associations.239 Some
of the younger generation go on to become members,and a few
become leaders of the associations. But that is hardly the rule.
Most association leaders believe that their organizations will be
replenished not through their children but through the ongo-
ing entry of new immigrants.240
Mexican hometown associations today, like organizations
of other immigrant populations in the past,have had a difficult
time attracting the second generation. One illustration is the
difficulty many members have in persuading their daughters to
enter in the annual federation beauty contest. Last year’s search
for Senorita Zacatecas “began,as it does every year, with a des-
perate scramble for candidates.”241 The bylaws of the Zacatecas
Federation require that each club participate, but less than half
of the HTAs turned out candidates notwithstanding radio
commercials and badgering the eligible daughters of their
members. Every year it becomes more difficult to find an
attractive, articulate teenager who speaks decent Spanish, has
the time and the inclination to trudge through rural construc-
tion sites or peer into community wells,and is willing to endure
the old-fashioned corniness of it all: “American culture pulls
strongly on these young women, while Zacatecas threatens to
become ever more faded and remote.” 242
There are exceptions. The current leaders of many of the
Michoacan hometown associations in Chicago “are the sons
and nephews of the organization’s founders.”243 These new
leaders were educated in U.S. schools and tasted organization-
al work in Latino student groups and in high school and col-
lege sports. Their higher educational level is reflected in the
quality of their newsletters and their involvement in Chicago
area local politics on school boards and in social service agen-
cies, and as supporters of Mexican-American candidates for
local and state office. But it appears far more common for off-
spring to resist their parents’attempts to integrate them as their
successors.
In any event, as long as Mexican immigration remains at
high levels, the hometown clubs figure to persist and to expand
their activities, contacts, and concerns. If, as the AFL-CIO
proposed on February 16, 2000, amnesty is again granted to
current illegal aliens, HTAs will be major beneficiaries.
Like all ascriptive organizations—based on family, ethnici-
ty, geographic origin, or some other characteristic acquired at
birth—the role of hometown associations in a modern society
is limited. Among first-generation immigrants, HTAs have
helped create small businesses,banks, charities,and other insti-
tutions critical to success and integration. But in succeeding
generations they can become an obstacle, reducing the range of
economic and social opportunity and fostering parochialism,
chauvinism, and ethnic ghettoes. Crucial will be the extent to
which these associations can inspire confidence and trust not
only among their members but in the entire community and
nation.244
The American Character of the HTAs
I asked several club and federation leaders and members, as
well as officials of Mexican cultural institutes, why Mexicans,
who are generally unwilling or unable to establish independent
organizations in their native land, so often succeed in doing so
in the United States. The leader of the Jalisco Federation said
that in Mexico “the people remain subjugated to the PRI.They
don’t want problems.Here’s there’s more freedom.”245 Members
of the Club Ixtlan del Riopointed out that, in Mexico, “the
clubs are exclusive, only for those with money. And they’re all
organized by the PRI or the government.”246 Here, the immi-
grants found others in like circumstances, and the equality of
conditions make it easy to mingle and join. Dante Gomez of
the Mexican Cultural and Educational Institute of Chicago,
who for two years has been the Chicago consulate’s point-per-
son with hometown organizations in the area, gave four rea-
sons: (1) immigrants are influenced by the “organizational
environment” of U.S. society; (2) a U.S. perspective allows the
Mexican-born to perceive “the deficiencies of our country”and
to develop a “critical spirit”; (3) some members have achieved
the leisure time to dedicate to organizational tasks; and (4)
independent organization is discouraged in Mexico, especially
in the rural areas from which most club members hail.
Club leaders belonging to the Michoacan federation in
Chicago speak of the “transmission of certain traditional val-
ues, including the promotion of voluntary participation ....”
They maintain that “these values are opposed to the political
apathy, individualism and anonymity of urban life in the
U. S. ”2 4 7 T h u s , the Mexica n - b o rn may indeed be more
“American” than many native-born when it comes to this key
aspect of American society. The president of the Jalisco
Federation agreed that in organizing they were not imitating
Americans. “Americans go to work and then come home and
watch TV. They don’t worry about things. We meet at parties
(pachangas). We socialize (convivimos) more than the Ameri-
cans do.”248 Yet 150 years ago Alexis de Tocqueville called
attention to “the immense assemblage of associations” in the
United States:
… Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions
constantly form associations….They have not only commercial
and manufacturing associations … but … religious,moral,seri-
ous, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The
Americans make associations to give enterainments, to found
seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse
books, to send missionaries to the antipodes.249
HTAs serve to demonstrate that civil society develops most
strongly under a liberal democratic regime, whatever the ethnic
composition of the individuals involved.
“Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see
the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the
United States you will be sure to find an association , ”
Tocqueville wrote.250 In Mexico, “new undertakings” have been
monopolized for seventy years by the PRI and even longer by
the government. More often than not that means inaction
rather than action, that roads, clinics, wells, or schools will not
be built. When asked why they did not organize in Mexico as
they do in the U.S., Mexican immigrants responded that fear
of government reprisals and extortion impede independent
organization in their homeland. In Mexico, nearly everything
requires a permit from some government official and that
means a hefty bribe or kickback. This has begun to change,
especially with respect to political associations and opposition
parties. But in the rural areas from which most immigrants
hail, the old order often prevails.
HTA Citizenship Promotion and Political
Participation in the Host Country
The various events sponsored by hometown associations—
from regular soccer games to annual beauty contests—bring
Mexican migrants together on a regular basis, not only for
recreation but also for exchange of information on jobs, hous-
ing, and schools. The talk may also encompass politics, espe-
cially when an issue arises affecting Mexicans.
Political activism in the host country appears to be the
exception rather than the rule, but leaders of hometown asso-
ciations generally appear to encourage naturalization. Since
these are organizations dedicated to preserving ties to the old
country, “the widespread consensus among HTA leaders about
the importance of attaining citizenship is in some senses con-
trary to expectation.”251 The president of the Asociacion de
Clubes Nayaritasexplained her efforts to overcome Mexicans’
resistance to naturalization in a 1997 interview:
...[A]s an association we have to say to people, “become citi-
zens, you’re not betraying your nation, you keep your roots
inside of yourselves and nobody can take your roots away, no
one can change our love for where we were born. But think
about your kin and your grandchildren, they are the ones who
need you to pave the way so that they don’t have so many prob-
lems in the future, especially the ones who were born here,
they’re not going to live in Mexico.” 252
According to Zabin and Escala, there was widespread
involvement by the HTAs in the opposition to Proposition
187:
The federations and most independent clubs all ended up
supporting the campaign against this initiative. Their suppor t
took various forms including: donating funds to “Taxpayers
against Prop. 187,” the main professional political campaign
against the proposition, participating in the October, 1994
street demonstration, which was Los Angeles’ largest demon-
stration since the Vietnam War, promoting the vote among
their affiliates, and using the media to influence public opin-
ion.253
One club leader stated that “Proposition 187 opened our eyes
to the necessity of getting involved in issues that affect the
community here ….”254
The Proposition 187 dispute spurred naturalization among
Mexicans, but it has not led to sustained political participation
by HTAs. Proposition 187 stood as an exception for most of
the leaders. And even then some club presidents “w e re
adamant that their clubs should not get involved in politics.”
Following Tocqueville’s distinction, most leaders see their
clubs as “voluntary organizations” but not as “political associa-
tions.” Zabin and Escala found that in Los Angeles most club
presidents felt that “the main work of the clubs was to help
their origin communities in Mexico and to provide a way for
their compatriots to maintain social links in this country.”
While not actively opposed to political participation, they sim-
ply did not see it as their “primary mission.” Club presidents
often bring “from Mexico their profound distrust of the polit-
ical process and politicians.” Only a minority of association
leaders and members think the clubs should be more actively
involved in U.S. politics. A member of the leadership of the
Zacatecas federation and some leaders of small clubs shared
the more activist view. But Zabin and Escala comment that
“discussion or action concerning U.S. politics” is “notably
absent” from the general activity of the clubs and federations.255
The issue of political participation led to factional conflict
in the largest of the hometown federations, the Zacatecas
Federation of Southern California. The “Traditional” group,
which reportedly had a closer relationship with the consulate,
the PCME, and the PRI, held that the federation should focus
on helping the clubs carry out their investment and philan-
thropy in the hometowns by putting their energies into raffles,
dances, and beauty pageants. The “Politicals” wished to main-
tain the former work but also wanted the federation to play a
more active political role on both sides of the border.256
The conflict first came to a head in the hotly contested
1997 elections for the leadership of the federation, which was
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won by the Traditionals.The losers complained of irregularities
and claimed that the Mexican consular officials had doctored
the vote (which was held in the consulate).257 Soon after the
vote, the governor of Zacatecas turned up in Los Angeles “on
an unplanned visit … allegedly to ensure that the election dis-
pute did not fracture the federation.”258
The next year, a second and perhaps decisive round was
fought. Ricardo Monreal, the apparent PRI nominee, came to
Los Angeles in November 1997 to seek support for his candi-
dacy for the governorship of Zacatecas.He met with members
of the Zacatecas federation and made a favorable impression
on the Politicals faction,which decided to back him.259 Back in
Mexico, however, party bosses unexpected ly blocked his nom-
ination. In February 1998,Monreal and 5000 of his supporters
resigned from the PRI and joined a coalition of opposition par-
ties,led by the PRD.260 The Politicals decided to continue their
support of Monreal ’s candidacy while the Traditionals contin-
ued to back the PRI candidate.
The Po l i t i cals formed the Fre n te Civico Zaca tac e n o
(Zacatecan Civic Front), which organized political rallies in
Southern California in support of Monreal. The Frente also
arranged for the candidate to do radio spots on California sta-
tions, calling on local Zacatecanos to get their relatives back
home to vote for him.261 Both candidates campaigned in
California, even though U.S. Mexicans cannot vote in Mexico.
Monreal visited twice during the spring campaign.262 Monreal’s
spokesperson called his California campaign swings “very
important, if not definitive.”263
The intensity of that campaign produced discord in the
Zacatecas federation.The organization survived,but Monreal’s
victory invigorated the Politicals faction, which had endorsed
him, campaigned for him in Zacatecas, and raised money for
him. One of Monreal’s first official acts was to name his lead-
ing U.S. supporter to a newly created cabinet position of liaison
with the Zacatecas hometown associations in the United
States. He then asked the state legislature to create two addi-
tional seats for U.S. residents—a first for Mexico.264 On the
strength of their victory, and of their warm relationship with
the new governor, the Politicals defeated the Traditionals in the
next federation leadership elections.265
The Frente Civico Zacatecanonow seeks to become a polit-
ical organization that works on both sides of the border. In
California, the Frente endorses and supports candidates from
both U.S. political parties. It has developed alliances with local
unions and elected officials.During elections,it operates a tele-
phone chain, gives press conferences, puts up banners and
posters, interviews candidates, and endorses them on the
Zacatecas radio station in Los Angeles. The Frente draws on
members of the federation but is independent from it. It does
not accept group membership and so HTAs may not affiliate
with the Frente. The latter, according the federation’s interpre-
tation of the law, would be illegal, since the federation and
many of its HTAs are nonprofit organizations. The president
of the Frente, Guatalupe Gomez, says that its political force
derives from its strength in the grassroots and its “lines of com-
munication” with elected officials.266
In June, Gomez joined the leaders of several of the major
Los Angeles hometown federations in the HTAs’ first concert-
ed effort to influence U.S. policy. Federation presidents from
Zacateca, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Oaxaca, and Sinaloa announced
their support for organized labor’s call for immigration reform
and a new amnesty. The announcement was made at the Los
Angeles County Federation of Labor and was described by the
Los Angeles Times as marking “a turning point for the clubs,
which are increasingly looking for ways to help fellow immi-
grants here …. ”267 The “potentially powerful coalition”—as the
Los Angeles Timesdescribed it—was formed at a time when the
AFL-CIO, led by unions in Southern California,has turned to
urban Latino immigrants, who work mainly in low-tech and
service industries, for the bulk of its new recruitment drive.268
Raul Hinojosa, director of the North American Integration
and Development Center at UCLA, noted that
these kinds of networks were a backbone of the labor move-
ment 100 years ago. Italians, for example, had very strong
hometown networks that labor tapped into in New York.
What’s interesting is that in this current wave of immigration,
the labor movement has taken so long to find them….These
immigrant networks are already organized.That’s an incredible
advantage.269
Educational Efforts of the HTAs
Members of the Los Angeles Club Ixtlan del Rioof Nayarit
told me that, because members lived in different parts of the
city, it was very difficult to organize political participation even
in school communities. But the HTAs do often have educa-
tional programs—not only Spanish and English classes, but
also citizenship classes.270 The clubs generally do not have the
resources to pay teachers,who are therefore contracted through
the consulate via the various educational programs of the
Mexican Education Department (SEP) and the PCME.271 The
Club Amigos de Coahuilain San Antonio gets help from the
consulate for its Spanish classes and finances the English class-
es on its own.272 This also appears to be the pattern in
C h i ca go.2 7 3 The Oaxaca ORO fe d e ra t i on provides both
Spanish and English classes as well as classes in the indigenous
Zapotec language. George J. Borjas concluded that “as much as
half of the relative wage growth experienced by immigrants in
the first twenty years after arrival may be attributed to the gains
f rom learning the English language.”2 7 4 I n d e e d , H i s p a n i c
immigrants with English earn 17 percent more than those
without it.275 Of course, the benefits of English are sharply
reduced if one lives and works in a Mexican community.276
While some of the members of the HTAs and of other
Mexican-American organizations I talked with seemed to
favor bilingual education, others stressed that “English is
everything.”277 The president of the Jalisco federation in Los
Angeles contended that parents who were more involved (al
tanto) with their children or had higher aspirations for them
tended to be less supportive of bilingual programs.278 On the
other hand, several club leaders liked the bilingual program
because it aided them in achieving their goal of producing
bilingual children.279 “Children are like sponges, they absorb
languages.”280 A common complaint about bilingual programs
was that the teachers were “incompetent.”281 Many club mem-
bers and leaders supported bilingual education methods when
it came to adults or adolescents, but not for children.282
Educational issues deserve a chapter of their own, which
follows.
T
he PCME considers educa t i on crucial to the
demand of Mexican residents in the United States
for “just and equitable opportunities for employ-
ment.” For this reason it has promoted, with the
support of the Mexican Education Department
(SEP),programs in the areas of bilingual education,adult edu-
cation, and migrant education. The Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Relations (SRE) coordinates the services of the various
Mexican programs in the U.S. These programs have no central
organization in the United States. As a result, “most people are
not aware of the many activities in which the Mexican educa-
tion establishment in involved in the United States.”283 Since
most programs are arranged between local U.S. school districts
and Mexican state or federal entities, it is not possible to pro-
vide more than a general idea of their scope here.
Historical Background
The activities in the United States of the SEP preceded the ini-
tiatives of the Salinas administration by more than a decade.
The SEP’s involvement with U.S. bilingual education dates
from the mid-1970s. According to the SEP official who super-
vised the program, the initiative for cooperation with bilingual
programs came from the United States.284
Educators in the Pajaro Valley Unified School District
(Santa Cruz, Calfornia) became aware that a large number of
children in their schools all came from Gomez Farias in
Michoacan.These children spent the winter months in Gomez
Farias and the rest of the year with their migrant parents in
California. They were denied access to the Gomez Farias
schools because they were not present at the start of the school
year. In 1976,the Pajaro Valley district administrator asked one
of the teachers to investigate the situation in Gomez Farias.
She convinced Mexican federal officials to allow the migrant
children to attend the Gomez Farias schools.285 When the
teacher returned, she helped establish in 1977 the Gomez
Fa ri a s – Pa j a ro Va ll ey Pro j e c t , s u p p o rted by the Californ i a
Migrant Education Program.286 By 1978, SEP had established
a special department “to support the education of Mexicans in
the United States.”287 Under the acronym MEDIR (Migrant
Education Data International Record), the Pajaro Valley proj-
ect spread to several other California districts and to other
M e x i can sender com munities in Gu a n a j u a t o, M on t e r rey,
Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon.288 Along with local and California
state funding, the project received grants from UNESCO and
from the David and Lucille Packard Foundation.289 In 1982,
the Binational Project between Michoacan and California was
inaugurated.290
By the late 1970s, the SEP had developed a pilot program
with the California Department of Education for teachers and
administrators.The program focused not only on Spanish but
on Mexican history and culture.291 Literacy courses for Mexican
adults in the U.S. were established and the practice of donating
excess school textbooks for supplementary purposes became
widespread.292 In 1979, summer courses for U.S. bilingual edu-
cation teachers began to be offered in Oaxtepec, Mexico.293
By the 1980s, the SEP had begun sending Mexican teach-
ers to schools in Los Angeles and Chicago with large Hispanic
populations lacking English.294 In 1982,with the support of the
SEP, the Colegio de la Frontera Norte was opened in Tijuana.
The Colegio, now part of the University of the Northern
Border, has become the leading center for the study of Mexican
migration to the United States.295
During the 1970s and ’80s, there were “handsome U.S.
budgets for bilingual education,” creating a great demand for
the services of the SEP.296 In California and other U.S. states,
Spanish teaching methods were “antiquated.”The SEP helped
m o d e rn i ze instru c t i on for Spanish-language teach e r s .2 9 7
Binational meetings and the formation of binational working
groups became common.The SEP also imparted courses intro-
ducing “the world view” of Mexican culture, Mexican history,
and regional Mexican differences. The courses explained the
socioeconomic pressures leading Mexicans to emigrate.
The initial SEP programs and other initiatives suffered a
setback after 1982, when a severe financial crisis (then becom-
ing the rule in Mexico every six years) forced drastic budget
reductions. It was not until the Salinas administration that the
Mexican government was prepared to take another big step
forward. But most of the SEP programs continued, though
many on a reduced basis. Some individual state governments,
most notably Zacatecas, began developing their own programs
for their own immigrant populations. 298
In August 1990,the U.S. Department of Education and the
Mexican SEP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
on Education.299 The memorandum established closer U.S.-
Mexican cooperation on education issues and programs within
the already established framework of the United States/Mexico
Binational Commission. The memorandum has been called
“the most comprehensive agreement that the U.S. Department
of Education has made with any nation.”300 It contains an auto-
matic provision for successive two-year extensions.301
Proposition 227, the “English for the Children” ballot ini-
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tiative approved by California’s voters in June 1998, appears to
have somewhat curtailed this extensive program. For the past
three years, the courses in Oaxtepec have been suspended,
though there are plans to resume them this year with students
from Texas, Chicago, Wisconsin, and California.302
Bilingual Education
The Washington Post reports that “bilingual education has
grown increasingly controversial in some portions of the coun-
try because immigrant students sometimes spend years speak-
ing mostly their native language in special cl a s s e s . ”3 0 3
According to The San Jose Mercury News, limited-English stu-
dents tested in the spring of 1999 “made more reading and
math progress in elementary schools that switched from bilin-
gual to English immersion than in schools where most stu-
dents used waivers to stay in bilingual classes….Except for
fourth-grade math, there was more progress in every grade in
the English immersion schools.”304 Nonetheless, the PCME
declares: “In education, the basic concept is that a full knowl-
edge of Spanish constitutes the main instrument for learning a
second language, in this case English.”305 Officials from the
SEP and PCME, as well as many other Mexican officials with
whom I talked,hold that Spanish instruction is essential for the
education of Mexicans in the United States. They regard this
as “scientifically proven”306 and not a matter of controversy.
They cite “the studies of Fishman and Cummings and many
others.”307
The position of the U.S. Department of Education appears
to coincide with that of the Mexican government.The website
of the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Bilingual
Education and Minority Language Affairs states that “research
over the last decade in bilingual classrooms with established
models of instructional excellence indicates that utilization of
and facility in the primary language enhances the acquisition of
a second language.” But a comprehensive 1997 National
Research Council report on the subject found most of the
research supporting bilingual education unscientific and incon-
clusive.308
In principle, the director of special programs at the SEP
sees no reason why bilingual programs should be transitional at
all. “They should go all the way to the university. The ideal
would be for everyone to speak two languages, especially in a
globalized world.”309 They perceive several advantages in bilin-
gual education:
n A bilingual individual has a greater capacity for academic
and general development.
n The bilingual student identifies with the Spanish-speaking
teacher, thereby strengthening his own cultural roots and
facilitating learning.
n A language is a window to a culture.
n Bilingual education preserves family values.Immigrant chil-
dren who retain the mother tongue have stronger ties to
their parents. This increases parental authority and decreas-
es the sway of television, gangs,and drug traffickers. On the
other hand, children who lose the mother tongue are more
exposed to these noxious influences.
But Mexican officials stress that they do not see themselves
as promoters of bilingual education in the United States, but
rather as serving a demand that has its origin in local U.S.
school systems or the federal educational apparatus of the
United States. “We only come when we are invited,” the direc-
tor of the PCME told me.310 One PCME official stressed that
“bilingual education is a U.S. policy not a Mexican policy.”311 At
the same time, PCME officials pointed to Mexican bilingual
programs with indigenous peoples in Mexico.312
“In particular, PCME has concentrated its efforts on immi-
grants and children whose first need is to master Spanish in
order to then learn a second language.”313 With the support of
the states, Mexican normalista teachers are sent to schools
densely populated with Spanish monolingual students to act as
low-paid assistants for short periods, usually during summer
school for children needing special attention.314
The PCME boasts of its strong ties with the National
Association for Bilingual Education (NABE) and with state
associations for bilingual education in California, Colorado,
and Texas, as well as the National Association of State
Directors for Bilingual Education (NASDME). Since the for-
mation of the PCME, Mexican government officials and edu-
cators have regular ly made presentations at the annual NABE
conference. In 1991, Mexican educators spoke on theories of
bilingual education. At the 1992 conference, they introduced a
new program of Spanish instruction. During the 1993 confer-
ence, forty specialists from twenty-five Mexican educational
institutions organized displays and presented workshops on
education in Mexico.315 By 2000, the Mexican presence was
somewhat more modest. The main presentations were by
PCME officials on their program objectives and on distance
learning.316 The PCME is proud of Mexico’s having been
awarded the NABE’s Presidential Prize for 1997 for its support
of bilingual education in the U.S.317
But there are critics. Jorge Amselle of the Center for Equal
Opportunity in Washington, D.C., sees Mexico’s relationship
with NABE as part of an effort to undermine California’s
Proposition 227 against bilingual education. Amselle notes
that Mexico has been an NABE “Gold Sponsor,” which
involves a $10,000 donation, and purchases booths at NABE
conferences to promote the PCME. Amselle argues that the
PCME’s educational programs stress “the cultural identity of
Hispanics” as against “academic basics” and form part of a sus-
tained effort to “influence U.S. education policy at every level
of government, making the assimilation of Hispanics in the
United States that much more difficult.”318
Though Mexican officials stress that assistance to U.S. edu-
cational programs is by invitation only, at least in some
instances Mexico appears to initiate relations. In November
1 9 9 9 , the Consulate General of Mexico in New Yo rk ,
Ambassador Jorge Pinto, hosted a meeting whose purpose was
to review the education of Mexican students in New York state.
The meeting was attended by directors of bilingual and ESL
(English as a Second Language) programs in New York school
districts. Joining Ambassador Pinto in leading the event were
Mrs. Carmen Perez Hogan, Coordinator of Bilingual Educa-
tion for the New York State Education Department, and
Assemblyman Peter Rivera. The meeting featured a profile of
New York students with Mexican backgrounds, an examina-
tion of the problems that Mexican and Mexican-American
students face in the U.S. educational system, an overview of
education in Mexico, and a description of the education pro-
grams offered by the Mexican consulate.The meeting was fol-
lowed by a one-day conference in April 2000 in New York
city—in which the SEP, the PCME, and the Mexican Office
for Hispanic Affairs participated along with New York’s state
education authorities. At the conference, a series of education
a g reements between New Yo rk state and Mexico was
announced.319
On the website of the Texas Education Agency (TEA),the
Mexican consulate lists programs “supporting bilingual educa-
tion.”320 The website states:
The U.S.-Mexico Teacher Exchange Program is sponsored by
Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Binational Program
of Migrant Educa t i on , M e x i c o’s Se c re t a riat of Pu b l i c
Education, and the governments of several states and localities
with a high rate of emigration.The Teacher Exchange Program
cordially invites bilingual teachers in the U.S. and U.S. school
districts with high immigrant student populations to partici-
pate in this program.321
It certainly appears to be the case that, as the website goes
on to state, the Mexican program was developed by Mexico “to
help meet the demand for bilingual teachers in school districts
with a large immigrant population.” Moreover, the Dallas
Morning News reports that the 120 Mexican teachers partici-
pating in exchange programs in the United States in the sum-
mer of 1999 were all “directly solicited by U.S. schools that see
them as an asset.”322 Yet it is equally clear that Mexico invites
school districts to participate in the program.
Immersion Courses for Bilingual Teachers
in the U.S. and Teacher Exchange
Programs
Leaders and members of Mexican hometown associations fre-
quently complained to me of the low quality or incompetence
of bilingual education teachers. Advocates of bilingual educa-
t i on ack n owledge that “w e ll - p re p a red bilingual teach e r s ,
resources and materials are in short supply.”323 The National
Association of Bilingual Education estimated in 1994 that the
United States needed 175,000 more certified teachers than are
currently available.324 One 1993 study found that only 10 per-
cent of the country’s 360,000 teachers providing bilingual
instruction were credentialed bilingual teachers and only a
third had ever taken a college course on “culture, language
acquisition, or teaching English to limited-English proficient
(LEP) students.”325
It was in the light of these facts that the U.S. Department of
E d u ca t i on’s Office of Bilingual Educa t i on and Minori ty
Language Affairs (OBLEMA) embarked upon a binational
effort to increase the number of qualified bilingual teachers and
to help other teachers … serving LEP students to learn Spanish
and increase their knowledge of the history and culture of stu-
dents of Mexican origin.Much of this work is being done with
the Mexican Secretariat of Education.326
The Mexican government agrees:
The training of bilingual teachers who serve children of
Mexican origin in the U.S. is one of the most effective ways of
contributing to the raising of living standards of our country-
men in that country. It is in the national interest of Mexico as
well as the U.S. that bilingual teachers possess the best possible
tools for dealing with the particular needs of our immigrants’
children,especially with respect to a better knowledge of Span-
ish and of Mexican culture, as well as the mastery of technical-
pedagogical questions related to the cultural and cognitive
characteristics of Mexican children.327
The PCME, in partnership with the Universidad Pedagogi-
ca Nacional (UPN), the SEP, and the Binational Program for
Migrant Education (PROBEM), has collaboratively designed
four training courses taught by Mexican instructors for bilin-
gual teachers in United States school districts. The courses
“seek to support bilingual teachers in improving their Spanish
skills, increasing their knowledge of Mexican history and cul-
ture, as well as increasing their understanding of the special sit-
uation of Mexican and Mexican-American children and youth
that have been relocated to the United States.”328
They include a basic Spanish course, an intermediate
Spanish course with emphasis on Mexican expressions, a
course on “Mexican Culture and Civilization,” and a course on
cl a s s ro om intera c t i on in bilingual and bicultural env i ron-
ments.329 In the culture and civilization course, “students will
engage pre-Columbian cultures, the Conquest, the Colonial
era, the process of integration, the Liberal Republic, the
‘Porfiriato,’ the post-revolutionary system, and the Mexican
influence in the United States, among other subjects.”330 These
four courses are offered by the UPN to U.S. teachers who teach
children of Mexican origin. Six hundred teachers have taken
some twenty-five courses.331 Each course consists of five ses-
sions of six hours each,in Spanish,for a total of thirty hours of
instruction. Courses are offered at all times of the year also at
Mexican cultural institutions and centers.332 They require sixty
days advance notice.333
The PCME also supervises the Te a cher Exch a n g e
Program, which has involved 450 Mexican teachers and 50
U.S. teachers. The stated purpose of this program is to “con-
tribute to the strengthening of the national history, values and
traditions in students of Mexican origin,” as well as to propiti-
ate a “permanent communication” between Mexican and U.S.
teachers so as to improve teaching and learning on both the
primary and secondary school levels.334 These exchanges usual-
ly last from four to six weeks. Teachers are chosen on the basis
of their interest and proficiency; there is no official preference
given to those of Mexican descent.335 In a second phase, teach-
ers from the United States come to Mexico for unspecified
periods—usually a week or two—to get to know the regions
from which some of their immigrant students hail.336
Mexican teachers in this program are expected “to know
the history, traditions and culture of Mexico.” U.S. teachers
should “be willing to collaborate with Mexico regarding the
exchange of teaching and learning methodologies” and “to
work … to further his/her knowledge of the culture and tradi-
tions of Mexican children and teenagers.”337 The activities
undertaken by the Mexican teachers include “workshops about
Mexican history, traditions and culture and self-esteem and
identity of the Mexican or Mexican-American students.”338
The state of Guanajuato receives U.S. teachers of Mexican
students in the summer and sends Mexican teachers to U.S.
school districts. The U.S. teachers receive Spanish-language
training and courses in Mexican culture and history and
observe Mexican classrooms to acquaint themselves with the
idiosyncrasies of Mexican children.The Mexican teachers and
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administrators are exposed to advanced professional techniques
in the U.S., such as how to cope with different age groups in
one classroom, though transferring these techniques to one-
room rural school houses in Guanajuato is no simple matter.339
The SEP has extensive contracts with school districts in
various states of the U.S., most extensively in California.
Because of the deficit of Spanish-competent teachers for the
many bilingual education programs in the U.S., there is a con-
siderable demand for Mexican teachers.Those who have stud-
ied English may spend two to three years in the U.S. as bilin-
gual education teachers. SEP tries to find teachers from the
same states and regions as the Mexican students they will be
teaching (thus, teachers from Zacatecas will go to a particular
locality in Los Angeles).340
The teacher exchanges are frequently financed by U.S.
foundations. For example, the North Carolina Center for
International Understanding has Ford Foundation funding for
a program that brings Mexican teachers to North Carolina.341
North Carolina is one of several states that have acquired large
Mexican populations rapidly over the past several years.
Arkansas is another, and last summer it hosted ten Mexican
teachers. One of them worked in the small (population 2000)
rural community of Green Forest set in the Ozark Mountains.
Seven years ago, Green Forest had its first Spanish-speaking
student. Now 15 percent of its schoolchildren are Spanish
speakers.In kindergarten and first grade, the number is 25 per-
cent. The Mexican government sent textbooks along with the
teacher. The school’s principal said the school is trying “to
think a generation ahead” as migrants who once swept in and
out with the crops now sink roots to work in the burgeoning
chicken-processing industry.342
Adult Education
Mexico’s National Institute of Adult Education (INEA) has
given literacy training in Spanish, but not in English, to more
than 8000 Mexicans in the U.S. The INEA works with the
Mexican consulates and has offered ninety-two language train-
ing courses for some 2062 instructors.343 INEA offers courses
to train instructors in teaching adult immigrants how to read
and write in Spanish and to help teachers of adult immigrants
who are completing their elementary or secondary school
under the Mexican open system. Mexico provides free text-
books and materials for literacy and elementary school pro-
grams, and the INEA charges only a nominal fee for the sec-
ondary school materials.
The purposes of this program include: to supply elemen-
tary educational tools to immigrants; to increase their “self-
esteem and their pride in their culture of origin”; to strengthen
their parental capacity to contribute to the education of their
children; and to improve the mastery of the mother tongue so
as to help in the learning of English as a second language.344
(This program rests on the assumption that mastery of Spanish
will facilitate learning English.)
Many of the Mexican cultural institutes and centers offer
Spanish-language classes. Leaders of the HTAs say that these
classes are most relevant and useful for illiterate or semiliterate
adults and adolescents.345
Transfer Documents 
for Binational Migrant Students
A major concern in migrant families is ensuring the continuity
of their children’s education, given their mobile lifestyle.346 A
binational program was originally established by the Migrant
E d u ca t i on Pro g ram of the California Department of
Education.It currently operates as part of the U.S. Department
of Education’s Migrant Education Program. As of 1996, a
b i n a t i onal com m i s s i on included re p re s e n t a t i ves from the
Mexican SEP, all Mexican states, and some ten U.S. states.347
One of the primary purposes of this commission has been
the development of a “Transfer Document for Binational
Migrant Students.”The document, a kind of binational report
card, contains demographic and educational information (sub-
jects studied,grades) on binational students that is intended to
support continuity of schooling experiences as Mexican stu-
dents migrate between U.S. and Mexican schools on an annu-
al basis. In recent years, the Mexican federal government has
adopted the initiative of a number of states and promoted the
Transfer Document for migrant students.348 The Transfer Doc-
ument is printed by the SEP and distributed to state and dis-
trict offices throughout Mexico and to consulates in the United
States.349 The Binational Program for Migrant Education
(PROBEM) has conferred 160,000 Transfer Documents to
allow students to continue their studies while migrating.350 The
PROBEM is run by the SRE, through the PCME, with the
support of the SEP and the representatives of the SEP in the
diverse federated states of the Mexican union as well as their
U.S. counterparts.
Distribution of Free Textbooks
The Mexican government has a vast and active program for the
distribution of textbooks. The provision of free textbooks is
inscribed as a right by the Mexican Constitution. To combat
domestic criticism that Mexican resources are being donated to
America, Mexican officials emphasize that the books come
from domestic surpluses.
The PCME states that “the program is intended to provide
support materials for students in the US who speak only
Spanish and to help US students who are learning Spanish as
a second language.”351 Libraries, schools, and educational insti-
tutions that serve Mexican or Spanish-speaking patrons are eli-
gible to receive donated textbooks. In order to receive books,
eligible institutions must cover part of the expense for shipping
the books from a port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border to
their final destination in the U.S. The Mexican government
will provide the books free of charge and will transport them as
far as the U.S.-Mexico border.352 And Mexican consulates “in
major cities all across the United States have supplies of
Mexican textbooks and other materials to assist in the educa-
tion of Mexican migrant and immigrant children and adults.”353
In 1998, 307,000 books were distributed to U.S. schools and
libraries to be used as, officials emphasize, “supplementary
m a t e ri a l . ”3 5 4A list of titles is available on-line at
<www.tea.state.tx.us/ resources/us-mex/textbooks.html>.
Distance Learning
In the exploratory stage is the adaptation of an SEP program
of “distance learning” on a primary and secondary school level
both through videocassettes and the use of satellite television.
Other educational programs sponsored by the PCME
include “Summer Courses at Mexican Universities”355 and
“Youth Meetings” (so that “young people will get to know the
country of origin of their parents so as to strengthen their cul-
t u ral identity and pride in their ro o t s ”3 5 6) . The “M e x i c o
Vacation Plan” allows Mexican and Mexican-American young-
sters between the ages of 6 and 14 to learn traditional Mexican
c u s t om s , g a m e s , and sport s . M e x i can phys i ca l - e d u ca t i on
instructors organize summer camps in the United States.
Mexican teachers are housed in local U.S. school districts.
Local educational, athletic, and community institutions or
organizations can participate by agreeing to receive at least one
Mexican instructor and by providing food, lodging, local trans-
portation, and a stipend for the Mexican teachers for a five-
week period.357
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ducation is not the only area where the PCME,
HTAs, and other actors play an important role for
U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Some of
these other areas are discussed in this chapter.
Culture
The PCME wishes to promote knowledge of Mexican history,
traditions, and culture in order to “reaffirm the identity of
Mexican communities abroad” as well as to preserve the cele-
bration of Mexican civic and popular holidays.358 PCME’s cul-
t u ral pro g ram seeks to make immigrants and Mexica n
Americans “proud of their roots.”359
The PCME works with the forty-two Mexican consulates
and twenty-three cultural institutes and centers to present
expositions, exhibitions, concerts, readings, seminars, and the
like. Since 1997, a children’s drawing contest entitled “This Is
My Mexico” has been organized in the U.S. for children
between 7 and 13 years old.The purpose of the competition is
to “stir pride in our roots among children from Mexico and of
Mexican origin who live in the U.S.”360
The PCME has used culture in its attempt to reconfigure
Mexico’s relations with Mexican Americans. In one of its first
major cultural initiatives, the PCME sponsored a photograph-
ic exhibition in California ca lled “M e x i can Faces in
California.” The exhibit showed that, in appreciating the
Mexican communities in the U.S., “artists have been way ahead
of us,” according to Roger Diaz de Cossio, the PCME’s first
director. According to the Los Angeles Times, the exhibition
portrayed its subjects as “Americanized … but with clear links
to Mexican culture.”361
The exhibition was timed to coincide with the awarding of
Mexico’s highest honor, the Mexican Order of the Aztec Eagle,
to three Mexican Americans: Los Angeles County Supervisor
Gloria Molina; Texas politician,and later Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development,Henry Cisneros;and Raul Yzaguirre,
president of the National Council of La Raza. For the third
year in a row, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari presented the
award to Mexican Americans whom the government considers
defenders of the culture and human rights of Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in the United States (and who were help-
ful in getting NAFTA passed).
Sports 
The PCME focuses its attention on sports, not so much for
their own sake, but because they are “one of the most appro-
priate ways to reach the family and at the same time foment
communal activity and to foster community organization.”362
Mexican consuls for community affairs and community liaison
officers in Mexican cultural centers and institutes keep in touch
with the Mexican-immigrant soccer leagues that often spawn
hometown associations.
The PCME coll a b o rates with the Mexican Na t i on a l
Sports Commission (CONADE) in organizing various sport-
ing events in the U.S. and Mexico. A major effort is the Copa
Mexico national soccer tournament,which involves as many as
20,000 Mexican and Mexican-origin players in the U.S. The
winners of the regional competitions and the national champi-
on come to play in Mexico, where they are received by the state
sporting institutes.363 The PCME has facilitated the participa-
t i on of a Mexica n - Am e ri can delegation to three Yo u t h
Olympics in Mexican cities in which 399 athletes from twen-
ty-two cities have taken part.364
Health
Mexican illegal immigrants often do not make use of U.S. pub-
lic health services. This highly stressed and overworked popu-
lation is therefore especially vulnerable to disease.The PCME
health programs focus mainly on tuberculosis, diabetes, heart
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disease, and mental health, as well as AIDS, alcoholism, sub-
stance abuse, and tobacco addiction.365
U.S. academic research would seem to confirm the rele-
vance of not only these programs, but also of social clubs, to
good health. A 1984 study of Mexican immigrants, native-
born Mexican Americans, and non-Spanish whites found that
“a pervasive sense of cultural heritage was positively related to
mental health and social well-being among both immigrants
and native Mexican-Americans.”366 Similar studies of Mexican
farmworkers and women immigrants showed similar results.367
Various studies have shown the importance of “co-ethnic net-
works”—the presence or absence of friends and kin—as major
predictors of depression.368 On the other hand, studies appear
to indicate that alcohol and drug abuse increases with accultur-
ation or “Americanization.”369 These studies conclude that “The
best way of dealing with the challenge of acculturation is
apparently to balance its progress with a parallel reaffirmation
of primary social ties within the ethnic community.”370 This is
part of a larger argument for “ethnic resilience” and the rele-
vance of ethnic communities in making for a healthy gradual
transition to American life. The classic study is Nathan
Glazer’s and Daniel Moynihan’s Beyond the Melting Pot.
The main activities of the PCME health programs have
included the distribution of informational posters and folders
in Spanish about the prevention of AIDS and tuberculosis as
well as addictions, domestic violence, and diabetes; Spanish
radio spots; an 800 number for health problems;371 the presen-
tation of two traveling expositions on AIDS; seminars on
AIDS and tuberculosis prevention, which have been presented
to some 630 U.S. health professionals; seminars on “psychoso-
cial aspects of immigrant life,” which have been held for vari-
ous groups, including INS agents and local U.S. police; and a
pilot program, “Binational Interchange of Health Profession-
als,” usually on a state-to-state basis, with the participation of
forty-two health professionals.372
The Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) offers a
Family Health Policy to Mexican workers in the United States.
The central objective of the policy is to provide insurance to
cover the medical necessities of workers’families left in Mexico
and to workers when they return to Mexico.373
Business
The principal aim of the business activities of the PCME is to
provide links in the Mexican and Hispanic business communi-
ties, especially among small and medium entrepreneurs.374 The
main work is conducted through the Council for the
Prom o t i on of Business with the Mexican and Hispanic
Communities, which was created by the PCME in 1991.The
Council is presided over by the Ministry of Foreign Relations
(SRE) and includes the main Mexican participants in U.S.-
M e x i can com m e rcial re l a t i on s , s u ch as the Chambers of
Industry and Commerce , the Mexican National Development
Bank (NAFIN), the National Bank for Foreign Trade, the
Mexican Investment Bank, the Ministries of the Treasury,
Tourism, Trade, and Industry, major banks, and so forth.375
In 1992, the Council established a “Hispanic Reserve”
together with, among others, NAFIN, the Hispanic Chamber
of Commerce, and NCLR. The project included an initial fund
to promote joint ventures between Mexican and Mexican-
American entrepreneurs and was billed as a “historic” agree-
ment.376 Mexican-American investors are encouraged to apply
for funds from the Hispanic Reserve, which sets aside $20 mil-
lion annually. Preference is given to those working with
Mexican partners. This program does not, however, seem to
have attracted much interest. 377
The Council also participates in conventions with Hispanic
chambers of commerce in the U.S. It has organized two
reunions of the business forum Acercamiento al Mercado His-
pano de Estados Unidos,where some 800 entrepreneurs, busi-
ness representatives, and students met.378
Though the PCME wishes to focus on a niche of small and
medium Hispanic businesses,379 this does not appear to be a
very dynamic sector for PCME’s work.Hispanic and Mexican-
American business groups were hostile to the formation of
NAFTA because they feared Mexican competition. Moreover,
they have apparently been slow to take advantage of Mexican
o f fers of pre fe rential treatment to Hispanic inve s t o r s .
According to Rodulfo de la Garza, there has been a “faulty
assumption that cultural similarities would facilitate Mexican-
Mexican American business relations.”380 Paradoxically, these
Hispanic links fared better before NAFTA removed barriers to
trade and investment.The utility of Mexican-American inter-
m e d i a ries familiar with the Mexican market declined as
Mexican and American firms got used to dealing with one
another directly.381
San An t onio has an especially active “A s s o c i a t i on of
Mexican Entrepreneurs” that has been fostered by the con-
sulate. It sponsors commercial and educational projects.382
Hometown associations also participate in business ventures.
Every summer, the Sinoloa Brotherhood of California (La
Fraternidad Sinoloense de California), a federation of Sinoloa
HTAs, hosts a “mini expo” that features both cultural perform-
ances and products from Sinoloa (beer, coffee, canned goods,
handicrafts, etc.). It is cosponsored by the Public Relations
Department of the state of Sinoloa.
Awards
From its inception in 1990, the PCME has worked to see that
Mexico’s highest honor, the Order of the Aztec Eagle, was
awarded by its president to leaders of prominent Mexican-
American organizations.In addition to those mentioned above
(see page 28), Antonia Hernandez, the president and general
counsel of the Mexican Am e ri can Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF), was given the award by Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1991.383
Since 1995, the SRE,through the PCME, has granted the
“Ohtli” award to Americans, usually Mexican Americans, who
have worked to benefit the Mexican community. The award
means “path” in Nahuatl, the Aztecs’ language. In January
2000, the award was given to Ruben Zacarias, the former
Superintendent of the Los Angeles Unified School District
whose ouster in the fall of 1999 angered many in the Latino
community and remains an issue in Los Angeles politics.It was
the third time the honor has been given by the Mexican con-
sulate in Los Angeles.384
The PCME has awarded five “Bilingual Teacher of the
Year” citations to people nominated by U.S. bilingual organiza-
tions. It also awards citations for outstanding athletes and
entrepreneurs in the U.S. Mexican community.
O
ne of the most interesting aspects regarding the
role of Mexican-American and U.S. Mexican
o r g a n i za t i ons—like HTAs—is the extent to
which they influence Mexican domestic policy,
just as there are undeniably attempts by Mexico
to influence these organizations. This mutual political influ-
ence and related issues are the focus of this chapter.
Outreach to Mexican-American Leaders
and Organizations
Mexican officials are well aware of the increasingly “prominent
position” of the Mexican-American, Hispanic, and Latino
communities in the United States, “a position,” Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce told the National Council of
La Raza in 1997, “that should only be better and more influ-
ential in the future.”385 As President Zedillo suggests, Mexico’s
courting of Mexican-American groups is a long-term, strategic
effort.It derives from two unambiguous demographic realities:
The U.S.-born children of U.S. Mexicans are by law American
citizens, and Mexican Americans enjoy population growth
rates well above the national average.Thus, even in the unlike-
ly case that Mexican immigration continues at these high lev-
els for another generation, Mexican Americans will greatly
outnumber U.S. Mexicans.Mexican Americans compose near-
ly two-thirds of the Latino population,and their share is grow-
ing (see Tables 2, 3, 7, 9). The U.S. Census Bureau’s flat-line
projection tells us that every fourth American will be a Latino
by the year 2050—and more than two-thirds of them will be
Mexican Americans (see Tables 9, 10). If the German, Irish,
Italians, Poles, Jews, and many other American immigrant
groups have sought political influence at first by forming eth-
nic alliances, it is only natural to expect the largest and poten-
tially most powerful immigrant group to do the same.386
Demography, history, and politics all instruct Mexico that its
relation with Mexican Americans is important. But that hard-
ly means that the relation is straightforward or simple.
At the outset, Mexican officials saw their relations with
Mexican-American organizations as a way to counteract nega-
tive publicity in the U.S. As a high-ranking foreign ministry
official told the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) in 1990,
they thought that:
Through Chicanos, it will be possible to transmit a more
accurate image of the Mexicans which states with fairness the
accomplishments of the government and its efforts to overcome
ancient problems,including the risks of modernization.This is
the case of drug trafficking and extreme poverty.387
The Mexican consul in Los Angeles, Jose Luis Bernal,
acknowledges that the PCME was formed with “the implicit
idea” of creating a Mexican lobby modeled on “the Jewish
lobby.”388 Andres Rozental, who directed U.S. relations for the
Salinas administration, acknowledged to me that such an idea
“was in the air.”389
The PCME began to host board members of leading U.S.
Hispanic and Mexica n - Am e ri can organiza t i ons such as
NCLR, LULAC, the American GI Forum, the Southwest
Voter Registra t i on Educa t i on Project (SVREP ) , a n d
MALDEF. These organizations now hold an annual meeting
in Mexico at the invitation of the federal government. They
meet with top Mexican government officials who brief them
on “the achievements of the current administration.”390 They
are customarily received by the President of Mexico.
Since 1997, the PCME has been holding informational
meetings about Mexico (Jornadas Informativas sobre Mexico) for
Mexican-American leaders. Some thirty federal, state, and
country officials have been invited each year to Mexico to
become acquainted with the Mexican perspective on Mexican-
U.S. relations and to learn about human rights, election
processes, and the economic situation in Mexico.391
M e x i ca n - Am e ri can organiza t i ons such as Te a tro
Campesino,United Farm Workers, LULAC, NALEO, and
NCLR have all worked with the PCME.392 Representatives of
N C L R, LU LAC , the Am e ri can GI Fo ru m , NA B E , t h e
National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education, the United
States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and the Intercultural
Development Research Association (IDRA) sit on the board of
the Mexican gove rnment-funded Mexican and Am e ri ca n
Solidarity Foundation.This is a private, nonprofit organization
that promotes ties between Mexico and U.S. Latinos, especial-
ly Mexican Americans. The Foundation sponsors seminars for
activists from U.S. Latino organizations to acquaint them with
Mexico and is led by the first director of the PCME.393 The
Fo u n d a t i on also has on its board re p re s e n t a t i ves of the
Mexican foreign and education ministries (SRE and SEP).
The PCME has achieved steady and close relations with
the leading Mexican-American organizations.These advocacy
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groups often help to fund and sponsor the Mexican govern-
ment pro g ra m s , as do Am e ri can gove rnments (the U. S.
Department of Education and many municipal, county, and
state organs). These parties differ on occasion but generally
agree on such issues as immigration, bilingual education, affir-
mative action, welfare rights, and voting rights.
A 1994 Los Angeles Times article, describing a meeting
between the personal emissary of the Mexican presidential
candidate and Mexican-American leaders, envisioned the lat-
ter becoming “a lobbying force and conduit for Mexican inter-
ests and concerns.”394 In 1995, The Dallas Morning News
reported that the recently inaugurated President Zedillo told a
private meeting of Hispanic leaders “that his goal is to develop
a close relationship between his government and Mexican-
Americans, one in which they could be called upon to lobby
U.S. policy-makers on economic and political issues involving
the United States and Mexico.”395
De la Garza believes that the PCME
may have laid the foundations for an ethnic lobby through the
relationship it has established with Mexican American elites,
especially the leaders of organizations such as the Hispanic
chambers of commerce, the National Council of La Raza, and
the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. [The
PCME] has courted and worked with these groups to organize
and host a variety of activities including junkets to Mexico.
Some Mexican officials appear to envision the Mexican rap-
prochement with Mexican-American organizations as a way of
influencing U.S. policy on bilateral issues (such as drug certifi-
cation and immigration) and even on some domestic issues
(affirmative action, bilingual education, welfare rights, voting
rights). A former Mexican press attache in Mexico’s Atlanta
consulate has written that “the strategic long-range importance
of the communities of Mexican origin in the U.S. will be their
influence in the internal and international policy of the U.S.
that affects Mexico and the Mexicans.” He advocates that the
Mexican-born should be “lobbyists for Mexican interests in the
decision-making process of the U.S.”396
Most Mexican officials deny that the PCME is designed to
convert Mexican immigrants or Mexican Americans into their
allies.397 De la Garza says,however, that “Mexican officials deny
that they are pursuing an ethnic lobby when they address non-
Hispanic American audiences but indicate that they seek such
a relationship in meetings limited to or dominated by Mexican
Americans.”398
Certainly when talking with me Mexican officials appeared
to approach the subject gingerly. As mentioned, the founder of
the PCME (now no longer a government official) acknowl-
edged that forming a lobby was an original objective of the
PCME but carefully denied it was a “government plan”—a
puzzling distinction since the PCME is a government pro-
gram. As mentioned, the Mexican consul in Los Angeles was
careful to say that the formation of a lobby was only an “implic-
it” objective of the PCME.399 Ambassador Rozental acknowl-
edges only that “there were some people” in the government
who wished the PCME “to generate something like an Israeli
lobby.”400
At first blush, the skittishness of Mexican officials over the
term “lobby” is puzzling. After all, Japan, another major U.S.
trade partner, is well known for its lobbying efforts and seems
to make no bones about them. Israel, with a large and active
ethnic constituency, has a renowned Washington lobby. But the
size of the Mexican ethnic presence, its fledgling political sta-
tus plus the importance for Mexico of its relationship with the
United States, and the relative newness of its improved stand-
ing, help to explain the hesitancy of Mexican officials to refer
openly to an ethnic lobby.
Moreover, Ambassador Bernal stresses that the initial
PCME project took for granted “the homogeneity of the
Mexican community.”401 Mexican officials say that experience
has taught them to recognize the independence and hetero-
geneity of the Mexican diaspora and the “variance of interests
and opinion s ” b e tween Hispanic and Mexica n - Am e ri ca n
organizations, on the one hand, and those of Mexico, on the
other.402 Bernal and others likewise emphasize the divergence
of interests between recently arrived immigrants (3 million of
whom have reached California in the last decade) and “the
Mexican American or Hispanic or Latino establishment.”403
The learning curve led to a “change of goals and instru-
ments.”404 In addition, Bernal acknowledges the “resentment”
felt by many immigrants toward the Mexican government, yet
it is the hometown associations that nonetheless occupy the
bulk of the consulate ’s community liaison.
As for the Mexican-American organizations, De la Garza
c onsiders them “a tenuous foundation” for any Mexica n
lobby.405 “There is no doubt that the heads of these organiza-
tions are the most visible spokespersons for Mexican Ameri-
cans.” De la Garza writes:
Nonetheless, these organizations are not widely recognized or
supported by the Mexican American community … and there
is no evidence that they have the capacity to influence Mexican
American opinion or mobilize them to action.406
Peter Skerry points to MALDEF as “the quintessential
example” of the modern post-sixties “association without mem-
bers,” to use the phrase of Harvard political scientist Theda
Skocpol.407 Skerry writes nonetheless that MALDEF’s claim to
“represent all Mexican Americans—indeed all Latinos … is
widely and routinely accepted.” The organization, which has
ten regional offices around the country, is widely recognized for
its paramount role in Plyer v. Doe, the 1982 Supreme Court
decision constitutionally requiring Texas schools to educate the
foreign-born children of illegal immigrants, as well as for its
prominent role in the promotion of voting rights and affirma-
tive-action suits and its opposition to various California ballot
initiatives affecting Latinos.408 “Yet MALDEF,” Skerry contin-
ues,
is not a membership organization. It has no members whatso-
ever in the communities it purports to represent, and therefore
no real bonds of accountability to those communities. It gets
most of its funding from a few corporations and large founda-
tions,in particular the Ford Foundation,which played the crit-
ical role in establishing the organization in the late 1960’s.409
The case of La Raza is more complex, for it has more than
230 “local affiliates,” which its literature describes as “non-
profit Hispanic, community-based organizations.” NLCR is
run by its board of directors,however, and the local affiliates do
not elect the board. In the view of Peter Skerry, both groups
help make up a politics of “elite networks” whose base of sup-
port is not their “weak community ties” but “a process of spe-
cialization and professionalization by which politics become
more and more an insiders’ game.”410
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That Mexico has friends who play and win at this game is
surely an asset when what Hugh Heclo has described as “issue
networks” play such an important role in Washington politics.
But these networks “of proto-bureaucracies … interlaced with
loose personal associations” are composed of inside operators
rather than politicians with mass constituencies.411
In the case of Mexican-American officeholders who do
respond to mass constituencies,their power is more likely to be
exercised on behalf of their U.S. electorate rather than Mexico.
De la Garza cites the actions of Texas Attorney General Dan
Morales and Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña in the
controversy over NAFTA’s provisions allowing Mexican trucks
to operate in the U.S. The former led opposition to the trucks,
and the decision to postpone their entry was taken by Peña
“over the protests of Mexican officials.”412 George Grayson, a
Virginia state legislator who has written widely on Mexican-
U.S. affairs,says that,despite the efforts mounted for NAFTA,
the combination of Mexican Americans’ low incomes, modest
educational levels, leadership conflicts, below-average voter
registration, and ambivalence toward their homeland suggest
that many years will pass before Chicanos play for Mexico the
same role in influencing U.S. policy that Jews fill for Israel or
Greek Americans do for Greece. 413
At the same time, Grayson points out that Mexico enjoys
broad support from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus,creat-
ed in 1976 to advance the agenda of Hispanic-American legis-
lators. More than two-thirds of its members are of Mexican
descent, and the Caucus “closely shadows Mexico City’s line
respecting questions of immigration, human rights and drug
enforcement sanctions.”414 Nonetheless, one-third of the caucus
voted against NAFTA.415
De la Garza questions “why Mexico needs an ethnic lobby”
at all considering the intimate relationship “that now exists
between the Mexican and U.S. governments.”416 NAFTA, the
Clinton 1995 economic “bailout” package, and the repeated
“certification” of Mexican cooperation with U.S. antinarcotics
efforts are examples of this collaboration, which extends to a
wide range of policies and areas.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Mexico had dropped its
reluctance to lobby Washington. That policy had been part of
a hands-off approach that Mexican officials argued was part of
a general commitment to non i n t e rve n t i on . Until then,
Mexican officials argued that if they did not seek to intervene
in U.S. affairs, the U.S. would be less likely to intervene in
Mexican affairs. (To some in Washington this principle eroded
when Mexico signed a 1981 agreement with France recogniz-
ing the Sa lv a d o ran rev o l u t i on a ri e s . But Mexico’s activist
Central American policies were pursued in the name of nonin-
tervention, with the United States considered the representa-
tive interventionist. Mexico’s capacity for Central American
activism was in any event weakened by the 1982 debt crisis and
subsequently subsided as Mexico began to look to the U.S.
economy for relief.) 
Between 1985 and 1991, Mexico’s lobbying representation
in Washington leaped from two minor contracts totaling
$67,229 to more than a dozen contracts worth more than $9
million.417 The Salinas administration, which founded the
PCME program, also opened a spanking new $16 million
embassy complex three blocks from the White House.418
Mexico began to seek out “U.S. allies through which it could
pressure the U.S. Congress.”419 The chief confederates were
special interests and major businesses, with the U.S. Latino
community bringing up the rear.
Mexico’s Congressional efforts reached a high-water mark
in 1993 during the NAFTA debate, when its lobbying expen-
ditures outstripped all but a few perennial-champion foreign
lobbyists, such as Japan, Canada, Great Britain, and West
Germany.420 Mexico mobilized its forty-two consulates and the
PCME.421 It chose a lead agency for lobbying Congress—the
Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (SEC-
OFI)—which organized a polished campaign that combined
powerful Washington lobbying firms with a three-pronged
grassroots effort. Washington insiders hired by Mexico in-
cluded William R. Brock,the U.S. Trade Representative in the
Reagan administration; Burson-Marsteller, a top Washington
public relations firm; as well as Steptoe & Johnson and
Shearman & Sterling, two leading Washington law firms.422
Opponents of NAFTA, such as Charles Lewis of the Center
for Public Integrity, and Ross Perot,suggested that Mexico was
“trying to buy the treaty.”423
The grassroots interest-group mobilization pulled together
Latino organizations,border region communities, and the pro-
NAFTA U.S. business coalition.424 Todd A. Eisenstadt writes
that, to complement its investment in Washington insiders,
SECOFI retained several freelance Latino lobbyists, including
two Hispanic former New Mexico governors, who were asked
to persuade Hispanic interest groups to pressure the U.S.
Congress. “The Mexican agents’ efforts in the [border] regions
and in the Latino community” apparently had “a broad cat-
alyzing impact.”425 Among the Hispanic groups enlisted were
MALDEF, NALEO, the Hispanic National Bar Association,
and LULAC. With the support of the PCME,NCLR and the
National Hispanic Chamber of Commerce organized junkets
to Mexico.426
As an early convert to NAFTA,the NCLR frequently bro-
kered relations between the Mexican government’s lobbying
campaign and Mexican-American and Hispanic organizations.
“The NCLR … took delegations of Chicano/Latino business,
community and media representatives to meet with their coun-
terparts in Mexico City” to win support for the agreement.
NCLR president Raul Y za g u i r re explained that Mexica n
Americans “must be players [on NAFTA]. Hispanics must
learn how to make our presence felt.”427
But De la Garza points out that only a modest portion of
Mexico’s handsome investment in the NAFTA lobby went to
Hispanic lobbyists, and but five of thirty major lobbyists
involved with NAFTA were Hispanics. Of them, only two
reported that their major task was to influence Hispanics.428
Moreover, whereas the Mexican government was interested in
a t t racting foreign inve s t m e n t , the Hispanic organiza t i on s
thought the proposed NAFTA agreement was slanted toward
business interests and was insufficiently protective of labor and
the environment.The main Hispanic organizations sided with
NAFTA’s critics on those issues, ended up supporting the
Clinton administration’s negotiating position, and conditioned
support for NAFTA on Mexico making concessions. Hispanic
groups also argued variously that NAFTA should encourage
immigration, bolster border controls, and ban guest-worker
programs. Mexico, fearful of jeopardizing the agreement, pre-
ferred to skirt those sensitive issues.429
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Hispanic elected officials were similarly refractory. For exam-
ple, to secure the vote of California Representative Esteban
Torres,the administration accepted the idea of a North Amer i-
can Development Bank.The administration hoped that others
in the House would follow Torres, but this proposal secured
only one vote—or, as one leader said,“One man, one bank.”430
The Hispanic Caucus eventually split over NAF TA, with
nine members voting in favor, eight against.431 Though all but
two Mexican-American members of Congress ended up voting
for NAFTA, the majority complied only after securing side
agreements to meet constituent concerns.
Mexico’s endeavors to marshal Mexican-American elites
have been deemed of only “marginal significance to NAFTA’s
enactment.”432 Indeed, “there is no evidence … that Mexican-
American members of Congress voted for NAF TA because of
Mexican lobbying or because they supported Mexican inter-
ests.”433 De la Garza,Eisenstadt, and Grayson appear to regard
the Mexican effort as a superfluous and wasteful “overkill.”434
Grayson says that Mexican officials “quickly learned that U.S.
lawmakers respond most briskly to contacts from constituents,
not to entreaties from foreign governments.435 The entire
Mexican and U.S. business NAFTA campaign fell shy until
President Bill Clinton weighed in with an extensive lobbying
effort of his own, featuring a broad array of “pork barrel proj -
ects.”436 The latter provided members of Congress with politi-
cal protection on a controversial vote. “Yet, once the Clinton
administration got its act together, it won going away.”437 But
Mexican officials point out that, while the Clinton administra-
tion had many other priorities in 1993, including organizing
itself in its opening year, for Mexico NAFTA was an issue “of
life and death.” They believe that Mexico played a crucial role
until the Clinton administration got itself organized.438
In all events,the Mexican effort was not only unprecedent-
ed but so far unique.Mexico does not appear to have been able
to afford to sustain such a high level of expenditure. Now “the
ambassador and government officials shoulder most of the bur-
dens of lobbying the U.S. Congress.”439 While Grayson argues
that the NAFTA experience served Mexican officials by
“developing and honing their skills for future use,”440 Mexico
did not mount any real effort for the bailout, perhaps because
it would have been counterproductive.441 Nothing remotely
similar to the NAFTA drive was launched in opposition to the
1996 immigration reform or in the annual battles over “certify-
i n g” M e x i c o’s coopera t i on with U. S. a n t i n a rcotics effort s
(although the Mexican Embassy devotes itself to this issue for
a month), but then neither of these have been matters of “life
and death.”
The Mexican gove rnment did back efforts to defe a t
Proposition 187, the 1994 California ballot initiative limiting
immigrant access to public facilities. In part the government
was responding to domestic political pressures in the form of a
torrent of protests in the national media and demonstrations in
Mexico City, Tijuana, and other cities.442 The Mexican Foreign
Ministry’s official responsible for the U.S., Andres Rozental,
was placed in a delicate situation, as his statement to the Los
Angeles Times indicates: “Without interfering with the United
States,the government of Mexico will work actively to prevent
the passage of the anti-immigration initiative 187.”443 Besides
issuing several strong public statements of opposition,Mexican
foreign service officials met with organizations opposed to the
ballot initiative.444 In his interview with the Times, “Rozental
stopped short of detailing what, if any, money his government
has devoted to the cause but made clear that Mexico is sup-
porting groups in the United States working to defeat Prop.
187.” He added:
Mexico will participate with organizations, associations and
human rights groups to bring down this proposition….We
have media campaign strategies to inform the entire California
electorate of the contributions that Mexicans have made and
continue to make to this state, so that no one will go away with
the idea that we are responsible for the costs and problems of
the state.445
M e x i ca n - Am e ri can activists do not consider Mexico’s
efforts opposing Proposition 187 to have been effective.445 To
the contrary, many feel that the identification of the opposition
with Mexico—an impression heavily reinforced by the multi-
tude of Mexican flags brandished by demonstrators—doomed
opposition efforts. 447 One obser ver notes that Mexican efforts
to coordinate with advocacy groups “do not seem to [have
been] followed up since then.”448 Apparently, however, some
officials wish their government to become more active. Citing
fears that other states would follow the lead of California and
initiate legislation unfavorable to Mexican immigrants,a group
of career Foreign Service officials circulated a memorandum
urging the government to “engage in lobbying activities to
influence U.S. decisions on immigration, following the model
implemented … in the case of NAFTA.”449 Since Proposition
187, however, the Mexican government has preferred to trust
its U.S. allies to handle similar U.S. domestic issues.
Lobbying for NAFTA and against Proposition 187 were
singular events that seemed to call for exceptional efforts, but
rapproachment with Mexican-American and Latino organiza-
tions is an ongoing and extended project. The PCME “dedi-
cates itself to close observation of local leaders and non-gov-
ernment organizations with which it should consult continu-
ously over what course to follow.”450 Mexican government offi-
cials and government organizations such as the PCME enjoy
warm relations with some Mexican-American organizations,
especially NCLR. LULAC is probably the next in importance
for the PCME, followed by MALDEF and NABE. The
PCME also tries to maintain warm relations with the National
A s s o c i a t i on of Latino Elected Officials (NA LE O ) , t h e
Southwest Voters Repre s e n t a t i on and Educa t i on Pro j e c t
(SWVREP), and the American GI Forum.
U.S. nongovernment organizations (NGOs) often fund
and sponsor the Mexican government programs,as do sections
of the Am e ri can gove rnment (the U. S. D e p a rtment of
Education and many municipal,county, and state organs).The
more active partners appear to be the U.S. side, but both par-
ties share a political and sociological perspective on such issues
as immigration, bilingual education,affirmative action, welfare
rights, and voting rights.
It is not at all clear that these perspectives are shared by the
HTAs or even by the bulk of Mexican Americans. As the
Binational Study on Migration reports,
Survey work has shown that very few Mexican Americans or
Mexican migrants believe that they have been victimized by
racism or discrimination. Mexican Americans seem eager to
embrace a meritocratic vision of American society. While Mex-
ican Americans in the U.S. Congress tend to find common
ground with black congressional leaders … on the local level
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such black-Mexican coalitions have proved much harder to cre-
ate or sustain.4510
On the issue that most intimately affects Mexico and
M e x i can Am e ri ca n s , i m m i g ra t i on , Mexico and Mexica n
Americans remain as far apart as ever. Various surveys have
found that Mexican Americans view illegal migration in par-
ticular very unfavorably. The Latino National Political Survey
conducted in 1989-90 found that 83.6 percent of Mexican
Americans surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the view
that “there are too many immigrants.”452 Despite the Mexican
government’s clear preference for the continuation of illegal
immigration, 65 percent of Latino leaders in 1998 considered
it important to control and reduce illegal immigration.453 In
1990, a majority of Mexican Americans favored reducing the
number of legal immigrants to the United States.454 Surveys
conducted in succeeding years indicated “a consistent pattern:
Mexican Americans support reductions in the number of
i m m i g rants admitted to the United St a t e s . ”4 5 5 M e x i ca n
Americans in Texas and California have offered tacit or explic-
it support to INS efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der.456 Mexican officials applaud MALDEF, NCLR, and other
Latino organizations for having “the courage to take unpopu-
lar but enlightened stands” on issues, such as illegal immigra-
t i on , w h e re majorities of U. S. M e x i cans and Mexica n
Americans differ with both MALDEF et al. and the Mexican
government.457
Where Mexican Americans agree with the Mexican gov-
ernment is on the issue of allowing both legal and illegal immi-
grants to participate in U.S. social services.458 Thus, as De la
Garza puts it,“the Mexican diaspora favors immigrants but not
immigration.”459 De la Garza summarizes the situation as fol-
lows:
Clearly Mexican Americans do not rally around the positions
of the Mexican government regarding U.S. immigration poli-
cies. When Mexican Americans and the Mexican government
agree on a policy, as was the case with Proposition 187, it is
coincidental rather than because Mexican Americans are being
mobilized in behalf of Mexico’s preferences. In other words,
Mexican Americans would have opposed Proposition 187
regardless of Mexico’s position,and their opposition cannot be
interpreted as an indication of [PCME’s] success.460
Mexican officials are well aware that there are contradic-
tions between the two communities they serve in the United
States.The Mexican consul in Los Angeles called attention to
one example: the proposed settlement of the federal class
a c t i on lawsuit against We s t e rn Union and Mon ey G ra m
Payment Systems Inc. for extortionate hidden fees in wiring
money to Mexico—especially the unfavorable exchange rates
for remittances paid in local currency. In the preliminary set-
tlement, MoneyGram and Western Union parent First Data
Corp. agreed to set aside $2.3 million in contributions to
Latino community organizations and for the money to be dis-
bursed by MALDEF and the National Association of Latino
Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The settlement
was opposed by hometown associations from several states and
by California politicians who argued that a better disposition
could be obtained under strict California consumer protection
l a w s . The hom e t own associations were joined by thre e
Congressmen and other prominent California legislators and
mayors, as well as several community rights groups and the
Hermandad Mexicana Nacional, in a friend-of-the-court brief
filed in Ill i n o i s , asking that an injunction fre ezing the
California case be lifted. MALDEF and NALEO were absent
from the brief.461 In December, more than 2500 immigrants
filed a new $100 million class action lawsuit against the wire
companies.462
Since 1997, the PCME has been holding informational
meetings about Mexico (Jornadas Informativas sobre Mexico) for
Mexican-American leaders. Some thirty federal, state, and
country officials have been invited each year to Mexico to
become acquainted with the Mexican perspective on Mexican-
U.S. relations and to learn about human rights, election
processes, and the economic situation in Mexico.463
It will be interesting to see what kind of relations will
develop between groups like NCLR and LULAC and the
incipient national Mexican immigrant organizations. It is
worth recalling that at its founding meeting in Dallas, the
International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad, a group of polit-
ically active U.S. Mexicans influenced by the left-leaning PRD,
hastened to point out that so-called mainstream Latino organ-
izations such as NCLR and LULAC did not “represent their
interests in this country.” Some of the activists involved with
the immigrants believe that NCLR and LULAC have gotten
too close to the Mexican government.464 
One current in this political stream is the export of
Mexican domestic politics—but another is American ethnic
and minority politics.In 1998,Roberto Suro suggested that the
“fissure” among Latinos on questions such as illegal immigra-
tion, “if it becomes widespread and permanent, will call into
question Latinos’ ability to function as a minority group.”465
Five years earlier, Peter Skerry systematically raised the ques-
tion: “Will Mexican Americans define themselves as tradition-
al ethnic immigrants or as victims of racial discrimination?”466
He answered that they were “ambivalent” but that there was lit-
tle question that “the dominant institutions of contemporary
Am e ri can society ” as well as “M e x i can Am e ri can elites”
(including such groups as NCLR and MALDEF) answered
that they were a minority group.467
Information
The Mexican Cultural Institute of Houston produces a nation-
al monthly newspaper, La Paloma (The Dove), which is insert-
ed in the eleven largest Spanish-language newspapers in the
U.S. Some forty-six issues have been published. It began with
a circulation of 26,000 and now reaches 727,500.468 The news-
paper publicizes PCME activities, presents the Mexican point
of view on bilateral affairs with the U.S. and on issues such as
drugs and the human rights of Mexican immigrants, and pro-
vides health news, information on sending money to Mexico,
and the like. The PCME also publishes a bimonthly bulletin
that is sent to Mexican embassies and consulates and deals with
cultural affairs.
The PCME supervises the radio broadcasting of infor-
mational programs, serials, public awareness spots, and other
programs. They are carried on Spanish-language stations.469
Similarly, the PCME supervises television programs.The tele-
vision program La Paloma is broadcast weekly in the U.S. by
the Spanish-language chain Telemundo and has an audience of
some 3 million viewers.
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Problems of the PCME
Despite NAF TA, whose benefits have been restricted mainly
to the export sector, Mexico is a country with severe economic
problems. Indeed, that is the main reason for Mexicans’
mounting emigration to the United States. Though Mexico
has reduced its swollen state sector over the past fifteen years
and liberalized its trade, the economy has failed to achieve sus-
tained growth.The agrarian sector is in crisis as it tries to move
from a cooperative system to individual farming; its banking
sector is paralyzed; small- and medium-sized businesses are
stagnant; and the entire economy is plagued by periodic finan-
cial crises. During the 1994-95 peso crisis, Mexico’s gross
national product plummeted 7 percent and interest rates sky-
rocketed. Tens of thousands of businesses and farms were
forced either to close or to cut back their operations, generat-
ing massive unemployment and plunging large numbers of
people into destitution. Large sectors of the population have
not recovered from that crisis, although Mexico is now enjoy-
ing annual growth rates of around 4 percent. Nearly a third of
the population lives in poverty.
This situation, compounded by last year’s fall in oil prices,
obliged the Zedillo government to cut the federal budget
sharply. A straitened budget constitutes a major constraint on
the PCME pro g ra m . An d res Roze n t a l , the form e r
Undersecretary of State for North America, who was one of
the engineers of the original Salinas PCME initiative, says that
the Zedillo government and its foreign ministers did not main-
tain the same interest in the PCME. He claims the govern-
ment has cut back on the PCME program,lowering its profile,
discontinuing the practice of sending high-level appointments
to the consulates, reducing official visits to the United States,
and cutting the budget. The current leadership of the PCME
and the Office of Hispanic Affairs at the Mexican embassy in
Washington refute this charge, claiming that the PCME has
the full support of the Ze d i llo administra t i on . T h ey do
acknowledge budgetary constraints but attribute them to the
austerity dictated by the peso crisis.470
Roger Diaz de Cossio, the first director of the PCME,says
that there has always been resistance to the program within the
foreign office “for fear of angering Washington” and hurting
bilateral relations with the U.S. He says the resistance contin-
ues, though he believes that Zedillo himself supports the pro-
gram.This subject bears further investigation.
Budgetary and staff resources do appear quite limited, at
least in some regions. For example, the Washington, D.C.,con-
sulate has a staff of sixteen people to deal with visas and all the
other normal activities of the consulate.That leaves three oth-
ers to cover the PCME program, which serves a population of
400,000 in D.C., Virginia, and Maryland. The consulate also
serves North Carolina, where there are 200,000 Mexican
immigrants who are a ten-hour drive from the D.C. office.471
As state programs become more active, they may take up the
slack.
State Programs
The federal PCME program has worked with governors of
major sender states to establish some fourteen Offices of
Emigrant Affairs. These are essentially smaller, state versions
of the PCME.
“Two for One” and now “Three for One” programs are
among the major state initiatives. These programs provide
matching funds to those raised for community development by
hometown associations. During the Salinas administration
between 1993 and 1995, the Two for One program was a fed-
eral operation coordinated by the PCME and the Ministry of
Social Deve l o pm e n t . E a ch dollar sent by the HTA was
matched by a dollar from federal and state coffers. The
Zacatecas federation of hometowns was the main beneficiary.
In 1995, Zacatecas hometown projects received a total of $1.8
million, which supported fif ty-six projects in thirty-four com-
munities.After that year, the federal Two for One program was
eliminated as part of the Mexican government’s decentraliza-
tion efforts. The initial year of the Zedillo administration was
marked by economic crisis and budget cut-backs,and leaders of
the Zacatecas federation also say that “the PCME showed a
lack of leadership at the time.” State governments,especially in
Zacatecas but also in Guanajuato, took up the slack.472
Zacatecas responded to federal austerity by resuming and
expanding its own program in a newly formed state office for
Zacatecan communities abroad. The investment program was
revised to include a contribution from the municipal govern-
ment. Under the new terms, each of the four partners (federal,
s t a t e, mu n i c i p a l i ty, and the fe d e ra t i on) make match i n g
grants.473 In its first year of operation (July 1998-July 1999), the
Zacatecas state program raised nearly $5 million for 193 proj-
ects focusing on infrastructure development in twenty-seven
Zacatecas municipalites.474 The program works through the ten
Zacatecas federations of hometown clubs located in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, and Texas.
Each dollar contributed by a club is matched by a dollar
amount from the state, local municipal government,and feder-
al government: thus, “Three for One.” The funding, project
selection, execution,and monitoring process have been formal-
ized and unified. Accordingly, the process begins with a project
proposal’s presentation to its federation,after an analysis of the
village’s needs.If approved, the federation submits the propos-
al to the representative of the Zacatecas state government in
Los Angeles and to the Presidente Municipal(mayor) for ap-
proval.The mayor sends the technical plan to the relevant state
offices. If it is approved, work begins on the project. 475
The Zacatecas federation generally serves as the intermedi-
ary for all club investments, a process that establishes a com-
mon formula for the presentation and evaluation of projects
and centralizes information with regard to changing govern-
ment requirements. “Along with making project review and
monitoring much more efficient, this system also makes the
federation the principal intermediary between the Mexican
government and the clubs.”476
In Jalisco, a fiduciary fund Fideraza, through a mechanism
called Raza Express, provides nonbanking financial services to
those who send remittances to their families.The purpose is to
create a guaranteed fund (Fondo de Garantias) with an initial
donation by the state government and 25 cents for every dollar
remitted. The fund is dedicated to the support of small and
micro enterprises in the regions of highest migration. Raza
Express also offers reduced charges (40 percent less than com-
mercial companies such as Western Union and Moneygram)
for money transfers from the U.S.
Because of decentralization efforts and,even more, the cen-
trifugal tendencies in the Mexican polity, state programs are
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becoming increasingly important.Oaxaca,a state where migra-
tion is of more recent origin, opened the newest state office for
migrant affairs in the spring of 1999. The axis may shift
increasingly to state programs in coming years. State officials
also contend that immigrants are reluctant to contact Mexican
government consulates. Because of the widespread distrust of
the federal government, especially among immigrants, these
officials claim that state programs, closely tied to the immi-
grants’ places of origin, have a better chance of reaching the
immigrant communities.
Guanajuato is the state that receives the biggest share of
remittances, some 15.4 percent of the total.477 Guanajuato,
which is also the third biggest sender state, has a well-organ-
ized and extensive program for its migrants. There are 2 mil-
lion residents of Guanajuato descent in the United States—
half Mexican-born, half U.S.-born. The Guanajuato program
began in 1994 at the behest of the PCME. Guanajuato had,
and has, a conservative opposition (PAN) government and had
some differences in perspective with the PRI-run federal gov-
ernment. The state office has the ultimate decision as to
whether to go ahead with a project, and on the whole the rela-
tionship has been cooperative.478 In 1996, Guanajuato estab-
lished a program (Mi Comunidad) to create sources of employ-
ment in the poorest communities through the participation of
hometown associations in the U.S., with the state government
providing technical and legal assistance.479
The state office in Guanajuato, Guanajuato, has grown
from one official in 1994 to a staff of thirty housed in the cen-
tral provincial capital building. The main Guanajuato project is
helping to organize Casas Guanajuato,social clubs composed of
Guanajuato immigrants residing in the U.S., and helping to
keep these clubs in touch with local com munities in
Guanajuato.The office is currently working on a project to cre-
ate a federated club with a central office in Washington, D.C.,
to represent the 2 million Guanajuatenses.The director of the
Guanajuato office cites the Washington lobbying efforts of the
U.S. Cuban community and Israel as precedents.Given decen-
tralizing tendencies in Mexico, we should expect lobbies from
many of the most important states, especially the sender states
such as Gto, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. To the extent that state
programs become a more important component of Mexican
policy, we should expect that policy to become more pluralistic
and less unified.
There are thirty-three Casas Guanajuato in the United
States. They celebrate holidays; provide legal and migratory
counsel, as well as assistance to families abandoned by fathers;
find lost people;combat illness; transfer corpses to Mexico; and
pay funeral expenses. They are supported by Mexican con-
sulates and cultural institutes and centers.480 Casas Guanajuato
are independent clubs. The Guanajuato office helps them
organize, but they elect their own boards of directors. Dallas
has the biggest club, with music classes, a theater group, Tae
Kwan Do classes, English classes, and citizenship courses.The
Casas Guanajuatoorganize partnerships among their members
and others to invest funds collectively in their places of origin.
These include m a q u i l ad o ra s ( f a c t o ri e s ) , w h i ch have been
formed in various villages and often employ the wives of men
working in the U.S.
In Guanajuato as well as several other states, there are pro-
grams that provide matching federal and state funds for those
contributed by immigrants.481 The budget for Guanajuato is
small: $800,000 annually. The state has hired a consultant to
attempt to bring in funds from U.S. foundations and city gov-
ernments.482 The state office produces radio programs that are
sent via cassettes to radio stations around the U.S. to commu-
nicate with and entertain Guanajuatenses. It also produces
videotapes for broadcast on Spanish-language television chan-
nels.The aim is to make “Guanajuatenses feel that they are not
alone.”483 The office publishes a four-color magazine called
Pa’El Norte, which is distributed through the Casasand the cul-
tural institutes.484
The Guanajuato office organizes assistance to families of
migrants in the state.It manages a fund that offers subsidies to
families abandoned by fathers in the U.S. It also offers medical
assistance and help with gove rnment re d - t a p e . T h e
Guanajuato main office has small branch offices in various
parts of the state. In Silao, Guanajuato, an institute for
“Chicano” community leaders has just opened. It is linked to
University of Texas in Dallas. U.S. anthropologists and sociol-
ogists study there.
The PAN-appointed director of the Guanajuato office,
even more than his counterparts at the PCME in Mexico City,
stresses that his program brings benefits to the United States:
“our people become more cultured, polite, educated, know the
rules,avoid drugs and drink,stay out of trouble.They are moti-
vated to work. Their children study better and are better edu-
cated. We wish Mexicans to be better integrated into the U.S.
by not forgetting Mexico.”485 The perspective on the U.S. from
the PAN-run Guanajuato operation is worth noting. Officials
told me that “Mexico has to adjust to the U.S.” The U.S. has
“structures to which Mexico has to adjust by raising productiv-
ity, learning punctuality, improving the quality of its products
to world standards.” One local official spoke of “a different
kind of nationalism, not the nationalism of winning the soccer
match or of the grito (a Mexican Independence Day ritual),
restricted to singular and symbolic events, but a nationalism
that takes pride in workmanship, in the products of our indus-
try.” Such comments illustrate the pluralistic character of
Mexican politics and of Mexican support for their paisanos in
the U.S.
In the light of the “initial partisan objectives”486 attributed
to the PCME, one should have expected conflict between the
PCME and the state offices. As governor of Guanajuato,
Vicente Fox, now the Mexican president, expanded the mi-
grant program and used it to attract U.S. investors to his state
and to open offices in the United States.487 Zacatecas is now
governed by a PRD member whom leaders of the Los Angeles
Zacatecas federation promote as a presidential candidate in
2006. To the extent that Guanajuato and Zacatecas become
opposition bases, fortified by remittances, investments, and
political solidarity from the Mexican diaspora in the U.S., the
PCME will have contributed to the entrenchment of strong
rivals to the PRI. At the very least, the state emigrant-affairs
offices afford a source of financing independent of the federal
government, thus increasing the base for autonomy from the
center.488
The Guerrero-Chicago Program 
In 1998, the government of the state of Guerrero, a dirt poor
southern state, agreed to match with three dollars every dollar
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raised by the Chicago Federation of Guerrero for development
projects.The local community was to propose the projects, and
they were to be carried out in a transparent manner. Under this
accord, projects in 1998-99 were completed in seven commu-
nities, with the state government contributing 6 million pesos
and the communities 2 million ($200,000).
In 2000,the agreement was expanded—raising the levels of
the matching funds and establishing a program for productive
investment in Guerrero of the funds raised by Guerrenses in
Chicago. In addition, a contingency fund of $200,000 was
established, providing medical insurance and for which the
state pays one third of the cost, for families divided between
Chicago and Guerrero. An additional endowment was estab-
lished to pay for the costs of transferring the remains of
Guerrenses who die in Chicago without funds. Guerrense fam-
ilies who are deported will be provided food and travel expens-
es to return from the border to their homes.A public awareness
program will be developed for the communities with the high-
est level of immigration in Guerrero to explain the risks and
rights of immigrants.These programs are designed, according
to the Chicago consulate, not to encourage illegal immigration
but to prevent abuses.489
The PaisanoProgram
While immigrants may be heroes in their local communities
and regarded as a resource by top administrators, they regular-
ly have been subjected to shakedowns and other abuses by cus-
toms and other officials when they return to their homes for
visits. The Salinas administration heeded demands of immi-
grants and established the “Paisano Program” to combat abuses
by government officials.The program sought to coordinate the
action of different Mexican government agencies to provide
accurate information, facilitate administrative procedures, and
receive and respond to complaints from immigrant visitors.490
The consulates, cultural institutes, and hometown associations
distribute Paisano literature, which provides information to
migrants as to their “rights and obligations … as well as facili-
ties and support offered by the Mexican government.”491
The Mexican government has been criticized for applying
a double-standard: It complains that Mexican immigrants are
abused in the United States but permits much worse abuse of
Central American immigrants in Mexico. A hometown associ-
ation leader from Oaxaca, which borders on Guatemala, con-
firmed that Guatemalan immigrants were treated “miserably”
in his state. 492 Los Angeles consulate officials cited a new pro-
g ra m , based on the Pa i s a n o Pro g ra m , w h i ch counsels
Salvadorans and Guatemalans about their rights in Mexico.493
By the mid-1990s,the Paisano Program had made headway
against official abuses. In light of the failure of the Mexican
government to reduce corruption substantially in other areas,
and considering the notorious reputation of the customs
agency, Paisano’s progress must be seen considered a significant
bureaucratic and political accomplishment.494 But HTA leaders
and academic obser vers say that the abuses of immigrants still
occur at intolerable levels.495 Recently, the Mexican Center for
Border Studies and the Promotion of Human Rights charged
that officials of the National Migration Institute were extort-
ing payments from Central Am e ri can migrants tra ve l i n g
through Mexico to the U.S.The Center also accused Migration
Institute officials of taking bribes from “coyotes” who smuggle
migrants over the U.S.-Mexican border.496
Networks of Protection 
(Redes de Proteccion)
The consulate of the Chicago area, which serves nearly 1 mil-
lion Mexican immigrants,has established a very successful pro-
gram that is being imitated in Wisconsin, Iowa, Indiana, and
other midwestern states. Among the regular duties of a con-
sulate is to protect the rights and interests of co-nationals in a
foreign country. The Chicago consulate has developed what it
calls “active protection” in order to provide “preventive protec-
tion.”497 Its chief innovation is “protection networks” to provide
i n f o rm a t i on about immigra n t s ’ rights and obligations on
migratory, labor, penal, and other subjects. The nine Chicago
and midwestern “networks” are organizationally independent
of the consulate. In Chicago, there are 200 network members
who provide information in organizations to which they
belong, such as HTAs, churches, schools, parents’ committees,
and labor unions. They also organize informational meetings
for members of the community. The networks are supported by
lawyers from the area (there are twenty-one supporting attor-
neys in Chicago) as well as community organizations.The nets
also serve as a communication channel for the different sectors
of the Hispanic com mu n i ty.4 9 8 Ne tw o rks have pro d u c e d
leaflets, bulletins, brochures, videotapes, informational cards,
and an information manual.499
The Manual on Matters ofProtection (Manual sobre Asuntos
de Proteccion) is 112 pages long and covers migratory, penal,and
labor questions,domestic violence, nationality and dual nation-
ality, U.S. social security, transferring physical remains, eco-
nomic support for victims of violent crimes, money orders for
remittances, requirements for tourists who bring automobiles
into Mexico, requirements for registering births, notary func-
tions at the consulate, the Mexican social security and medical
program for Mexican families in the U.S., and other subjects
pertinent to U.S. Mexicans. The manual is studied chapter by
chapter by members of the nets.500
In August 1999, the “First Annual Conference of the
Immigrants’ Protective Network in the United States” took
place in Chicago. Controversy arose over how extensive that
network’s work should be. Some members argued that they
should be limited to providing information. Others argued that
they should provide advice on how “legally to influence the dis-
positions sanctioned in the laws which negatively affect immi-
grants.”501 Among the key motions passed in the conference: to
communicate that only “a general amnesty can resolve defini-
tively the problems of the undocumented”; to explain to immi-
grants “the advantages of being unionized”;and to “disseminate
by all possible means that members of the community that are
detained by the authorities have the right to remain silent until
they are permitted the counsel of an attorney or a consular offi-
cial.”502
The networks appears to be an effective method for in-
forming immigrants of their legitimate rights. But the close
relationship with the consulate and the nature of some of the
accords at the conference may raise the question in some minds
about whether the network’s activities or their resolutions con-
stitute intervention in the internal affairs of the United States.
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Private Programs
In 1994, the Salinas administration provided seed money to
found the Mexican and American Solidarity Foundation.
Besides seminars for activists from U.S. Latino organizations,
the foundation sponsors an annual conference to promote
commercial exchange among Hispanic businessmen, and it
o f fers a Te a ching Cert i f i ca t i on in Bilingual-Bicultura l
Education for Mexican teachers. The latter is a three-year
course jointly created by the SEP and California St a t e
University at Long Beach to certify Mexicans now residing in
the U.S. whose teaching credentials are not recognized in the
U.S.503
In what may or may not be a sign of faltering government
support for the activities oriented towards Mexicans in the
U.S., the foundation is underfunded and desperately searching
for money.504
Dual Nationality
In 1996, Mexico amended its constitution (the amendment
was formally published on March 20, 1997) to provide that
Mexican nationality is not lost as a result of obtaining a second
nationality. Though part of the general endeavor to forge clos-
er ties with Mexican communities in the United States, the
amendment was also a specific re s p onse to Californ i a’s
Proposition 187, widely perceived in Mexico as anti-Mexican.
The amendment was designed to increase the political influ-
ence of the Mexican-born in the U.S by removing obstacles to
their becoming citizens and voters. Historically, Mexicans have
had the lowest naturalization rate of any immigrant group in
the U. S. , with the exc e p t i on of Canadians. Prev i o u s ly,
Mexicans who adopted foreign citizenship became foreigners
and thus lost the right to own property or shares in communal
farmlands called ejidos. The amendment allows them to retain
their Mexican passport and to own property. The measure was
strongly opposed by the California Republican Party, which in
a 1995 letter-writing campaign called on the Clinton adminis-
tration to oppose it as an attempt to “influence U.S. internal
affairs in order to advance Mexican national interests.”505
Mexico is not alone in allowing its nationals to retain their
prior citizenship upon naturalizing in the United States. In a
globalized environment an international trend towards dual
citizenship has emerged, aided by the revolution in communi-
cations and by economic interdependence.A strong motivation
has been the avoidance of the heavy estate taxes that the U.S.
government imposes on foreigners working here.In past years,
voting in a foreign election incurred loss of U.S. citizenship, but
while the federal government does not endorse dual citizen-
ship, it increasingly tolerates it even as more countries allow it
and more individuals seek it.
Like major U.S. allies such as Britain, France, and Israel,
many “sender” countries to the U.S. near Mexico—such as
Guatemala, Costa Rica,the Dominican Republic, Jamaica,and
Colombia—now allow naturalized U.S. citizens to retain their
citizenship. So do many other Western Hemisphere countries,
such as Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
Seven of the ten countries from which most immigrants have
come to the U.S. from 1981 to 1996 now have some form of
dual nationalty. India and South Korea do not recognize dual
nationality, but new leaderships in those countries have sup-
ported the idea. Since 1949, the United Kingdom has permit-
ted dual citizenship, as have many of the U.K.’s former
colonies, including Caribbean countries like Antigua, Barba-
dos, Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis, and St. Lucia.
Many of the republics of the former Soviet Union, including
Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and the Ukraine, also permit dual citi-
zenship, as do several European countries with large immigrant
populations, such as Croatia, Greece, Poland, and Turkey. In
total,some seventy nations—including also Italy, South Africa,
and New Zealand—allow their citizens to retain or regain cit-
izenship or nationality after being naturalized in another coun-
try.506
With the exception of Mexico, all of the above-mentioned
countries allow their dual citizens to vote at home. The
Mexican government offers foreign citizens born in Mexico
the possibility of retaining their nationality, though not their
Mexican citizenship. This dual nationality, which does not
include a right to vote in Mexican elections, does allow
Mexican naturalized citizens to buy property in Mexico. Thus,
Mexico sharply distinguishes between nationality and citizen-
ship. The former confers economic rights such as property,
inheritance, and other rights; the latter guarantees political
rights, such as the right to vote and to hold office.507
Mexican-American groups had requested the 1996 consti-
tutional change for some time as a way to raise U.S. citizenship
rates among legal residents, thus increasing the political influ-
ence of Mexican Americans.508 But it was opposition to
California’s Proposition 187 that led the Mexican Congress to
act.The increasing political clout of Mexican Americans would
raise the “stakes of those who would promote anti-Mexican
campaigns.”509 The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations has
stated that the amendment obeys the Mexican government’s
interest in taking preventive measures to strengthen migrants’
security and other interests: “[It] will improv[e] the protection
of their rights where they reside, support … fuller development
of their potential in their host countries, and improv[e] their
voice and their ability to exert greater influence on the deci-
sions that the communities of which they are a part make.”510
As Alexander Aleinikoff points out, “this line of reasoning
parallels that of other states [such as the Dominican Republic]
that have recently permitted their nationals to maintain their
c i t i zenship when naturalizing in the United St a t e s . ”5 1 1
Dominicans argued that the Dominican-born in the U.S. “need
to integrate themselves into the political process of [the U.S.]
It is the only manner of obtaining solutions …and attending to
the matters that harm us.”512 Aleinikoff notes that the claim
that naturalization will aid in the protection of the rights of
U.S. residents “is distinct from the promotion of Mexican (or
Dominican) national interests in the American political sys-
tem.” And he comments further that such motives, rather than
being signs of doubtful loyalty, could be viewed as “emblemat-
ic of precisely the kind of behavior that is generally praised in
U.S. politics: active involvement in interest-group politics.”513
Mexico’s 1996 legislation actually will decrease as well as
increase Mexican dual nationals.Under the old rules,Mexicans
who elected to live in the U.S. without naturalizing conveyed
Mexican nationality automatically to their offspring, who
became dual nationals at birth. They in turn could choose
Mexican nationality when reaching their majority and thereby
transmit it to their offspring. Thus, under the old dispensation
there was the possibility of dual nationality for all subsequent
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generations if the first generation did not naturalize.But under
the new legislation, the children born to Mexican parents in
the U.S. will be dual nationals whether or not their parents nat-
uralize, but theirchildren will not obtain Mexican nationality.514
The new Mexican legislation in effect restricts the possibility
of dual nationality to two generations at the most.
Previously those Mexicans who became U.S. citizens suf-
fered severe sanctions in Mexico: They lost the right to belong
to a union or agrarian cooperative (ejido), hold property, or
assume public office. A sharp breach separated Mexicans and
Mexican Americans. The legislation serves Mexicans in the
U.S. who wish to travel easily to and from Mexico for social
and economic reasons. It will encourage Mexicans who have
acquired economic and political values and skills in the U.S. to
return to Mexico to invest and hold property and to vote and
hold office in Mexico. Thus, while raising the question of
Mexican influence in the U.S. polity, it may in the long run
(especially when taken together with the other processes
unleashed by NAFTA) have the effect of augmenting U.S.
influence in Mexican economic and political life.
In amending their constitution to allow dual nationality,
Mexican legislators sought to strengthen “the material and
symbolic ties” with Mexican communities in the U.S. and “to
facilitate their integration into the societies in which they lived,
in order to reduce discrimination against them.”515 Two Mexi-
can authorities believe that “these two purposes are comple-
mentary not mutually exclusive.516 But U.S. critics consider that
such measures increase the tendency to seek naturalization for
“instrumental” motives.
A re natura l i zed Mexicans availing themselves of the
opportunity to reclaim Mexican nationality? David Hayes-
Bautista of UCLA writes that, of 4 million Latinos in Los
Angeles County, fewer than 4000 have even applied for the
dual status.517
According to the U.S. State Department:
U.S. law does not mention dual nationality or require a person
to choose one citizenship or another. Also, a person granted
another citizenship does not risk losing U.S. citizenship. The
U.S. Government recognizes that dual nationality exists but
does not encourage it as a matter of policy because of the prob-
lems it may cause. Claims of other countries on dual national
U.S. citizens may conflict with U.S. law, and dual nationality
may limit U.S. Government efforts to assist citizens abroad.
The country where a dual national is located generally has a
s t ronger claim to that person’s all e g i a n c e . H ow eve r, d u a l
nationals owe allegiance to both the United States and the for-
eign country.
Though encumbered by bure a u c ratic back l o g s , the U. S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service encourages legal per-
manent residents to naturalize. One difficulty is the policy of
many countries to withdraw citizenship from individuals who
naturalize. Since many countries require citizenship as a condi-
tion for ownership of property, to receive public benefits, to be
employed,and to vote, loss of citizenship can be a hardship and
an obstacle to naturalization.
In that light,dual citizenship can be seen as congruent with
U.S. immigration policies. On the other hand, critics object
that dual citizenship can convert citizenship from a pledge of
undivided loyalty into a convenient contrivance, impairing the
vow to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all alle-
giance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty,” the exclusive commitment embodied in the natu-
ra l i zed citize n’s oath of all e g i a n c e . An official for the
Federation for American Immigration Reform asks, “Is it in
our national interest to have literally millions and millions of
people who have this dual allegiance?”518 Proponents such as
Hofstra University professor Peter Spiro rejoin that a “dual
Mexican-American citizen who advocates policies that benefit
Mexico is little different from a Catholic who advocates poli-
cies endorsed by the Church or a member of Amnesty
International who writes his congressman at the organization’s
behest. Non-state affiliations are an accepted part of our plu-
ralist system.”519 Spiro wants the U.S. to eliminate the renunci-
ation oath.520 Others wish to replace the exclusivity of the oath
with primacy.521 More generally, do affective, sentimental, cul-
tural,or commercial ties with another country impair one’s via-
bility in and loyalty to the U.S. polity?
By offering the example of foreign policy, Spiro raises
another issue: the setting in which dual-nationality policies
operate. Samuel Huntington has argued that 
the end of the Cold War and social, i n t e llectual and demo-
g ra phic changes have brought into question the validity and re l-
evance of tra d i t i onal com p onents of Am e ri can identity. Wi t h-
out a sure sense of national identity, Am e ri cans have becom e
unable to define their national intere s t s , and as a result sub-
n a t i onal com m e rcial interests and tra n s n a t i onal and non n a t i on-
al ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.522
Huntington argues that formerly immigrants and refugees
from Communist countries vigorously opposed the govern-
ments of their home countries and actively supported Cold
War policies. Today immigrants, such as Chinese Americans,
tend to “pressure the United States to adopt favorable policies”
toward their home countries.523
Some argue that dual nationality—along with the tenden-
cy to seek naturalization primarily for instrumental motives,
the lowering of the standards for naturalization, and recent
Supreme Court decisions making citizenship more difficult to
lose—contributes to a cheapening of citizenship.524 As a reme-
d y, T. Alexander Aleinikoff advocates a re n ewal of the
“Americanization” policies promulgated during the last great
wave of immigration (education for citizenship, civic educa-
tion, etc.), such as recommended in the final, 1997, report of
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.525
Absentee Voting Rights
The demand for the right to vote in Mexican elections has
become a major political issue both in Mexico and among U.S.
Mexicans over the past decade or so. Opposition parties, espe-
cially the left-leaning PRD, have embraced this cause. The
issue was broached by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in his 1988 pres-
idential bid and sustained in part by PRD organizers in the
immigrant community.526 The right of emigrants to vote in
presidential elections was included in an eighteen-point agree-
ment on political reform negotiated by the PRI and the oppo-
sition in July 1996.The inclusion of the provision for an absen-
tee ballot legitimized and energized the issue for U. S.
Mexicans. But when it came time to pass legislation imple-
menting the accord, the consensus broke down.527
Nonetheless, the Mexican Congress did remove a constitu-
tional stipulation that Mexicans vote only in their home dis-
trict and commissioned a Federal Election Institute (IFE)
CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
3 9
A
s should be apparent from this description of
Mexican federal and state policies,programs,and
activities,Mexican immigrants are a “primary tar-
get,” in De la Garza’s words. Community organ-
izing efforts are directed at the HTAs, which are
c omposed ove rw h e l m i n g ly of the Mexica n - b o rn . Te a ch e r
exchanges, bilingual programs, and textbook donations con-
centrate on schools with important contingents of immigrant
children. Health programs are similarly aimed at Mexican
immigrants, as are the bulk of the sports programs.The media
programs are also aimed primarily at Mexicans. The Paisano
program benefits Mexicans returning to their homes for visits.
The state programs we have reviewed are aimed over-
whelmingly at U.S. Mexicans; Mexican Americans are reached
mainly by the cultural and business programs and by the grant-
ing of awards. Jose Luis Bernal, the Mexican consul in Los
Angeles, with far and away Mexico’s largest consulate in the
United States, estimated that the consulate spent 70-75 per-
cent of its time on routine bureaucratic processes (visas, pass-
ports, identity papers, and the like), 10-15 percent on activities
relating to the HTAs,and no more than 5 percent on Mexican-
American organizations.532 But it must be added that the
Mexican embassy in Washington has an Office of Hispanic
Affairs that deals primarily with Mexican-American and other
Latino organizations.
If U.S. Mexicans are the primary constituency of the
Mexican government’s acercamiento, Mexican Americans may
turn out to be more important in the long run. That results
from the elementary demographic and political logic discussed
above (see page 30).
What is the connection between these two constituencies?
C a rlos Gon za l ez Gu t i e r r rez , who directs the Mexica n
Embassy’s Office on Hispanic Affairs,says,first,that efforts on
behalf of immigrants lends the government legitimacy in the
eyes of Hispanic-Am e ri can groups such as the Na t i on a l
Council of La Raza, MALDEF, and LULAC. “Our legitima-
cy lies in our work with the most needy of the diaspora.”533
Secondly, Gonzalez draws the obvious conclusion from current
demographic and political trends: The political salience of
Mexican Americans is bound to increase in coming years.534 So
accordingly will their “capacity to intervene and impose their
own terms in issues relating to Mexico,” as Gonzalez Gutierrez
writes in a book commissioned by Mexico’s Foreign Minister,
with Gutierrez’s chapter on “the future of Mexicans abroad in
the foreign policy of Mexico.”535
Rodulofo De la Garza believes Mexico has shown little
s u b s t a n t i ve interest in Mexican Am e ri cans and that the
Mexican government uses the PCME “to maintain relations
with emigrants so that remittances and other forms of direct
financial investment in their pueblos will continue.” 536 What is
indubitably clear is that immigrant political and economic
influence in Mexico has increased significantly during the
decade of the PCME’s existence. It is hard to avoid De la
Garza’s conclusion that that the PCME’s mission, at least for
the moment, has “much more relevance for domestic issues
than for Mexico-U.S. relations.”537 Yet Gonzalez Gutierrez’s
comments suggest that the two purposes, domestic and for-
eign, are not mutually exclusive. The PCME was founded by
an administration convinced that Mexico’s future lay in its inte-
gration in a free-trade area dominated by the United States.
For motives that went beyond lobbying on behalf of NAFTA,
the administration saw improving relations with Mexican
CHAPTER SEVEN
C on cl u s i ons and 
Po l i cy Implica t i on s
report on the conditions for an absentee vote.528 The report
estimated that 83 percent of U.S. Mexicans wanted the vote,
but also found that many felt they could not afford the time to
register or cast ballots. The report outlined several modes by
which Mexicans could cast ballots in the United States, most
involving setting up polls in consulates, churches, Mexican-
owned businesses, and homes. Though the report concluded
the exercise to be “viable,” U.S. academic observers feared that
a typically raucous Mexican political campaign in the United
States could provoke a backlash.529 Mexican-American activists
also feared that the exercise would undermine efforts of U.S.
Latino organizations to naturalize and register Mexicans to
vote in the United States.530
The issue was tabled for the present when the PRI-con-
trolled Senate suspended discussion of political reform in July
1999. Thus, nationals living in the U.S. did not vote in the
country’s July 2000 presidential election. But given the rising
influence of Mexican emigrants, the issue is sure to be revisit-
ed in coming years.Cardenas of the PRD made it a major issue
in his 2000 presidential bid.531
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Americans as a worthy goal. But the PCME was also founded
in the midst of an unprecedented migration of Mexicans to the
United St a t e s — one that demanded the attention of the
Mexican government and increasingly affected domestic eco-
nomics and politics.
Mexico’s policies toward her diaspora should not be con-
fused with those of countries with geopolitical ambitions (the
M e x i cans com p a re themselves with Po rtugal or the
Philippines). To its north, Mexico has no geopolitical goal
beyond self-defense; it is not seeking “living space” abroad nor
is it attempting to weaken a global rival. Even if it had such
ambitions, Mexico’s political class is not sufficiently united to
pursue them. Mexico’s international policy is basically reactive
to global economic forces and to internal pressures.Its political
class is concerned mainly with internal economic development,
with the problematic transition to democracy, and with its
affluent northern neighbor. A difficult history—marked, of
course, by the U.S. annexation of half of Mexico in the nine-
teenth century as well as by an intervention on behalf of the
U.S. government during the revolutionary war of the early
twentieth century—plus decades of regime ideology, as well as
economic and geopolitical realities, have accustomed Mexican
leaders to seeing themselves as past and potential casualties.
Mexican political leaders remain highly sensitive to what they
consider interference in their internal affairs, and their eco-
nomic and political problems constrain foreign policy activism
and still more any policy of surreptitious subversion within the
United States.
Peter Brimelow believes that the “the Mexican elite” is pur-
suing a “geopolitical strategy” on behalf of “irrendentism” and
“a Hispanic-dominated political unit to be carved out of the
Southwest.”538 Such a view misconceives not only Mexican pol-
icy but also the mentality of the Mexican Americans. As Peter
Skerry writes, “by the late 1980s, even the most extreme ele-
ments among Mexican Americans had abandoned” separatist
aspirations roused by the turmoil of the early seventies.539 The
Latino National Political Survey found that 83.8 percent of
U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans felt “extremely strong”
or “very strong” “love for the United States” (14.1 percent said
their love was “somewhat strong” and only 2.1 percent said it
was “not very strong”; 90.8 percent were “extremely” or “very”
proud of the United States540) (see Figures 2, 3). Brimelow also
ove rl o oks the Mexican diaspora’s deep suspicion of the
Mexican government.The same survey found that 85.1 percent
of U. S. M e x i cans and Mexican Am e ri cans con s i d e re d
“Mexican corruption” rather than U.S. policy to be the cause of
Mexico’s problems541 (Figure 4). It is important to recognize
that “many Mexican Americans have looked to their mother
country for emotional and cultural solace while at the same
time harboring great animosity toward the Mexican state that
failed them.”542
Brimelow also makes two mistaken assumptions about “the
Mexican elite.”The first is that it is unified around a “strategy.”
Not since the Mexican Revolution has the Mexican leadership
class been so divided. The divisions between the PRI and the
opposition over the issue of absentee voting suggest that there
is more than one Mexican strategy vis-a-vis U.S. Mexicans.
Second, the hostility of Mexican elites towards the U.S. is
mainly a thing of the past or of present rhetorical posturing by
c e rtain vested intere s t s . President Ze d i ll o, together with
Vicente Fox and Francisco Labastida, the leading Mexican
2000 presidential candidates, support the broadening relations
between the two countries—as do, for that matter, the leading
U.S. presidential candidates, and President Clinton.
The same is true of the Mexican business elites.The most
dynamic sectors of the Mexican economy, such as those that
produce high-tech electronic components, are linked to the
U.S. market and U.S. capital. Over the past several years,
Mexico’s maquiladora industry has moved from the border into
the interior of Mexico. No longer merely assembling low-tech
goods, it is now producing on contract with the most advanced
sectors of the U.S. information industry.543
Not only do Mexican business leaders see their future in
the U.S., but its political class has been moving, haltingly,
toward democracy. The PRI took a major step in the direction
of internal party democracy by holding a national presidential
primary last November. July’s 2000 elections were closely con-
tested and brought the first opposition president to power. A
new technocratic elite has emerged in Mexico that is pragmat-
ic and not generally disposed to anti-American rhetoric. The
general population is less susceptible to such gambits, in part
because so many Mexican families now have relatives in the
United States.
This is not to suggest that Mexico is traveling on an
expressway to liberal democracy and market capitalism, nor
that everyone there is deaf to anti-American invocations.
Problems abound, one of them well known: Mexico’s emer-
gence as a major transit point for illegal drugs and a home for
powerful drug cartels. Less well publicized are the crime waves
in Mexico’s two principal cities. Moreover, the weakening of
the ruling party has been associated with centrifugal regional
tendencies and with the emergence of a major guerilla move-
ment and two terrorist organizations.544 And there may indeed
be those in the Mexican government who would promote an
ethnic lobby by supporting the bilingual education bureaucra-
cy and multiculturalist radicals in the United States. But the
United States appears to have more to fear from a weak and
divided Mexico than from one whose “geopolitical” agenda will
encourage a discordant Mexican diaspora.
Is Mexico therefore above promoting an ethnic lobby
should circumstances warrant it? No, and U.S. officials should
be willing to raise with Mexico any instances where her offi-
cials cross the line from support for “the Mexican nation” to
i n t e rfe rence in U.S political affairs. But Mexico’s leaders
believe their future lies in adapting to the U.S., not subverting
it. Many Mexican leaders would probably wish a Mexico-ori-
ented ethnic lobby, were it feasible, but not at the price of alien-
ating Washington.In any event,such a coalition appears out of
reach for the foreseeable future, because of the divergence of
interests and the widespread distrust of the PRI.
In the last analysis, the impact on Mexicoof Mexican com-
munities in the United States may be the more powerful one. I
have mentioned the economic and political repercussions of
U.S. Mexicans on Mexican rural communities. It is just as like-
ly, perhaps more so, that their descendants will favor reforms in
Mexico. As U.S. Poles, Cubans, Filipinos, Haitians, African
Am e ri ca n s , and Jew s , a m ong others, h a ve demon s t ra t e d ,
American ethnic groups tend to press their countries of origin
for human rights and for the very democratic and market-ori-
ented institutions to which they feel indebted in the United
States.545 Though to date the major Mexican-American organ-
izations have not played a conspicuous role in Mexico’s drive
for market reforms and democracy, that day may come.Already
the President of MALDEF, Antonia Hernandez, sits on the
board of the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and
actively supports programs that assist Mexican election moni-
toring, anticorruption initiatives,and other democratic groups.
Yossi Shain writes that
if elements in countries dependent on diasporic voices inside
the United States wish to mobilize their diasporas, they must
heed their diasporas’ Americanness, including their allegiance
to “American values”such as democracy and human rights;they
must incorporate diasporic perspectives in a redefinition of the
homeland. To a large extent,U.S. diasporas have emerged as the
true marketers of the American creed.546
The Mexican government may find that its efforts to pro-
mote cultural ties among Mexican communities in the United
States result in bolstering democratic and market reformers at
home. With such an outcome, which would be welcomed by
many in the government, Mexicans would be living en carne
propria a central aspect of the American polity—the relative
autonomy of culture from politics.The United States is a civic,
not an ethnic, nation. The American “civic culture”—the term
is Gabriel Almon d’s but we could also borrow Gu n n a r
Myrdal’s term: “the American creed”—honors freedom of
speech and association and the separation of church and state,
but has from the outset, in Lawrence Fuchs’s words, “facilitat-
ed and protected the expression of ancestral cultural values and
sensibilities.”547 In so doing, the United States forged a system
of voluntary adhesion in which ethnic groups mobilized their
economic and political interests and fostered a vast array of vol-
untary organizations and interest groups. Fuchs and Yossi
Shain think Mexican Americans are following this path. As
they do so, Peter Skerry finds that “Mexican Americans are
ambivalent, poised between defining themselves as an ethnic
group [traditional ethnic immigrants] and as a minority group
[victims of racial discrimination].” 548
That is one sort of ambivalence. Another quite different
variety, to which I have already alluded,is expressed in an adage
associated with the heyday of LULAC, the oldest Mexican-
American organization: “Mexican in culture and social activity,
but American in philosophy and politics.”549 Shain suggests a
corollary: “Mexican-American elites realize that they can wear
two hats without compromising their ancestral ties or their
American identity, a reality that Mexico itself, in a departure
from its historic inclination, has begun to recognize and now
interprets as a positive development.”550
Whether these realities prove a positive development for
the U.S. may depend less on Mexican policy than on that of the
United States. An ethos of integration and incorporation char-
acterized government and business programs, public schools,
and the progressive political movement throughout the “first
great wave,” a situation that stands in dramatic contrast to the
second great wave, which began in 1967.Since the 1960s,these
same institutions and movements have been broadly character-
ized by an opposition to “assimilation” and sponsorship of mul-
ticulturalism and minority-based preferences.In contrast to the
Progressives of the earlier period, the current ethos “denies that
there can be a unitary American identity based upon common
assent to universalist pri n c i p l e s , an identity that makes
Americans one people despite differences of ethnic deriva-
tion.”551
Mexico’s courting of Mexican communities in the United
States can be seen as part of a larger acercamientoof the entire
countries. NAFTA, increased trade, investment and migration,
the multiplication of nongovernment liaisons, the diversifica-
tion of links between localities, and closer and more institu-
tionalized bilateral relations all have converged to create a
unique era in Mexico-U.S. relations and a novel, multifaceted
relationship between Mexico and the United States. In this
new setting, Mexico and the United States have differences
and common interests respecting Mexican communities in the
United States.
Regarding immigration, for instance, their differences con-
cern, on the one hand, Mexico’s labor surplus and its political
need for an emigration “safety valve”—which leads Mexico to
permit uncontrolled migration—and, on the other, the U.S.’s
sporadic desire to control its border. Recently there has been
considerable movement on the immigration issue in the United
States.The AFL-CIO has broken with much of its restriction-
ist tradition and come out in support of a new amnesty for ille-
gal immigrants. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
has advocated letting more foreign workers into the United
States to ease labor-market constriction.On the Mexican side,
as already discussed, the effect of NAFTA, a stable economy,
and lower rural unemployment may ease pressures to emigrate.
The two countries should consider a binational accord that
would regulate immigration. In return for a new amnesty of
illegal aliens, most of whom are Mexican, Mexico could coop-
erate with U.S. immigration authorities in stemming the tide of
illegal immigrants.
Citizenship promotion could be an additional component
of the binational accord. Both Mexico and the United States
have an interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming U.S. citizens. As
Mexico’s ambassador to the United States stated in March of
this year, “most immigrants and their descendants want to
become an integral part of the United States.” They have a
“natural desire to be good citizens of this country,” one that is
“perfectly compatible” with cultivating “their roots and ties
with Mexico.”552 The Mexican government believes that U.S.
Mexicans, by becoming U.S. citizens, increase the ranks of
Americans less likely to be hostile to Mexico. The U.S. also has
an interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming citizens because that
furthers their social and political integration into U.S. society.
HTAs are one vehicle for citizenship promotion. Several
clubs, as we have noted, have citizenship programs. Mexican
consulates are in touch with many HTAs and are thus in a
position to encourage such initiatives. On the U.S. side, fund-
ing for citizenship instruction—through HTAs, community
colleges,night schools,or some other vehicle—would be a wise
way to profit from the acercamientoof Mexico with its nation-
als in the U.S. Promoting the integration into U.S. life of the
long wave of immigration from Mexico is,with its unique chal-
lenges, the maiden task of the American twenty-first century.
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A b b rev i a t i on s
CIME International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad
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APPENDIX B
Ta b l e s
TABLE 1
Resident Hispanic-Origin Population in the U.S.
YEAR RESIDENT HISPANIC TOTAL U.S. RESIDENTS PERCENTAGE
1980 14,609,000 226,542,199 6.45
1981 15,560,000 229,466,000 6.78
1982 16,240,000 229,664,000 7.07
1983 16,935,000 233,792,000 7.24
1984 17,640,000 235,825,000 7.48
1985 18,368,000 237,924,000 7.72
1986 19,154,000 240,133,000 7.98
1987 19,946,000 242,289,000 8.23
1988 20,786,000 244,499,000 8.50
1989 21,648,000 246,819,000 8.77
1990 22,372,000 248,765,000 8.99
1991 23,384,000 252,127,000 9.27
1992 24,275,000 254,995,000 9.52
1993 25,214,000 257,746,000 9.78
1994 26,152,000 260,289,000 10.05
1995 27,099,000 262,765,000 10.31
1996 28,092,000 265,190,000 10.59
1997 29,160,000 267,744,000 10.89
1998 30,250,000 270,299,000 11.19
1999 30,461,000 272,330,000 11.19
2000 31,366,000 274,634,000 11.42
2005 36,057,000 285,981,000 12.61
2010 41,139,000 297,716,000 13.82
2015 46,705,000 310,134,000 15.06
2020 52,656,000 322,742,000 16.32
2050 96,508,000 393,931,000 24.50
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book 119th Edition. Issued October 1999. Washington, D.C.
Tables No. 12, 18, and 19.
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TABLE 2
Population of Hispanic and Mexican
Origin in 1990
NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Total Hispanic Origin 22,354,000 100.00
Mexican 13,496,000 60.37
Puerto Rican 2,728,000 12.20
Cuban 1,044,000 4.67
Other Hispanic 5,086,000 22.75
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
The National Data Book 119th Edition. Issued October 1999,
Washington, D.C. Table 32.
TABLE 3
Population of Hispanic and Mexican
Origin in 1998
NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Total Hispanic Origin 30,773,000 100.00
Mexican 19,834,000 64.45
Puerto Rican 3,117,000 10.13
Cuban 1,307,000 4.25
Central-South American 4,437,000 14.42
Other Hispanic 2,079,000 6.76
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
The National Data Book 119th Edition. Issued October 1999,
Washington, D.C. Table 55.
TABLE 4
Total Mexican-Born Population
YEAR NUMBER IN THOUSANDS
1990 103,000 103
1910 222,000 222
1920 486,000 486
1930 617,000 617
1940 377,000 377
1950 454,000 454
1960 576,000 576
1970 759,000 759
1980 2,199,000 2,199
1990 4,298,000 4,298
1998 7,017,000 7,017
Sources: Mexico-United States Binational Migration Study. Migration
between Mexico and the United States. Morgan Printing. Austin, Texas.
1998 Volume 1. Table 3. “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign Born
Population of the U.S.: 1850s to 1990,” Population Division Working
Paper. Table 3.
TABLE 5
Total Mexican-Origin Population in the
United States
(Calculated as sum of Mexican-born population and natives of Mexican parentage.)
YEAR NUMBER IN THOUSANDS
1910 385,000 385
1920 740,000 740
1930 1,423,000 1,423
1940 1,077,000 1,077
1950 1,346,000 1,346
1960 1,736,000 1,736
1970 4,532,000 4,532
1980 8,740,000 8,740
1990 13,393,000 13,393
1996 18,039,000 18,039
2000 19,259,000 19,259
2010 25,876,000 25,876
2020 33,908,000 33,908
2030 43,211,000 43,211
2040 54,031,000 54,031
Source:Mexico-United States Binational Migration Study. Migration
between Mexico and the United States. Morgan Printing. Austin, Texas.
1998 Volume 1. Tables 2 and 6.
TABLE 6
Mexican Legal Immigration to the U.S.:
1990-1998
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER
1990 679,068 1995 89,932
1991 946,167 1996 163,572
1992 213,802 1997 146,865
1993 126,561 1998 131,575
1994 111,398
Sources: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997. U.S.
Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1999. Table 3. U.S. Department of
Justice, INS, Office of Policy and Planning, Statistics Branch. Annual
Report Fiscal Year 1998. Number 2, May 1999. Table 2.
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STATE NUMBER
Total 163,572
Alabama 162
Alaska 111
Arizona 5,051
Arkansas 446
California 64,238
Colorado 3,138
Connecticut 207
Delaware 130
District of Columbia 40
Florida 3,155
Georgia 1,399
Hawaii 70
Idaho 839
Illinois 11,715
Indiana 877
Iowa 620
Kansas 1,470
Kentucky 98
Louisiana 178
Maine 14
Maryland 319
Massachusetts 141
Michigan 828
Minnesota 496
Mississippi 61
Missouri 451
Montana 15
STATE NUMBER
Nebraska 893
Nevada 2,263
New Hampshire 40
New Jersey 1,125
New Mexico 4,254
New York 1,553
North Carolina 661
North Dakota 16
Ohio 320
Oklahoma 931
Oregon 1,942
Pennsylvania 692
Rhode Island 49
South Carolina 148
South Dakota 15
Tennessee 261
Texas 46,403
Utah 1,036
Vermont 19
Virginia 531
Washington 3,482
West Virginia 18
Wisconsin 474
Wyoming 94
TABLE 8
Mexican Immigrants Admitted, by State, in 1996
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book 119th Edition. Issued October 1999. Washington, D.C. Table 11.
TABLE 7
Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population for Top Twenty Countries of Origin, 1996
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN POPULATION RESIDENCE POPULATION
All countries 5,000,000 All states 5,000,000
1. Mexico 2,700,000 1. California 2,000,000
2. El Salvador 335,000 2. Texas 700,000
3. Guatemala 165,000 3. New York 540,000
4. Canada 120,000 4. Florida 350,000
5. Haiti 105,000 5. Illinois 290,000
6. Philippines 95,000 6. New Jersey 135,000
7. Honduras 90,000 7. Arizona 115,000
8. Poland 70,000 8. Massachusetts 85,000
9. Nicaragua 70,000 9. Virginia 55,000
10. Bahamas 70,000 10. Washington 52,000
11. Colombia 65,000 11. Colorado 45,000
12. Ecuador 55,000 12. Maryland 44,000
13. Dominican Republic 50,000 13. Michigan 37,000
14. Trinidad & Tobago 50,000 14. Pennsylvania 37,000
15. Jamaica 50,000 15. New Mexico 37,000
16. Pakistan 41,000 16. Oregon 33,000
17. India 33,000 17. Georgia 32,000
18. Dominica 32,000 18. Colombia 30,000
19. Peru 30,000 19. Connecticut 29,000
20. Korea 30,000 20. Nevada 24,000
Other 744,000 Other 330,000
Source: Illegal Alien Resident Population Report, INS. Table 1. Found at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm#Table1
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TABLE 9
U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2050
RACE HISPANIC ORIGIN NUMBER PERCENT
(IN THOUSANDS)
White 207,901 52%
Black 53,555 14%
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut 3,534 1%
Asian, Pacific Islander 32,432 8%
Total Hispanic 96,508 24%
Mexican 62,200
Puerto Rican 9,775
Cuban 4,099
Central-South American 13,915
Other Hispanic 6,520
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book 119th Edition. Issued October 1999. Washington, D.C.
Tables 12 and 19.
Note: The “Hispanic Origin” estimates assume that its composition remains the same.
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FIGURE 1
Mexican Legal Immigration to the U.S.: 1901-1990
Source: Mexico-United States Binational Migration Study. Migration between M xico and the United States. Morgan Printing. Austin, Texas. 1998.
Volume 1. Table 4.
U.S. Department of Justice. INS, Office of Policy and Planning, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1998. Table 2
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